

Spaces of Struggle

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Spaces of Struggle

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Spaces of Struggle

Andre Comandon
Nicole Lambrou

This issue came together at a time when the global resurgence of far-right political movements required us to define and assert what radical planning does. From its roots as a project that aims to reverse the legacy of authoritarian and exclusionary practices, radical planning devises strategies to prevent the incursion of newer forms of dismissal and erasure. The spaces where that resistance takes place are Spaces of Struggle.

In 2016 a number of graduate students organized a mini-conference dedicated to the theme Spaces of Struggle, in turn inspiring this Critical Planning Journal issue. The Spaces of Struggle collective is particularly well-positioned as it is engaged in both the planning discipline as well as the broader field of geography through its relation to the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning and the American Association of Geographers. The mini-conference aimed to challenge how we perceive planning as a field and practice, and to re-invigorate discussions about what it means to engage in radical planning.

The conferences (now having three iterations) has spanned many themes that forge new paths for engaging both planning theory and practices in the North American context and globally. Importantly, participants never lost sight of the balance between the emergency of trends such

as displacement and homelessness, xenophobia, and racialized disinvestment, and fundamental questions surrounding pedagogy, colonialism, and capitalism. The themes that emerged from this event testify to the diversity of approaches that planners draw from and to the political and ethical decisions involved in what research to center, whose voice and perspective to pay attention to, and towards what goals. It is the goal of this issue to capture that diversity and to wrestle with the implications of these decisions.

These debates parallel intellectual movements that are reshaping urban studies. Debates have grappled with the nature of cities and comparison (Weinstein, 2016) and, more broadly, the nature of radical urban research (e.g. Brenner, 2018). The response to these debates illustrates an important role initiatives like Spaces of Struggle must fulfill. Well-established senior scholars dominate the intellectual space of radical planning and geography. Natalie Oswin's (2018) response emphasizes the systematic erasure that happens as a result of these practices.

Spaces of Struggle is not free of internal division (what collective is?), but provides an essential space for debate among emerging scholars and more established scholars. We hope this volume contributes to a continuing debate that will strengthen

radical political projects. This volume centralizes debates and research agendas from young scholars that are formulating ways to engage with radical planning as a research tool. We feature student-led efforts to define a space for engaged research that confronts mainstream ideas about the environment and climate change, market-driven urban development, and the systematic marginalization of historically oppressed groups.

The first part of the volume focuses on the contribution of participants in the Spaces of Struggle mini-conference. The organizers of the 2017 conference provide an introduction to the Spaces of Struggle project and an overview of what it has achieved so far. They invite us to engage with some of the pressing questions that will open up the field of radical planning and ensure that the next generation of scholars knows there is a space for them to share their ideas, a mission the journal shares and prompts this collaboration. Four articles issued from past presentations follow. These articles focus on strategies to protect community assets and spaces. Cultural, economic, and political displacement, and how to resist assaults on marginalized spaces, are at the center of each argument.

Claudio Sarmiento-Casas identified the disconnect that exists between visions of mobility that a privileged class of Mexico City residents is pushing for, one that excludes the prevalent modes of transportation and emphasizes walking and public transit. The essay illustrates how propositions that neglect existing practices further marginalize the working class and those that are perceived to be informal, and therefore unruly, despite the purported common goals that prevalent and

alternative practices claim to have. Sarah Gelbard contributes a provocative reflection on the process of developing a research program and methodology as a doctoral student. Her project, which links what she calls the 'non-public' and theories and methodologies that are regularly challenged, if not excluded from mainstream academia, advocates for the potential of embracing a messy methodology that does not sit easily with accepted formal and positivist approaches.

Both Leanne Serbulo and Kuni Kamizaki write about the strategies to anchor communities in places that are under intense gentrification pressures. Serbulo focuses on a case in North Portland where the transition from public school under threat of closure to charter school was harnessed to ensure not only the long term inclusion of students from the community but also support for their success. Kamizaki highlights the potential of community land trusts to protect residents against displacement while shedding light on the possibilities of alternative economic models.

The second part presents emerging scholarship on different scales of struggle in space. Domitille Hamand's contribution makes use of Lefebvre's idea of differential space to analyze the ways in which daily experiences contest an exclusionary city in London's Regent's Canal. Rebecca Crane and Skye Allmang discuss what politically-engaged research in support of, and in collaboration with, communities entails. They focus on a day-long conference at the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs comprised of researchers and graduate students who gathered to discuss and reflect on the role of students in the university and on establishing relationships

between researchers and community-based efforts.

Citing the deaths of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, and Freddie Gray, Mimi Cheng examines the ways in which concrete infrastructure becomes the material basis for racial violence but also a tool for bodies in protest. Amelyn Ng similarly focuses on systemic exclusionary practices in material space by foregrounding housing-as-capital, and discussing the implications of such financialization on architecture, planning, and political economy.

Neoliberal processes remain a source of intense contestation and scholarly focus. Two of the articles provide analyses of how these processes unfold tangibly, in how infrastructure is expanded or redeveloped, and institutionally, in how laws are interpreted and enforced. Sandy Mackay analyzes the inability of existing planning tools to contest naturalized, or third-wave, neoliberalism by investigating planning efforts undertaken in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. Innocent Chirisa, Aurthur Chivambe, Liaison Mukarwi, and Abraham R. Matamand document the post-colonial period of Harare, Zimbabwe, and argue that white elitism has been replaced by statist domination, unable and unwilling to realize the promise of a post-racial city. In their overview of the post-colonial evolution of the sanitation infrastructure, they show how the legacy of colonial investment and systems of oppression can create a path dependence that is difficult to deviate from.

Vojislava Cordes exposes the injustices the current United States immigration systems visits on urban communities through an ethnographic study of an activist group in New York. Cordes weaves a trenchant

critique of the sanctuary city discourse through the empirical narrative and emphasizes the need to reconceptualize how we conceptualize who belongs in the city to value the political struggles refugees and undocumented people. Shivani Shedde's book review of Svati Pragna Shah's *Street Corner Secrets* highlights a different kind of struggle for belonging in urban spaces. The book focuses on the place of sex workers in the economy of Mumbai, India and Shedde provides an insightful reading of the use of spaces as embodying power relationships.

Hans Sagan's article aptly concludes this volume's engagement with spaces of struggle. He discusses the policing of space and how the state participates in the creation of oppressive urbanism through the appropriation of urban design and public space regulation. He rightly reminds us of the importance of public spaces as sources of tension that need to retain a balance if they are to perform their role as a conduit for participation.

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Spaces of Struggle Part I

This section includes an introductory essay by the 2017 Spaces of Struggle mini-conference in Denver, followed by three essays presented by 2016 conference participants Claudio Sarmiento-Casas, Kuni Kamizaki, and Leanne Serbulo.

FURA
ESPECULADORS
WE'RE BEING
FORCED TO
LEAVE OUR
HOMES

ENS FAN FORA
DE CASA BARRICIDI
DELINQUÈNCIA
IMMOBILIÀRIA

Barcelona, 2018
Photo courtesy of Adi Kuneva

Spaces of Struggle

Bri Gauger, Sarah Gelbard, Carla Maria Kayanan, Julie Mah,
Steve Sherman, Raksha Vasudevan

Cities are built on inequitable and unsustainable policies – the result of capitalist, patriarchal, and colonial planning values and power relations literally and figuratively cast in concrete. Radical scholars and planners continue to expose a troubled history of the complicity of planning in perpetuating spatialized inequity and injustice. Spaces of Struggle addresses both theoretical and practical aspects of an invigorated radical planning agenda, posing critical questions in pursuit of better ways forward. This essay, written from the perspective of the 2017 Spaces of Struggle mini-conference organizers, reflects on our efforts thus far and seeks to broaden the conversation about what radical planning efforts can accomplish.

Spaces of Struggle began in Portland, Oregon in 2016. In conjunction with local scholars from Portland State University, Michael Roman John (RJ) Koscielniak organized a mini-conference on the state of radical planning directly preceding the annual Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP) conference. Paper presentations addressed the following themes: Gentrification, Segregation, and Resistance; What Makes (Radical) Planning?; Insurgent Planning in Latin American Contexts; Pedagogy and Urban Rights; and Informality and Urban Rights. (This issue of Critical Planning Journal includes papers that were presented by 2016 conference participants Claudio Sarmiento-Casas, Kuni Kamizaki, and Leanne Serbullo.) Faranak Miraftab's keynote highlighted the imperative of decolonizing future imaginaries if we are to realize more humane urbanisms.

Written by the SoS 2017 Denver mini-conference organizing committee (in alphabetical order): Bri Gauger, Sarah Gelbard, Carla Maria Kayanan, Julie Mah, Steve Sherman, Raksha Vasudevan

Inspired by what we witnessed in Portland, we decided to organize a second mini-conference directly preceding the 2017 ACSP in Denver, Colorado. When crafting the call for proposals, we encouraged ambiguity and debate, instead of assuming we could agree on a definition of radical planning. The overwhelming amount of responses indicated a strong need for a space dedicated to a variety of marginalized planning issues and perspectives. The resulting sessions addressed multiple planning struggles through specific case studies, individual experiences, and theory. Roundtables included:

- Denver Displacement: Radical Research Confronting Local Gentrification and Homelessness
- Migrations, Multiculturalism, and Race
- Dismantling the Urban Decline Machine
- Planning, Money, Power: Intersections with the State, Developers, and the Public
- Sites of Anti-Colonial Struggle: Confronting Planning Paradigms and Hegemony
- Posters, Paint, and Paletas: Aesthetic Manipulations and the Future of the City
- Hope and Struggle: Jackie Leavitt & the Fight for Radical Planning.

A brown bag lunch discussion gave attendees the opportunity to reflect upon radical planning and to brainstorm paths forward for Spaces of Struggle.

The excitement generated from the 2017 mini-conference convinced Sarah and Carla to bring Spaces of Struggle to the 2018 American Association of Geographers (AAG) Annual Meeting in New Orleans. This was an opportunity to expand Spaces of Struggle into the domain of geography, by way of a national conference that attracts planners of wide-ranging disciplinary backgrounds, including geography, anthropology, and sociology. Four independently organized sessions were gathered under the Spaces of Struggle banner: Dismantling the Urban Decline Machine; Feminist Legacies and New Frameworks in Planning; Geography of Urban Planning Failures; and Settler-Colonial Governance & the Ordering of Indigenous Lands. The full-day program concluded with a panel with four of the session organizers (Sarah Gelbard, RJ Koscielniak, John Laueremann, and Libby Porter) and two guest panelists (Anna Livia Brand and AbdouMaliq Simone) to collectively think through theoretical and practical positions of the planning profession. Extending Spaces of Struggle to the AAG reflects our commitment to cross-disciplinary exchanges to capture and amplify the silent struggles occurring in disciplines adjacent to and beyond planning.

Spaces of Struggle is an emerging movement that builds upon a strong tradition of radical planners before us. Between 1964 and 1975, a group of American activist scholars and planners called Planners for Equal Opportunity (PEO) fostered debate around what it means to build a radical

planning project, and forcing the mainstream planning community to address issues of racism and inequality. PEO's conference proceedings and public statements echo many of the conversations we have participated in over the last few years, such as: Is the purpose of developing a group to provide a medium for the exchange of experience and knowledge? Is it to develop a platform for a set of agreed-upon issues? Is it to reform planning education? Is it to expose inequalities?

Our answers are not singular nor conclusive. Defining the scope of such a project must be both an inward and an outward looking process. Looking outward with the goal of exposing blind spots that planning scholarship negates, presentations at each of the three mini-conferences (Portland 2016, Denver 2017, and New Orleans 2018) sought new conceptual frames to understand entrenched capitalist logics and hegemonic structures within planning practice. Inwardly, Spaces of Struggle interlocutors recognize that planning requires reflective dialogue about the past while simultaneously looking forward to collectively negotiating new agendas. As a profession with power to shape and control space, planning cannot sustain anti-intellectualism that prioritizes pragmatism and efficiency over ethics and epistemology. Meaningful resistance to accepted practices of urban development demands that we radically rethink multiple embedded injustices and acknowledge the complicity of planning.

We imagine Spaces of Struggle as a site for those who believe radical practice and scholarship are crucial to challenging mainstream systems and practices. As we reflect upon the work of the first three mini-conferences and the conversations that have followed, we invite you to consider the same questions we posed to panelists in New Orleans:

- What are threats and obstacles to the planning profession? How is planning undermined in both productive and destructive ways?
- What are the greatest opportunities for the planning profession (its key strengths and realms of impact) to help bring about meaningful change?
- What is the role of the planner positioned between public and private interests?
- How are we failing the next generation of planners? How can we equip them to rethink inequities and push against the unsustainability of planning?
- How can we negotiate intersecting claims to knowledge and expertise?
- How can we displace entrenched planning logics and structures that control space?
- What potential alliances exist among groups with multiple marginalizations? How can these alliances disrupt planning paradigms that reproduce inequitable power structures?

You can find more information on the Spaces of Struggle conferences and group at: <https://radicalplanning.wordpress.com>

Street Lucha: Two Approaches to Streetscape Reclamation in Mexico City

Claudio A. Sarmiento-Casas

The resurgence of walking and cycling as transportation alternatives emerged with policymakers' postmodern vision of sustainability. Stemming from environmental concerns, spurred by the counter-culture movements, and brought to urgency by the Global Cities discourse, the bicycle and the pedestrian have been forged as political symbols for the opposition to the automobile-centric model of modern city planning (Walks, 2015). This "radical" stance has travelled to contexts where automobility has yet to take hold on the travelling behaviors of most of their population, as is the case with Mexico City's over 70 percent public transit mode share (Guerra, 2014). Mexico City's bourgeois activists nevertheless see non-motorized mobility as a cure for the mega-city's environmental ills. They see it as way to take back the streets from cars - as a tool for equity in urban mobility (Ballesteros & Dworak et al., 2015). However, only certain types of pedestrians and cyclists are included in this vision, even coming into ideological conflicts with captive motorists, street vendors, and eventual protesters. As streetspace is being physically and politically re-appropriated in the name of pedo- and vélo-mobilities, we must examine their equity rhetoric and ask: who are streets being reclaimed for?

First, I will examine new conceptualizations of "mobility" incorporating formal and informal dynamics that permeate Mexico City's streets. I will next describe the street reclaiming interventions in the last five years, and in the street vending dynamics that have persisted for more than five hundred years. This will prompt a discussion about how radical planning should be considered in the context of Mexico City.

Claudio A. Sarmiento-Casas is an architect and a doctoral student at the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto. His research on *bicoficios* lies at the intersection between street politics and everyday (alternative) mobility practices. He has worked as an urban consultant, researcher, and lecturer in Mexico City.

Mobility spaces

The design of the modern street has focused exclusively on the circulatory functions of the street, which has rendered this space susceptible to disciplinary powers of automobile-centric planning (Walks, 2015). But because streets are also inhabited spaces, their nature as place has produced conflicts over what are ‘public spaces’ and what activities should take place there (Bodnar, 2015). These conceptions of mobility echo those of the “right to the street”, in which the primary basis for gaining citizenship and a place in the street is detached, mass consumerism, as opposed to personal productivity, localized assembling, and direct engagement (Furness, 2010).

The exclusionary focus of streets as spaces of movement has been accompanied with the belief that only physical and legal infrastructures influence urban mobility (Golub et al., 2016). Design determinism is not exclusive to automobile-centric traffic engineering, as non-motorized mobility advocates seek to attract new cyclists through dedicated infrastructure solutions or new pedestrians through overly programmed sidewalks, designed only to attract middle-class residents and thus potentially exacerbating the existing inequalities of the street (Ehrenfeucht & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2010).

Concentrating solely on infrastructure has also proven inefficient in encouraging a sense of ownership or in promoting participation from the community which the street serves (Boyce, 2010). Because streets can never be fixed in space or time, and because their use shifts according to the drama of the everyday street life (Zavestoski & Agyeman, 2015),

logic of physical and judicial confinement of mobility spaces alone cannot address the everyday of dynamics of the street (Golub et al., 2016). While Renia Ehrenfeucht and Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris admit to the difficulty of planning for the “messiness, spontaneity, and unpredictability” (2010: 461) of the streets, bicycle scholars like Adonia Lugo (2012) suggest incorporating decidedly human infrastructures into urban mobility planning.

Indeed, the successes of advocates for the diversity of streets comes not so much from the advancement and increased investments in dedicated infrastructures, but from building rich social networks (Meador, in Golub et al., 2016). Aaron Golub insists that the key questions for the impact of street redesign on issues of social equity “surround their planning process, and not technical issues” (in Zavestoski & Agyeman, 2015: 87).

Mexico City’s “radical” street redesign

Contemporary issues of street planning and design need to be understood in a context of uneven urban development (Holston, 2009; Golub et al., 2016). While scholars and policy-makers have started to address the diversity of actors present in the urban streets of the West, cities such as Mexico City have yet to align the presence of hawkers, cart-pullers, and working bicycles with matters of urban mobility.

Although alluding to the social dimensions of streets, most urban planners and policy-makers are unmindful of the fact that “redesigning a street is not simply a technical project, but is also a social and political project”

(Miller & Lubitow, in Zavestoski & Agyeman, 2015). Contemporary planning and policy trends such as Complete Streets, Walkable neighborhoods, and Livable cities seek to shape the urban form of the street to incorporate modes of transportation other than the automobile, most notably dedicated infrastructure for pedestrians and cyclists. Yet, these street redesigns follow the conventional practice of traffic engineering; the space of the street is subdivided through physical elements.

The instances of street reclamation by Mexico City's young bourgeois activists follow the same technocratic logic: impromptu bike lanes are painted as a solution to cyclist safety; benches are placed in pedestrian-heavy areas to create temporary public spaces; sidewalks are carved out of roadway in the automobile-oriented neighborhoods to encourage pedestrianism. While these actions have been self-proclaimed as "guerrilla" activism (Varagur, 2016), they are actually modelled after the North American "bottom-up" urban planning trend of Tactical Urbanism (Lydon & Garcia, 2015). In fact, the Tactical Urbanism vernacular has been co-opted by the Mexican state as a tool to elicit Westernized versions of neoliberal urban development (Mould, 2014).

Indeed, much like their North American counterparts, young Mexican pedestrian and bicycle activists have had the opportunity to travel abroad and compare their local urban conditions with those of other world cities (Morfin, 2011). Some of them have even transitioned into public sector positions (see authors list in Ballesteros & Dworak et al., 2015) diminishing any radicalism espoused by these activists. Additionally, as Annette Kim remarks, these so-called urban insurgencies (through activist art) often have "little commitment

to a place or a people nor real engagement with the broader social institutions" (2015: 81).

Of street vending and struggle

By being overly ubiquitous to the political ecologies of the street, the informal economy epitomizes the current challenges of contemporary street governance. Street vending – understood as the trading of goods and services in the various spaces of the streets (Bromley, 2000) – also exemplifies Asef Bayat's "encroachment of the ordinary" (1997) as hawkers, carts, stalls, stands, tricycles, kiosks, and truck-borne stores quietly horn in "the city through unplanned and sometimes unarticulated ways of fighting for redistribution, while remaining autonomous from the forces of the state" (Crossa, 2009). Street vendors, however, are not immune to the gaze of 'modernity', in the form of economic formality, transportation efficiency, and the environmental bourgeoisie. They face a difficult ecosystem because of their poverty, marginality and legal irregularity.

Despite its heterogeneity, street vending is considered such a serious political issue that related problems like the unbalanced allocation of road space to the automobile and the disorganization of transit stations/centers are sometimes attributed to it (e.g. Ballesteros & Dworak et al., 2015: 73-77). Much like the segregation of transportation modes, the solution for street vending *par excellence* is the forced relocation of the individual vendors (Bromley, 2000; Crossa, 2009; Kim, 2015). This is not only a spatial strategy to alleviate the streets of the "messy" retail landscapes and

the unpredictability of informality (Ehrenfeucht & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2010), it is also a normative stratagem that seeks to eliminate everyday social struggle through persecution, containment or regulation (Bromley, 2000).

Conclusions

Modern planners have sought to order the street because of the inherent conflicts that arise when it is recognized that there are both “institutional” ways of designing it and “informal” ways of appropriating it (Ballesteros & Dworak et al., 2015). Ironically, “ordering” the street minimizes the same activities that contemporary Livable streets policies seek to attract: ground floor retail, social interaction, zero-emissions movement, low barriers for participation, economic vitality, DIY values, among others (Furness, 2010; Morhayim, in Zvestoski & Agyeman, 2015).

In contexts such as Mexico City, clearing streets from unsanctioned commercial activity often comes from the misguided perception that street vendors do not operate in well-to-do neighborhoods or in “world cities” (Bromley, 2000). However, the most recent critical literature has found in North America the same complex interdependencies that exist between the consumerist middle classes, the malleable state, and the “informalities” of the street. Although still mostly constrained to Latino Communities in the US, food trucks, and bike messengers (Loukaitou-Sideris, Ehrenfeucht et al., 2014; Zvestoski & Agyeman, 2015), this literature reflects the everyday realities of the urban Global South.

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Organizing a Community Land Trust in Pursuit of Anti-Displacement and Social Economy: A Case of Critical Planning in Parkdale, Toronto

Kuni Kamizaki

This article offers critical examinations of neighbourhood-scale critical planning practice and alternative economic initiatives in the rapidly gentrifying Parkdale neighbourhood in Toronto, Canada. This article conjoins the theme of this volume, as it sheds light on “economic planning” as spaces of struggles for resisting gentrification as well as building a more just local economy. This article pays attention to Parkdale’s experience in which building alternative economic institutions such as a Community Land Trust has been harnessed to respond to mounting pressures of gentrification and displacement. This paper offers important insights to critical/radical planning, since economic planning has received limited attention as an area of critical planning praxis.

Furthermore, while building on my own involvement as a community-based planner, this paper provides a detailed account of building one of the first CLTs in Toronto and a community-based economic planning initiative to develop a common platform for neighbourhood-wide collaborative strategies. Examining these concrete examples responds to this issue’s theme and the Critical Planning Journal’s mission. Parkdale’s critical planning efforts have emerged out of a local history of struggles against systemic marginalization of tenants, disinvestment, and stigmatization attached to mental health and homelessness. Equally important is that stories of these struggles are examined with a normative framework of Polanyian social economy based on the principles of redistributive justice, economic democracy and relational autonomy. This article highlights unique ways to contribute advancing the critical planning approach for forging equitable development and a socially just economy.

Kuni Kamizaki is a PhD candidate in Planning at the University of Toronto. His research interests lie at the intersection of neighbourhood change (gentrification and displacement), community and economic development, and social policy, with a focus on social justice. His doctoral research focuses on Tokyo’s world city (re)making and developmentalism in the time of nation-wide shrinkage and post-growth Japan. Prior to entering the PhD program, he worked as a community-based planner in the Parkdale neighbourhood, where he initiated a range of community development initiatives such as the development of Parkdale Neighbourhood Land Trust.

Introduction

Parkdale is one of a few downtown neighborhoods in Toronto that remains relatively affordable and accessible to low-income and marginalized residents, such as people with mental health experience, the homeless, and refugees. In the last two decades, however, Parkdale has experienced intensified pressures of gentrification. New patterns and processes of socio-spatial inequality in Toronto have consolidated (Hulchanski, 2010). In addition to diminishing social space, where they secure a sense of belonging to their neighborhood, low-income and marginalized tenants now face eviction threats and displacement. In response to gentrification pressures, Parkdale's community-based organizations have initiated a range of planning strategies.

In this paper, building on my own involvement as a community-based planner in Parkdale, I examine the potential and constraints of two inter-related community initiatives: 1) the development of Toronto's first CLT (community land trust), the Parkdale Neighbourhood Land Trust (PNLT); and 2) the neighborhood-wide planning initiative called the Parkdale Community Economic Development (PCED) Planning project. Parkdale's case offers vital insights to critical planning because Parkdale's initiatives combine resistance to displacement with the development of alternative economic institutions. By focusing on issues of land ownership and private property, PNLT has brought to the forefront the terrain of struggle against gentrification that iteratively combines these two purposes. There are similar initiatives in other cities – notably Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the Right to the City Alliance's Homes for All Campaign –

that harness alternative institutions to enhance democratic community control over neighborhood change. In the context of this growing movement of CLTs among progressive planners and organizers, Parkdale's case helps assess the potential and constraints of the CLT model as an alternative economic institution to counter gentrification.

To critically examine the Parkdale case, I engage Rankin's (2013) framework of Polanyian social economy built on the three principles: redistributive justice, economic democracy, and relational autonomy. The three principles are useful for foregrounding a normative, counter-hegemonic dimension for critical planning and social economy. Parkdale's case shows how these principles can be practiced on the ground in relation to anti-displacement efforts. It also highlights the contested dynamics of both urbanization and gentrification in the presence of social economy practices (e.g. organizing a CLT as an alternative economic institution).

The Parkdale case demonstrates that building alternative economic institutions such as PNLT can confront displacement not as abstract political economic phenomena but as the result of concrete processes. Displacement is rooted in specific social practices and norms that co-constitute multi-scalar processes of gentrification and socio-spatial inequality. For PNLT, attending to issues of private land ownership as root causes for injustices of actually existing urbanization provides a concrete domain of struggles against displacement. It also marks a point of departure for pursuing the three principles of social economy by enacting an alternative practice of collective ownership. Furthermore, Parkdale's experience highlights

the importance of embedding the process of building alternative economic institutions into wider processes of community planning and organizing. This approach is indispensable for connecting planning strategies with political opportunities to advance the three principles of social economy grounded in the experience and critique of gentrification and displacement.

This paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss a theoretical framework of the three principles. I then describe a historical and current conjuncture, from which Parkdale's combined initiatives on anti-displacement and social economy emerged. The next section outlines the PNLT as an alternative institution of community land ownership. In the following section, I highlight how the PCED planning project brought PNLT's activities into broader neighborhood strategies and organizing to foreground development without displacement. I conclude with a discussion of the possibilities and constraints of such alternative institutions to counter pressures of gentrification.

Three Principles of Social Economy

The three principles of redistributive justice, economic democracy and relational autonomy constitute a normative foundation of critical planning in pursuit of Polanyian social economy. Its point of departure is Polanyi's (1944) notion of the social embeddedness of markets. This notion underlines that the "self-regulating" market is socially produced through human practices, not naturally occurring. It questions how the economy is currently organized, and how it could be reorganized for social justice (Rankin, 2013). A key task for critical planning is to

guide the economy according to the social criteria of redistributive justice, economic democracy and relational autonomy, namely "planning the social economy" (Rankin, 2013).

The principle of redistributive justice can reframe issues of gentrification by shifting the focus from a simple account of demographic change and real estate dynamics to issues of community control and just redistribution. It interrogates how social surplus is produced, appropriated and redistributed (Gunn & Gunn, 1991; Gibson-Graham, 2006). The crux of inequality and capitalist power relations lies in private appropriation and control of surplus through private ownership of land, labor and money (Gunn & Gunn, 1991). Gunn and Gunn (1991) point out that private appropriation makes the social nature of surplus value creation invisible. Here, the role of planning for redistributive justice is to build alternative institutions of accumulation, social reproduction and exchange such as workers' coops, limited-equity cooperative housing, and credit unions (Gunn & Gunn, 1991). These alternative economic institutions ensure collective ownership, appropriation and distribution of social surplus under democratic control. Redistributive justice, coupled with the socialization of surplus, offers a critical view into issues of gentrification.

As urbanization and particularly gentrification assume a central role in capital accumulation and power relations, surplus value is produced in the form of land rents and property value appreciations (Harvey, 2012). For Harvey, urbanization is a dialectical process of the constant production of social surplus and commons and the continuous enclosure and private appropriation of them in a

commodified form. In this regard, the problem of gentrification can be understood not simply as “a lack of capital but a lack of [community] power and control over” capital investment and equitable redistribution of social surplus (DeFilippis, 2004, p. 89). With respect to gentrification, the crucial role of alternative institutions is not only to anchor social surplus in the community itself but also to protect land and commons against forces of dispossession by means of de-commodification and grassroots democratic control.

Redistributive justice helps understand the political-economic logic of capital and surplus value creation. It is, however, insufficient for altering capitalist social relations. It is also necessary to mobilize political consciousness and forge counter-hegemonic subjectivities able to challenge the prevailing cultural hegemonies associated with capitalist development – such as understandings of land market as naturally occurring and self-regulating (Rankin, 2004).

The second principle of economic democracy is thus an indispensable foundation for reimagining a socially just economy. Economic democracy can be articulated in two ways. First, it strives to extend democratic decision making beyond the political sphere into the economic sphere. Alternative economic institutions establish community-based democratic decision making over how social surplus should be managed. Second, economic democracy promotes ethical self-transformation, and cultivates political consciousness to construct and perform anti-capitalist subjectivities (Gibson-Graham, 2006). Gibson-Graham (2006) calls for decentralizing a “capitalocentric” representation of the economy – a

dominance of capitalism in our thought and practice – as a vital first step for constructing a counter-hegemonic visions and economic practices. The principle of economic democracy helps destabilize a totalizing narrative of gentrification and capitalist urbanization that naturalizes the primacy of private property. In this sense, economic democracy positions the economy as a site of ethical decision making (Gibson-Graham, 2006), and – borrowing Mirafab’s framing (2009) – creates an “invented space” for counter-hegemonic planning action.

A neighborhood-based approach to alternative institution building confronts a scale question. Practicing economic democracy at a local scale alone does not address structural causes of socio-spatial inequality that shape local processes of gentrification. In the context of neoliberal restructuring, a place-based approach risks becoming a local poverty manager that justifies downloading of welfare responsibilities (Fisher & Shragge, 2000).

The third principle of relational autonomy addresses the scale question. A point of departure is to regard a neighborhood not as a self-contained entity, but as a locality that is constituted through relationships with other localities and wider scales of institutions and political-economic processes. DeFilippis (2004) suggests that this relational view of neighborhoods clarifies autonomy because power is exercised through various institutions, relations, and practices at multiple spatial scales. He argues that local autonomy is realized through power relations and engagement with structural forces at multiple scales. In this regard, the question is how a neighborhood approach might

engage in multi-scalar commitments for relational autonomy. There are two ways to pursue relational autonomy. First is to emphasize movement building that can link community-based initiatives with broad-based economic reforms, political organizing and collaborative learning (Cummings, 2002). The second is to build alternative economic institutions that have multi-scalar connections, possessing the capacity to intervene in capital mobility and alter capitalist social relations (DeFilippis, 2004; Gibson-Graham, 2006).

Building counter-hegemonic economic institutions also necessitates the critique of the state due to its close involvement with maintaining capitalist economy (Karatani, 2014). For example, redistributive justice alone might be achieved through state redistributive programs and state ownership of means of production without economic democracy and relational autonomy. While these state measures are crucial, they could serve as ameliorative measures that would perpetuate the accumulation of capital and state productivism (Karatani, 2014; Brenner, 2008). Pursuing three principles together is one way to negate the complicity with state productivism. As Karatani (2014) and DeFilippis (2004) remind, however, the state and capital penetrate counter-hegemonic resistance. As such, community control is relationally constructed with multi-scalar forces of capital and the state. This is a space of struggle where critical planning is imperative for confronting political economic forces that constrain collective capacity to imagine and build an alternative economic future.

Historical and Present Conjuncture

Because of the rapid processes of gentrification in Parkdale, neighborhood change is often seen as

a relatively new problem. Historically, however, Parkdale has been under constant pressures of neighborhood change that have had lasting effects on current struggles against displacement. For example, in the 1960s, the construction of the Gardiner Expressway entailed the demolition of hundreds of single-family homes, and subsequently the development of two high-rise apartment blocks in South Parkdale. Since then, these high-rise apartments have become landing spots for low-income immigrants and refugees, most recently Tibetans. In the 1970s, the Ontario government’s deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients to Parkdale resulted in the parallel process of converting large single-family homes into substandard rooming houses to absorb discharged patients (Slater, 2004).

The 1990s marked the initial wave of gentrification through the influx of artists and higher-income homeowners. These socio-economic transformations caused conflicts between low-income tenants and homeowners (Slater, 2004). Since the late 2000s, Parkdale has experienced an ongoing process of gentrification along with a growing divide between North and South Parkdale. North Parkdale – now called the Roncesvalles Village – has seen a growth of higher-income homeowners and the de-conversion of rooming houses to owner-occupied single-family homes. In contrast, South Parkdale remains a low-income area where around 90% of residents are renters; close to 30% live in poverty; and approximately 16% of residents rely on government transfers including social assistance benefits (Statistics Canada, 2016).

The history of neighborhood change is also the history of community struggles against systemic marginalization of tenants, disinvestment, and territorial stigmatization attached to mental health and homelessness. Community leaders recall that in the 1970s and 1980s, Parkdale was understood as a de facto “priority neighborhood” for targeted public investment due to high social needs. Place-based investments of that time enabled the establishment of various community-based organizations, resulting in a strong social infrastructure for community services and organizing. Moreover, Parkdale has cultivated the diversity of alternative economic institutions and mechanisms. For instance, there are a dozen social enterprises and peer employment programs that reflect the history of supporting psychiatric survivors after deinstitutionalization. Additional examples include cooperative housing and non-profit supportive housing, a multi-stakeholder food cooperative, and an alternative local currency system that facilitates supportive work for refugees and people with mental health experience. Taken together, Parkdale has developed a community base of oppositional politics and alternative community economic development.

Parkdale’s oppositional political base was essential to resisting Ontario’s neoliberal welfare restructuring in the late 1990s, which had caused a profound shift in the emphasis of community organizations’ role from community development to service delivery (Trudeau & Veronis, 2009). Some established agencies such as Parkdale Activity-Recreation Centre (PARC) have retained organization’s capacities for community development, systemic analysis of poverty and organizing. In the 2010s, an

opportunity arose to bring this oppositional political base into a combined effort for anti-displacement and social economy. Toronto’s progressive private foundations shifted their grant-making approaches to emphasize community economic development and economic justice – most notably through the Metcalf Foundation’s Inclusive Local Economies program and the Atkinson Foundation’s Decent Work program. These resources enabled the intentional articulation of community-based economic planning work in Parkdale and other neighborhoods in Toronto.

Struggles over Urban Land

Gentrification and displacement in Parkdale are co-constituted with larger processes of growing socio-spatial inequality in Toronto. One way to articulate this relational understanding into planning action is to confront a prevailing notion of urban land as a commodity governed by the principle of highest-and-best use in the capitalist economy. Community Land Trusts (CLT) tackle this challenge. A CLT is a membership-based community organization that acquires, owns and stewards land for community benefits, such as affordable housing. The CLT removes land from speculative markets and holds it in trust through a community-based democratic governance. It establishes a structure of collective ownership and community control of land. The CLT intends to de-commodify land as commons for redistributive justice while creating an institutional space of economic democracy so as to advance relational autonomy. The formation of Parkdale’s CLT goes back to 2010, when PARC commissioned the Planning program at the University of Toronto to explore effects of gentrification on neighborhood affordability. A group

of planning students including myself undertook this action research project. Building a CLT was one of the recommended strategies. This recommendation garnered support from community leaders because the CLT model foregrounds the question of land ownership and private property as fundamental causes of gentrification and displacement, rather than the supply of affordable units per se. After receiving seed funding from the Metcalf Foundation, Parkdale Neighbourhood Land Trust (PNLT) was officially established as Toronto’s first urban CLT in 2012. PNLT began as an “organization of organizations” consisting of seven community-based organizations that represented diverse community constituencies. In 2015, PNLT moved to a community-elected governance model.

Unlike a CLT’s traditional focus on affordable homeownership, PNLT has pursued a holistic community development approach. With an emphasis on the concept of community ownership of land, PNLT has developed its mandate to meet community benefits, from affordable rental/supportive housing to affordable spaces for social enterprises and community services and land security for urban agriculture. Indeed, PNLT’s first land acquisition is a plot of vacant land that has been used by Tibetan ESL learners called Milky Way Community Garden. This garden has served as a social space for Tibetan members and a site for growing culturally appropriate food. PNLT intends to protect the site as a community-owned land from pressures of speculative redevelopment that often displace these social and cultural practices.

Although PNLT was formed around the urgency to address gentrification and the principle of

redistributive justice, the principle of economic democracy quickly emerged as an equally significant commitment. PNLT has harnessed its neighborhood-wide membership and a democratic governance structure to build an organized base for community-based planning and grassroots democracy. As is common for newly established CLTs (Bunce, 2015), PNLT did not own land until the acquisition of the Milky Way Garden. PNLT’s organizational focus was thus placed on public education, stakeholder engagement, and organizing around the concept of “community ownership of land.” Organizing was indispensable to build public awareness among residents and policy-makers because the CLT model was new in Toronto. When PNLT began to work on a fundraising campaign for the first acquisition, PNLT turned a small vacant land, the Milky Way Garden into a performative space of community ownership through hosting community events. These were PNLT’s ethical interventions for what Gibson-Graham call “reading for difference rather than dominance” (2006, pp. xxxi-xxxii) to destabilize the primacy of private property.

To pursue relational autonomy, PNLT has engaged in trans-local learning and alliance building. The development of PNLT was inspired by interactions with TRUST South LA, London CLT, Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and New York Community Land Initiative. The trans-local network enabled PNLT to learn strategies for organizing and land acquisition and their enabling conditions from other CLTs facing interconnected processes of uneven development. Locally, PNLT has sought to build learning exchanges with other groups to help start CLTs such as Hamilton CLT and Kensington

Market CLT. Moreover, as the community ownership structure is intended to alter relations with capital, PNLT's first community-owned land marked an important milestone of enhancing relational autonomy. It was, however, clear to PNLT and its partners that removing one piece of land from speculative real estate markets would not stop multi-scalar processes of gentrification and displacement.

Beyond Community-Owned Land

Since 2014, as the pace of gentrification and displacement in Parkdale further accelerated, the limit to the collective ownership of one land in altering gentrification pressures had been looming. Pressures on the affordability of high-rise apartments in South Parkdale have intensified rapidly after corporate landlords – who control around 30% of primary rental units – started to raise rents above the level of provincial rent guidelines. As a result, many low-income and immigrant members have faced increased rents, harassment, and threats of eviction. On the other hand, Parkdale has built diverse alternative economic institutions and mechanisms that have the potential to promote the three principles of social economy. PNLT is one of them. Nevertheless, mere diversity would not automatically translate into counter-hegemonic economic practices. As Marcuse (2015) points out, social economy mechanisms may “tend to become insulated and small defensive towers in a landscape not changed by their presence.” This was to some extent the case in Parkdale.

In response to these two challenges, PNLT and PARC brought together a network of over 26

community-based organizations in Parkdale to launch a neighborhood-wide planning initiative in 2015: the Parkdale Community Economic Development (PCED) Planning project. With the support of Atkinson Foundation, the PCED project combined participatory planning, community action research, and multi-stakeholder organizing to develop a Parkdale Neighbourhood Plan. It pursued two goals. First, the project aimed to organize residents and community-based organizations to develop a shared neighborhood framework for pursuing “development without displacement” and equitable community economic development. The second goal was to embed existing economic alternatives, such as PNLT, into neighborhood-scale strategies and policy options. With these goals, the PCED project intended to increase relational autonomy to influence multi-scalar processes of gentrification.

The PCED project aimed to address a thorny challenge inherent in community planning with long-term visions. In August 2015, 26 tenants were evicted by a real estate developer with only one week's notice from the Queen's Hotel rooming house. This incident exposed the violence and everyday practice of gentrification. Equally important, it raised a question of what is to be done now in face of immediate pressures of eviction and displacement that vulnerable tenants face on a day-to-day basis. In fact, this issue had been a source of tension among some partners who argue that a long-term process of land acquisition would have limited immediate impacts on the material wellbeing of low-income tenants.

To confront this tension, the PCED's nearly two-

year participatory planning process adopted a “Naming the Moment” approach. This approach is a participatory method for popular education and political analysis for social action (Barndt, 1989). Its conceptual framework revolves around Antonio Gramsci's conjunctural analysis. In this analysis, relations of structural forces are viewed as impermanent; they shift and show fissures that open up political opportunities at a particular conjuncture (or “the moment”) (Barndt, 1989). A task for critical planning is to seize these strategic possibilities and points of disruption at a particular moment in order to act on appropriate short-term strategies in relation to long-term goals.

With this framework, the PCED project enabled about 400 community members and stakeholders to envision an equitable future of Parkdale. The resulting Parkdale Neighbourhood Plan is a comprehensive community and economic development plan, rather than a physical land use plan, for equitable development. The Plan establishes over 30 “promising directions” for community strategies and policy options in seven areas: social infrastructure; affordable housing; decent work; food security; community finance; participatory democracy; and cultural development. Working committees of residents and community-based organizations were established to organize each area.

The PCED project provided the opportunity for PNLT to scale up its activities beyond land ownership. Through the collective process of conjunctural analysis, PNLT identified rooming house preservation as a priority strategy. After

the Queen's Hotel rooming house closure, PNLT organized a community forum on displacement. PNLT politicized the site as an illustrative example of the violence of gentrification and real estate capital and mobilized it to demonstrate a pressing need for alternatives such as the Community Land Trust. Through the PCED planning process, it became clear that after 20 to 30 years in business since the time of deinstitutionalization, many rooming owners are close to the age of retirement without succession plans. Rooming houses are susceptible to strong market demands for de-conversion and up-scaling at the current conjuncture. PNLT aimed to seize this moment by organizing tenants and housing agencies to align their needs and resources for supportive housing development with rooming house preservation.

In late 2016 after the PCED project completed, PNLT led a community action research to investigate the status of rooming house in Parkdale. PNLT's Rooming House Study (2017) reveals over 198 rooming houses in Parkdale offer deeply affordable housing options for 2,700 low-income tenants. Nevertheless, the Study confirms imminent risks of losing 59 more rooming houses due to the upscaling and de-conversion to single-family house. This means that 800 tenants are at risk of eviction, displacement and homelessness. To address this urgency, PNLT has developed rooming house preservation strategies based on lessons from CLTs in the San Francisco Bay Area. These strategies aim to create community-owned affordable supportive housing through the acquisition of at-risk rooming houses.

Discussion

PNLT has developed a range of community strategies that revolve around the collective ownership model which pursue three social-economy principles. One example of redistributive justice is the rooming house preservation strategy. A challenge is that alternative institutions such as PNLT – however non/anti-capitalist they strive to be – are entangled with forces of capitalist incorporation and the state discipline (DeFilippis, 2004; Rankin, 2013). Increasing property values and speculative investments in gentrifying Parkdale make PNLT's acquisition of rooming houses difficult as private actors act and channel resources at a much faster speed. It takes considerable time for PNLT to organize financing options in the absence of stable public funding. Just as any housing development, market-based financial feasibility also constrains a scope of what PNLT can do to socialize surplus.

On the other hand, the state disciplinary power penetrates into alternative economic spheres created by PNLT. Because it is necessary to engage in financial transactions to remove land from the capitalist market, PNLT needs to be made legally legible to the state through a non-profit charitable registration. In contrast with American regulations, Canadian charitable status comes with a narrower scope of permitted charitable activities that limit PNLT's efforts. In addition, although PNLT has developed an institution of collective ownership and de-commodification of land, that land is still subject to land use policy, property assessment, and legal regulations, all of which treat land as a commodity.

Due to the difficulty with realizing redistributive justice in face of gentrification, DeFilippis's remark on alternative economic institutions is important:

“[Alternatives institutions] are not wonder institutions and the expectations for them must be realistic. Their potential lies in what they represent, and the potential for greater local autonomy that is possible, rather than in what they actually able to achieve given their limited size and capacity” (p.12).

For Parkdale, the pursuit of economic democracy has played a profound role in challenging a false choice of either-disinvestment-or-gentrification (DeFilippis, 2004). It has helped build a community base for demanding equitable development. The development of PNLT has dovetailed with the neighborhood-wide organizing process through the PCED project. This iterative process – underpinned by participatory planning, organizing meetings, community forums, and action research – has served as invented spaces of counter-hegemonic planning (cf. Miraftab, 2009). These invented spaces have offered multiple entry points for residents and stakeholders to engage both in critiques of the dominant economic system and in everyday experimentation of alternative economies. They have contributed to shifting a prevailing common sense about the inevitability of gentrification to the possibility of equitable development. While economic democracy is often associated with organizational practices of alternative institutions (e.g. democratic management of land), the PCED project was the exercise of economic democracy beyond organizational boundaries of alternative economic institutions. Parkdale's case

demonstrates the imperative to exercise economic democracy at a broader neighborhood level to reinforce a link between anti-gentrification politics and alternative economic politics.

Balancing the need for redistributive justice and economic democracy is a persistent challenge. PNLT has developed a community-based democratic governance structure, which includes non-real estate experts such as low-income tenants and Tibetan members. As PNLT's Board focuses more on rooming house acquisition that requires speedy decision-making, technical discussions risk becoming exclusionary spaces for resident members. Furthermore, even if PNLT and PCED reframed a common narrative to the possibility of equitable development, low-income and marginalized members face, on a day-to-day basis, ongoing displacement pressures. For example, due to sudden eviction threats and disruptions in their mental health conditions, some of the emerging community leaders could not keep joining a long-term process of alternative institution building and neighborhood planning.

PNLT's collective ownership and the PCED's Parkdale Plan have worked to enhance relational autonomy by infusing neighborhood-based concerns into multi-scalar processes of gentrification and urbanization (DeFilippis, 2004). PNLT's rooming house preservation strategy has become a catalyst for rooming house tenants to organize grassroots anti-eviction campaigns. At the policy level, PNLT has collaborated with other housing groups to spearhead a policy advocacy campaign that aims to amend the Toronto's Official Plan in order to strengthen the protection of rooming

houses. Furthermore, PNLT has spearheaded the formation of the Canadian CLT Network to inform policy making around affordable housing and community ownership. Moreover, PNLT and PCED's partners are also conjoining a Toronto's emerging movement of alternative economic development. These multi-scalar commitments have been necessary to building conditions for local autonomy. Yet, relational autonomy via redistributive justice is limited due to the inability to control broader processes of capital investment and institutionalized planning practices. A recent redevelopment project in Parkdale is a case in point. A developer proposed 17-story and 14-story luxury condominiums. PNLT members and other groups organized deputations, street protests, and media campaigns against this redevelopment. The proposal was recommended by the City Planning Division and approved by the City Council.

Conclusion

Both PNLT and the PCED project demonstrate an iterative process of anti-displacement efforts and social economy practices, to increase democratic community control over neighborhood change. A key insight from Parkdale is that the process of building alternative economic institutions needs to be embedded into organizing and neighborhood-wide strategies through community planning. Rather than reduced to a technical alternative to government value capture mechanisms, PNLT has been able to establish an organized base for counter-hegemonic planning action. Above all, PNLT has exposed land ownership and private property as the concrete crux of gentrification and displacement, proposed the community ownership

model as a viable alternative, and politicized its planning action according to the three principles (cf. Marcuse, 2009).

Nevertheless, the Parkdale's experience raises important questions. To what degree can each principle be achieved at the same time? Which principle receives a priority over others at a given time? An answer depends more on a particular conjuncture of historical and political-economic contexts and relations with the state and capital than an aspiration of alternative institutions. Although pursuing redistributive justice is a pressing task in gentrifying Parkdale, the pressures of gentrification and sky-rocketing real estate markets have constrained PNLT's pursuit. A particular political-economic conjuncture, however, can open possibilities for concrete interventions such as rooming house preservation. Here, economic democracy plays a crucial role in seizing the moment to connect anti-displacement struggles with social economy practices for achieving redistributive justice and relational autonomy.

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Messy Methodologies: Proposing Radical Alternatives to the Formal Research Plan

Sarah Gelbard

The city as it is conceived and constructed through urban planning theory and practice is a reproduction of the values and forces which shape it, leaving it vulnerable and blind to other forces which risk burdening those who fall outside its definition. Due to the fundamental challenges of engaging with radical positions, perspectives, and experiences of the city, a consciousness of the limitations of conventional methodology and methods must be carefully considered; not only for logical but also ethical consistency with the subject. This paper examines the challenges of proposing an experimental—what I call “messy”—methodology informed by alternative approaches and radical theories which, by their nature resist rational organization, normative structures, and formal processes. In contrast to positivist methodologies, there is no clear separation between the subject of study, the researcher, and the process—nor between practice, theory, and pedagogy. This is how I come to center my doctoral research on city-users who fall outside mainstream assumptions and have to find/make space to satisfy their own needs either by negotiation with or circumventing the official city structures. In the process, my research similarly relies on developing ad-hoc and nimble tactics that sometimes align and sometimes diverge with the conventions of a formal research plan. I am rooted in and inspired by traditions of alternative praxes including Jewish thought, feminist and subculture theories, and everyday practices by marginalized/alternative urban groups.

Part anarchist. Part punk planner. Sarah is a PhD student in urban planning at McGill interested in how we shape our cities and how our cities shape us. Her research on transgressive urban spatial practices, traditions, and tactics looks at how marginalized and alternative groups operate around the formal professional structures of urban planning and architecture.

The subversive intellectual, we learn, is unprofessional, uncollegial, passionate and disloyal. The subversive intellectual is neither trying to extend the university nor change the university, the subversive intellectual is not toiling in misery and from this place of misery articulating a “general antagonism.” In fact, the subversive intellectual enjoys the ride and wants it to be faster and wilder; she does not want a room of his or her own, she wants to be in the world, in the world with others and making the world anew. (Halberstam, 2013,10)

Beyond the planners and beyond the public they plan for, a variety of dissident and dissonant voices, experiences, and actions exist and participate in making and remaking the city. My doctoral research looks at and engages with city-users who fall outside mainstream assumptions and definitions of the public. I refer to these city-users as non-publics; “non” because of the way they have been left out of, have opted-out of, and have frequently conflicted with the public interest that underlies the normative city-building project of traditional urban planning. Shaped by liberal, modernist, and rational-scientific values and processes, planning has traditionally placed faith in the idea that better designed and better managed cities better serve the public interest.

This concept of public interest has been widely employed to direct, legitimate, and reform the practice of urban planning. Given that public interest and public welfare are supposedly the principal objectives of planning, these non-publics often destabilize and threaten the legitimacy and claims of

the discipline. When non-public people and spaces fail to either conform or reform, they frequently become coded as “undesirable”. Even with all its good intentions, planning has a troubled and ongoing history of reproducing normative standards that privilege the status quo and burden those people and spaces that fall outside its definition and vision of the good city.

Sometimes this incompatibility of public plans with non-public interests is by ignorance, lack of visibility, or lack of political or social power. But, in many instances, city spaces are unwelcoming by design to those coded as undesirable. As a consequence, in their efforts to shape both space and identity in the city, non-publics – that is to say alternative and marginalized groups such as the punks, skateboarders, and LGBTQ groups in my research – are enabled and constrained both internally and externally by the dominance of public plans.

This struggle for space and legitimacy seems to necessitate both spatial and political tactics of negotiation with, or circumvention of, the mainstream and authoritative professional structures of urban planning and architecture. A great variety of outsider and non-sanctioned spatial and political practices are frequently excluded as part of the city-building process and are often overlooked by, and remain invisible within, the conventional histories and theories of urban planning.

I have encountered in my doctoral program and research limitations within the formal structures and expected processes of research within the university. These structures resisted alternative approaches, workarounds, and possible

compromises at all stages. Although I intended my research to be about skate, punk, and LGBTQ groups and their struggle and strategies for making space in the city, I continue to encounter analogous struggles to make space for and legitimate my research project. I find myself developing ad-hoc nimble tactics and relying on alternative scholarly traditions that sometimes align and sometimes diverge with the conventions of a formal research plan.

As I muddle through the academic, funding, political and institutional structures and the normative codes and requirements of a doctoral program, I have found a need and desire to extend my findings on the tactical traditions of non-publics in city-making to my experience of tactical knowledge-making. Faced with often restrictive academic procedures, the incompatibility of certain research standards for accessing invisible ‘data,’ and normative expectations of what constitutes valid research, I struggle with the academic structure. I also continue to find ways to make space for unconventional research and to build communities with others. Through this process, I began to see analogs between knowledge-making and place-making.

While mainstream academic standards have been a source of frustration, I have been fortunate in finding support and inspiration elsewhere, often hidden within institutional boundaries. From my standpoint as a Jewish woman engaged in subculture scenes, the intellectual traditions of Jewish, feminist and subculture scholars have been formative. Each comes with distinct historic experiences and positions in our contemporary context. Despite their differences, each of these theoretical strands

intersect with the motivation to explain the urban experience of their marginalized identities and conditions, and expose the structural logics and practices that have been, and continue to be used to legitimate and reproduce their exclusion.

From Jewish ghettos, to the suburbanization of women, to underground scenes, these urban non-publics experience and reveal the “dark side of planning” (Yiftachel, 1998) that literally and symbolically concretizes our cities – through land-use zoning, planning policies, and urban design – around normative values and socio-political, patriarchal, colonial, racist, and economic interests. Here, I see a link between Jewish, feminist, and subculture traditions insofar as they speak with those whose place-making is preceded by a need to first make space in the unwelcoming and incompatible spaces of dominant culture and official plans.

Due to the fundamental challenges of engaging with radical positions, perspectives, and experiences of the city, I maintain that a consciousness of the limitations of conventional methodology and methods must be carefully considered; not only for logical consistency but also as a matter of ethical engagement. Because of these recurring challenges and opportunities, I amended my research proposal to include a self-reflexive investigation of key epistemological and methodological questions—the preliminary arguments for which is the subject of this paper.

How do traditional academic methodological standards also reproduce the dominant socio-cultural and socio-political norms and narratives that

have shaped public understanding and meaning of the city and therefore might obscure, misrepresent, or marginalize the study of non-public place-making? What possible linkages are there between tactical approaches to non-public place-making and non-public knowledge-making? This paper examines the potential and challenges of proposing experimental and “messy” methodologies informed by alternative approaches and radical theories which, by their nature may resist but also subvert rational organization, normative structures, and formal processes. In other words, methodologies that may not conform to the conventions of contemporary mainstream academic research. This paper therefore proposes several analogs and potential intersections between the radical critique of planning and radical critique of academia. Key among these intersections is acknowledging the shared epistemological foundation in liberal modern rationalism that link the “dark side of planning” and the limitations of empirical research standards; a link between order and the universal public interest on the one hand, with the search for objective and universal proof on the other hand.

I propose that messy methodologies, rather than a formal empirical methodology, will help me complicate our coded expectations of space and place-making by reflectively questioning ways in which traditional planning practice and planning theory are structured as a series of overly determined and rationalized binaries, e.g. formal/informal, expert/community-based, reform/resistance, structure/anarchy, utopia/dystopia. I hope my research will reveal how planning narratives continue to map these coded expectations onto different people and spaces,

frequently misrepresenting non-public experiences, interests, and needs. These dominant frameworks are imposed from a position of power that privileges its own narratives without necessarily reflecting the experience of non-publics. As such, I argue that the use of experimental, less structured, and multiple approaches is justified, and, I hope, will better speak with those for whom the right to the city is often a fight.

Even when burdened by normative structures and restrictive practices, many of the non-publics I work with demonstrate an aptitude for spatial interventions that adaptively respond to group needs and aspirations, reveal the limitations of official city plans and regulations, and enrich the city. These interventions and practices may be both materially necessary and symbolically meaningful to the well-being and cohesion of these groups. It is here that I also draw from my architecture background. In addition to radical and critical analyses, material and structural analyses are productive tactics for making visible the rich heritage of spatial traditions by outside groups that have adaptively circumvented restrictions, covertly contested exclusive and dominant claims to territory, and repeatedly reconstituted and relocated their community. Spatial interventions, such as a skateboarder's reimagining of a park bench as a trick surface or such as a punk squat house, are re-appropriations of existing built-forms for unintended use, where unintended use is often coded as illegal use. Spatial intervention becomes a socio-political intervention that destabilizes the authority and exclusive claims of concrete form.

The concrete form and ubiquitous presence of the built-environment make the city an interesting cultural product for interrogating hegemonic, socio-political, and economic reproduction. In her critique of the “evolution of contemporary urban spatial structure” as a product of patriarchal and capitalist interests, Ann Markusen (1980) made the astute and provocative observations that:

[t]he sobering reality of this form of urban spatial structure is its permanence. It is literally constructed in brick and concrete. Therefore, its existence continues to constrain the possibilities open to women and men seeking to form new types of households and to reorder the household division of labour. (p. S36)

Dick Hebdige (1979) echoes this warning of how the dominant structures and ideologies are not only symbolically but materially built into institutions that are themselves the product of hegemony.

despite the apparent neutrality of the materials from which they are constructed... [institutions] carry within themselves implicit ideological assumptions which are literally structured into the architecture itself. (p. 12)

Both Markusen and Hebdige make the connection between the concreteness of material form and social norms. While this concreteness may contribute to the perpetuation of the status quo, they both go on to acknowledge that there exist tactical opportunities to subvert the relationship between form and norms. While the concreteness of built-form may be its greatest hegemonic strength, it is also its greatest point of potential vulnerability.

My preliminary findings suggest that several common conflicts emerge between a variety of non-publics and the dominant spatial practices and practitioners that control and order the spaces of the city to suit mainstream and normative assumptions. I propose that these common conflicts include: (1) negotiating group identities and spatial codes that are systematically misrepresented and misunderstood by the mainstream when they do not conform to mainstream normative values and expectations; (2) incongruities with the essentialist fixing of identity in territorially defined space over time; and (3) the struggle for space and right to the city without assimilation. Each of these conflicts seem to carry analogues for those of us who might consider ourselves and who might be considered by the university as “subversive intellectuals” occupying the “undercommons” of the university (Harney & Moten, 2013).

This rough sketch of different tactics and conflicts reflects many experiences and challenges of doing this research. As a process that makes visible and destabilizes the limitations of the dominant structure, my Jewish-feminist-subculture lens draws linkages between a variety of non-publics who have developed rich tactical traditions for making both space and place for themselves in the city. Yet, this theoretical and methodological grounding is on constantly shifting ground inspired by the intersections between these theoretical traditions of the city and the strategies and tactics they offer for accessing knowledge and experiences of the city by marginalized and alternative urban groups.

I focus on the misrepresentations and misunderstandings that are perpetuated in

professional practice and academic institutions and their reproduction of the status quo, the ways in which they limit different ways of knowing and being. Here I draw upon the feminist challenge to the rational-scientific and empirical ontology and epistemology of mainstream planning profession and theory (e.g. Harding, 1986; Haraway, 1988). I argue, this critique is echoed in Jewish thought and subculture theory, though, to my knowledge, this has never explicitly been framed as a critique of urban planning.

One of the many significant contributions of feminist scholarship on the city is revealing and explaining the ways in which planning reproduces the ordering of life and therefore the city through both conceptual delineations and physical segregation that followed from the public-private dichotomy. This rational model and modern constitution of public (i.e. its foundation in capitalist, liberal, and scientific ideology) is found elsewhere in planning literature. However, the feminist literature exposes certain limitations and moral contradictions of the modern and mainstream conception of public and challenges its a priori status and dominance in shaping our shared environment and in controlling our use of it. Through its gendered lens, feminist literature revealed ways in which planning, despite its progressive and reformist intentions, reproduces and protects the status quo. Traditional planning has, by definition, a fundamental problem with the irrational and with disorder. They are the problem that traditional planning tries to solve; along with all the undesirable, non-conforming, non-public people and spaces.

Following the postmodern turn, literature in multiple

fields of scholarship points to the ways in which dominant power first defines the “other” as crazy and irrational, in order to silence their resistance, and second defines the “other” as threats to public order in order to legitimate their exclusion or push for their assimilation. As Dick Hebdige (1979) argues, this double representation of undesirable people being irrational and disorderly can be constructed into narratives ranging from public nuisances to public threat:

we are interested in subculture — in the expressive forms and rituals of those subordinate groups [...] who are alternately dismissed, denounced and canonized; treated at different times as threats to public order and as harmless buffoons. (p. 2)

Whether undesirables are represented as buffoon or threat, the public response—including intervention by planners—then follow the “natural” order of this narrative. Solving the problem of undesirables range from paternalistic, “charitable” reform to authoritarian control and regulation.

While this point is captured and reimagined from multiple perspectives within postmodern literature, both Jewish and black scholars have rich scholarly traditions and critical positions with regards to the cultural and political significance of being “othered” by mainstream society. Hannah Arendt (1944) writes about this process of othering through a typology of caricatures of “the Jew as pariah” that negates identity and delegitimizes their place in society. She writes:

And the greatest injury which society can and

does inflict on [the Jew] is to make him doubt the reality and validity of his own existence, to reduce him in his own eyes to a status of nonentity. (p. 114)

Writing in the 1950s and 1960s, Frantz Fanon recognized that in the othering of black people, this negation frequently relied upon representations of irrationality, mental illness, and primitive, antisocial, and wild behavior. Fanon also recognized how as a scholar, his own work and validity was frequently confronted by these kinds of mischaracterization. As Jack Halberstam (2013) explains:

Fanon took an anti-colonial stance, he knew that it ‘looks crazy’ but Fanon, as a psychiatrist, also knew not to accept this organic division between the rational and the crazy and he knew that it would be crazy for him not take that stance in a world that had assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild [...] In order to bring colonialism to an end then, one does not speak truth to power, one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other, the other who has been rendered a nonentity by colonialism. (p. 8)

Here we slip back to the power of hegemony and the struggle for space without assimilation, both in the city and in the academy.

Like their non-public counterparts in the city, alternative scholars face the challenge of how to legitimate different ways of knowing and different ways of being in the face of a mainstream that has the power to misrepresent and misunderstand their difference as irrational and dangerous. A key tactic,

used by punks and radical academics alike, is of course to come to terms with who you are and to subvert the narrative that defines that position and experience as crazy. In so doing, it often reveals the lack of foundation of the dominant definition. This destabilization tends to shift the feelings of insecurity back onto the mainstream. Michel Maffesoli (1995) captures this subversion of accepted academic formats and almost dares his critics to point out his failure to conform or challenge his logical conclusion that his “object of study demands this transgression”:

It is not simply a question of frame of mind, but rather procedure, which would be useful to provide since the discipline’s traditional format will not be respected. Of course, this means it will no longer be possible to supply the usual degree of intellectual reassurance. (p. 2)

As an example of one of the smaller but telling spaces of conflict that have arisen in my research: One of the questions in my comprehensive exams asked “How have the different disciplinary strands feeding into a feminist urbanism defined “public” differently and what is the degree of consensus between them?” While it may seem like semantics or nit-picking, I found several issues with the formulation of the question which I aimed to address in my response, including the following excerpt:

Because of the attention to difference within the feminist debate and by feminist thought, the concept of “consensus” is itself complicated and its value destabilized. It seems perhaps a futile endeavour to find agreement on what the feminist definition of public is, what

role it should play according to the diverse disciplines that engage with it, or its particular application to present-day issues in planning. This is not an evasion of the question but a destabilization of the concept in order to open up the category and introduce complexities, contextualities, contestations, contingencies, and contradictions that is consistent with a feminist approach.

I am frequently confronted by questions and critiques that ask me to defend the use of feminist theory – or perhaps more accurately referred to as feminist theories – in my work. Accepting differing perspectives and contradictory approaches is, I believe, one of the greatest strengths of feminist theory and activism. But the conflict this creates with conventional and conservative academic norms is a point that I frequently struggle through before even getting to the question or subject of my research. It presents me with a feminist dilemma: How to use the comprehensive exams to destabilize the embedded academic standards while using them as part of the process to be recognized by them? How to defend epistemological foundations that do not align with the epistemological assumptions and norms of mainstream academic institutions that is based in modern liberal rationality and scientific objectivism? How do we assert a “right to different paradigms” (Gross, 1986) without ultimately conforming, without assimilating?

Herein lies one of the many traps and difficult “double work” of feminist scholarship. In trying to destabilize the dominant theories of the public and the policies and structures that reinforce their dominance and self-evident nature, feminist

scholarship must in the short-term strategically rely upon those structures it will in the long-term deconstruct. This seeming absurdity, it can be argued, is an effective counterstrategy or tactic in the “intellectual guerilla warfare” (Gross, 1986) of feminist or other radical movements that aim to subvert and replace dominant systems that have the power and advantage of occupying the foundational, self-evident position that legitimizes knowledge. Yet feminist theory and methods are frequently attacked firstly for being self-contradicting in their reproduction of the very systems they attack, and secondly because such seeming self-contraction either self-invalidates the work or reduces the work to the realm of subjective relativism. And once again, women and their alternative intellectual arguments are called irrational and thus delegitimized. However, radical methodologies are both challenging and challenged precisely because they cannot be self-evident in the way that methodologies that are part of the self-reproducing ideology they contest can.

As Elizabeth Gross (1986) writes, these inconsistencies of using models it ultimately wishes to subvert, may instead be considered a survival strategy of feminist theory that has to battle against the dominance of the mainstream:

In order to challenge and move beyond patriarchal models, feminists must be able to use whatever means are at hand, including those of the very system it challenges. (p. 197)

Feminist methodology can be consistent with feminist theory and goals even in the moments when it appears to reproduce the object it

is destabilizing. It can contradict itself. The literature is filled with multiple perspectives and approaches that diverge as frequently as they converge. Yet, seemingly contradictory theories and positions frequently coexist and reinforce each other by destabilizing the shared target from different positions at different times. Yet, even when challenged by one another these different strategies are not necessarily entirely discredited. They maintain value as some of the many possible subversive strategies to destabilize the dominant narratives and structures, and as a process in search of alternatives.

Yet, here too, I have been challenged for my resistance to conform to academic norms because the above argument, my critics suggest, proves that I can choose to use conventional forms to study non-conventional subjects. They further suggest that such a strategy is preferable in order to remain accessible to a mainstream audience. However, the strategy of “intellectual guerilla warfare” is not about assimilating into the dominant structure. By sometimes conforming to convention, mainstream audiences may be more receptive to my moments of defiance, more open to moments when I might ask them to confront their own expectations. Once the author can establish her legitimacy through convention, those moments, rather than being discredited as irrational, may instead be recognized as moments of difference. Finding the balance between conforming and resisting normative structures and processes is a struggle I also find among non-publics as they negotiate their claims to space in the city. Refusal to follow zoning bylaws or formal procedures make them “outlaws,” working within restrictions, applications, and sanctions make them “sell-outs.” There is no precise formula. There

is no formal plan or strategy to achieve the desired effect. It is a process that needs to remain nimble and responsive; that recognizes the receptiveness of its audience is not consistent and cannot be taken for granted.

Similar epistemological, ontological, and pedagogical concerns are present among other outsider, radical, and insurgent scholarship such as feminist and queer studies, critical black studies, the Global South, and the undercommons. Especially since the postmodern turn, scholars from these fields have recognized how institutional standards privilege forms of knowledge and subjects over others. To displace this privilege and dominance, and in order to make space for alternative, invisible, or otherwise marginalized subjects, many of these scholars are proponents of resisting and/or subverting formalized methodology. Alternative scholarships vary among these scholars as do the history and political contexts of the fields within which they operate. It would be a gross misrepresentation and oversimplification to collapse their contributions into an argument for a specific methodology. However, some recurrent themes appear within, what I call, the style of their scholarly approach that inspire my own developing methodological position. These themes include prioritizing critical consciousness, positionality, intersectionality, and ethical engagement over the use of conventional methods, objectivity, and rational order.

There is growing presence of such scholarship within the academy as demonstrated by the ever-increasing number of departments, programs, faculty positions, and publications that reflect these

alternative epistemological positions. Even with a significant body of scholarship to reference and cite, this type of work frequently continues to be marginalized, discredited, and mischaracterized by many mainstream academics and decision-makers. While many scholars employ alternative methods and recognize research never goes according to plan, there appears to be continued pressure to hide the messiness in research publications, grant proposals, and methodology syllabi. Pedagogically, few graduate students are exposed to the option of non-formal, non-traditional methodologies and those who pursue alternatives face frequent demands to defend methods that have established but less-known precedent. This perpetuated invisibility of the messiness of methodologies continues to code these alternative methodologies as “undesirable” because, like non-publics, they refuse to conform or reform to meet the expectations and assumptions of the status quo.

From my personal standpoint and professional experience, I carry with me a tendency and capacity towards nimble, ad hoc and improvised responses to both practical constraints and creative desires. I consider this not only a standpoint, but also a starting point to develop and come to terms with a “messy methodology” through which to practice my research. I explicitly position this alternative praxis as radical as opposed to novel. I consider it to be rooted in and inspired by traditions and lineages of alternative praxes that are marginalized and obscured by mainstream and dominant structures. I believe this is necessary and meaningful work. And I believe it is the reason my work receives so much support, but it is equally and sometimes aggressively unpopular and harshly criticized. It is

constantly shifting ground that is intellectually and emotionally challenging but also rewarding.

But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love. Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome [...] She disappears into the underground, the downlow low-down maroon community of the university, into the undercommons of enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted [...] (Harney & Moten, 2013, 26)

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Gentrification, Educational Disinvestment and Community Resistance

Leanne Serbulo

Gentrified neighborhoods are characterized by conflicts over public spaces split along racial or class lines. There is a great deal of research about the tensions that exist on the sidewalks, in shops, parks, and plazas within revitalized communities. Research on public schools, however, is sparser. Schools have become sites of contention and microcosms of broader gentrification conflicts. In inner Northeast Portland, a traditionally black neighborhood that is rapidly gentrifying, longtime resident families have spent the last decade fighting to save the area's public schools. These schools have been systematically disinvested in by the district resulting in declining enrollments, diminished programming and the closure of ten schools or programs (League of Women Voters, 2011). Despite their lack of resources, local schools continue to play an essential role in the community. For many residents, they are a home-place full of memories and significance extending back generations (hooks, 1991). The residents' struggles and successes reveal lessons about how to demand inclusive revitalization.

Public schools have played a pivotal role in shaping the racial and class composition of U.S. neighborhoods (Lassiter, 2012). Families consider many factors when purchasing a home, including transportation, job opportunities, amenities, and schools. In the postwar era, the establishment of separate, independent school districts helped fuel suburbanization and reinforce racial segregation (Dougherty, 2012). Early back-to-the-city migrations were spearheaded by white, childless singles or couples. As gentrification progressed, inner city neighborhoods grew increasingly appealing to middle and upper class families, a seeming contradiction given the lack of desirability of these neighborhoods' schools.

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But families were no longer purchasing a bundle of goods tied to location, because gentrification had decoupled the link between schools and real estate. School choice policies allowed parents to purchase a home in one neighborhood and shop for a desirable school in another. In Portland, school choice policies were initially established to promote desegregation in the early 1970s. Decades later, school choice policies became the key mechanism enabling gentrification, as families used these programs to bypass inner Northeast schools in favor of whiter, wealthier magnet programs. School choice facilitated gentrification and school segregation, and the district subsidized the process by quintupling the number of magnet and language immersion programs not tied to a specific neighborhood attendance zone over a twenty year time span (Portland Public Schools).

While the district was investing in these programs, they were disinvesting in inner Northeast neighborhood schools. The district embarked on a series of cost-saving measures that included closing schools after a 1990 statewide property tax limitation measure prompted severe budget shortfalls. Meanwhile, the No Child Left Behind Act required the district to address “failing” low-income schools. Enrollment in neighborhood schools declined sharply as gentrification displaced longtime resident families and newcomers enrolled in schools outside inner Northeast neighborhoods. Depopulation and the mandate to address “failing” schools made inner Northeast schools prime targets for closure.

Furthermore, the district allocated resources based upon enrollment. Schools with fewer students got fewer resources. This resulted in larger class sizes and less programming. This dearth of programming initiated

a vicious cycle whereby enrollment declined further as parents began to search for schools with more robust offerings. School choice policies, frequent closures and persistent disinvestment created separate and unequal educational experiences for residents. While some longtime resident families chose other options, many stayed in their neighborhood schools because they valued their convenience, programming and cultural makeup. By disinvesting in inner Northeast schools, the district elevated the preferences of white middle class families, while dismissing the needs of lower income African American students and parents.

Since 1998, the district closed twenty schools or programs (League of Women Voters, 2011). Half of these closures occurred in inner Northeast Portland. There is a long legacy of civil rights activism within the community, so every proposed closure sparked protest by affected students, parents, and teachers. More often than not, student and parent testimony fell on deaf ears, and schools shut their doors. Sometimes, community members were able to win a reprieve. Even when they successfully stopped a closure, the instability and uncertainty caused by the process negatively affected enrollment, programming and educational quality. The chronic instability experienced by students in inner Northeast Portland widened the class and racial educational divides in the city.

Occasionally, the community shifted the conversation about school closures and won concessions. For example, in 2010, Jefferson High School became a target for closure during the district’s High School Redesign process. Students, parents, alumni, community, and clergy leaders came out in force, threatening to occupy district offices. A

compromise was negotiated to keep the school open by converting it to a Middle College magnet program.

In 2013, activists halted a neighborhood-wide Enrollment Balancing plan. This was a plan to close multiple schools and reconfigure grade levels. Instead, the community forced the district to tighten restrictions on school choice policies and examine enrollment boundaries throughout the district, rather than targeting the shrinking number of schools in inner Northeast Portland. The widespread opposition to the Enrollment Balancing proposals ushered in a slate of progressive school board members with ties to the local community.

In both situations, community members won concessions by expanding their base beyond those directly affected by the closures. In the Jefferson case, students, parents and teachers were joined by alumni, clergy and civil rights leaders. A series of community meetings were held to discuss the district's Enrollment Balancing scenarios, Parents began to attend meetings at other schools in solidarity. As a result, school communities started coordinating with one another. In previous closure attempts, the district would propose three or four closures, and parents from these schools would be pitted against one another during board testimony. The ability of students, parents and teachers to build support outside of their own school community contributed to their success, as did the disruptive tactics they employed. Activists vowed to occupy district headquarters until Jefferson was taken off the closure list. At the Enrollment Balancing meetings, parents interrupted administrator's presentations and demanded open-mike public testimony. This was a sharp departure from the district's usual highly scripted, tightly controlled process.

Disruptive tactics brought results. The Middle College program has been a resounding success. The program established an official partnership between the school and nearby Portland Community College. Jefferson students can enroll in PCC classes for free, and Self Enhancement Inc. (SEI), a neighborhood nonprofit founded by a Jefferson alumnus, provides holistic support to students and their families. Since its Middle College transformation, Jefferson's graduation rates have climbed from just over 50% to 80% (Hopson, 2016). These gains are impressive, especially in a state with some of the lowest graduation rates in the nation. The equitable outcomes achieved by African American and low-income students are also remarkable. In 2016, 81% of African American students, 79% of low-income students and 98% of students receiving SEI services graduated on time.

All students at Jefferson are eligible for SEI support services. While the school remains predominantly African American and low-income, higher-income families are beginning to opt-in, further stabilizing enrollment. However, when schools gentrify, they are remade to appeal to the culture and values of the incoming gentry and inevitably, longtime residents get pushed aside (Joseph and Feldman, 2009, Stillman, 2012). If SEI support services remain intact, longtime resident students' educational achievement will not be subsumed by the needs of their wealthier peers. Jefferson provides an alternative model of inclusive revitalization that prioritizes the needs of longtime residents before, during and after renewal. Using programs that were designed by an organization with a proven track record in the community, Jefferson not only helped longtime residents' students weather the school's revitalization into a Middle College program,

they ensured that these students would benefit from this transition. These struggles to maintain neighborhood schools in inner Northeast Portland provide crucial lessons about how gentrification affects families who remain in gentrifying areas and how the process can be successfully resisted. Not only does gentrification fracture longtime resident communities, it extends and deepens the disinvestment these residents experienced prior to revitalization.

This disinvestment can be successfully resisted if longtime resident families organize in coalition and take direct action to demand resources and community control. Disinvestment can be combatted with inclusive revitalization that prioritizes the needs of longtime residents and gives them power over their community's future.

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Spaces of Struggle Part II

Since the outburst of the crisis, the Athenian city-centre became the locus of intense political struggle. Public space – streets, squares, pavements and building facades – offered the spatio-material canvas on which protesters mapped their struggles for equal voices against the reforms imposed with the aim of reducing public debt. As many commentators have argued, the protesters' radical understanding of their presence in public space as an active participation in politics defined the urban space not only a space of representation and visibility but also a space where new modes of political action and unmediated modes of social conduct could play out. Yet the field on which this struggle took place is not a tabula rasa. It is a site, centrally located in the Athenian city-centre, which encompasses saturated meanings and symbolisms originating in the neoclassical 19th-century urban planning and architecture that aim to manifest and cultivate a particular identity to its inhabitants. Through the contestation caused by the recurrent political mobilisations engaging with the urban environment of this site, what comes forward is an unprecedented confrontation with the site's identity and the latent historical and intercultural relations that constitute it.

Athens, Greece

Text and photo by Mariza Daouti

Clear chat history

Canal Contestations: Struggling for Space on London's Waterways

Domitille Hamand

As European cities are becoming more and more exclusionary, urban interstitial spaces unveil a topic that has been overlooked in the literature. This paper examines the case of Regent's Canal through the lens of Lefebvre's differential space concept and demonstrates how the combination of differential space and daily life activities creates a passive, yet powerful, contestation to the neoliberal and exclusionary city.

Indeed, through their daily practices, the canal's inhabitants are nurturing the canal as differential: boaters transgress the urban order and the logic of capital investment while rebalancing the use and exchange value of these left-over spaces. Inhabiting the canal constitutes a radical planning practice and embodies a vibrant political claim. It is an efficient denunciation of human rights violation. It is also an affirmation of the right to adequate and affordable housing, the defence of common urban spaces, and the promotion of new forms of appropriation of the city in contradiction to neoliberal development.

This paper questions the long term sustainability of these differential spaces: in the Regent's Canal case, inhabitants have been facing a strategy of control, exclusion and normalization implemented by urban governance actors, who neither share the system of value nor the idea of what the city is for. The gradual elimination of the Regent's Canal as a differential space reinforces the idea that it is not possible to disconnect these particular spaces from moments of contestation. Both the singularity of this case study and the close examination of its disruptive components against the exclusionary city expand our ability to identify and understand less visible social struggles in contemporary cities.

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'Living on a boat is not about freedom, not anymore. We are monitored all the time' (Interviewee 6). This urban boater refers to the psychological warfare the Regent's Canal's inhabitants are undergoing with the new management strategy of the Canal and River Trust (CRT). From January to August 2016, boaters have organized the 'Boats are Homes' demonstrations and petitions in Leeds and London. They want the CRT to stop refusing to renew boaters their licenses without a home mooring (also called Continuous Cruisers) and threatening them with eviction. This new management strategy affects the 10,000 inhabitants of London's waterways (GLA's estimation in 2013¹), where a significant increase of boaters was observed in the past years (by 57% over the past five years in total in London) (Markson, 2017). In March 2016, the CRT refused to renew the licenses of 20% of the continuous cruisers which were due to renewal, with a disproportionate share of refusals falling on London (CRT, 2016).

The point of contention is the implementation by the CRT of its interpretation of the S Section 17(3) (c)(ii) of the British Waterways Act 1995, relating to boaters' rights to legally be on the water as 'Continuous Cruisers License'. This section states:

'The applicant for the relevant consent satisfies the Board that the vessel to which the application relates will be used bona fide for navigation throughout the period for which the consent is valid without remaining continuously in any one place for more than 14 days or such longer period as is reasonable in the circumstances' (emphasis by author of article)

The lack of clear definitions of 'bona fide for navigation', 'one place' and 'reasonable in the circumstances' is at the center of the dispute between the CRT and the canal's inhabitants who live on their boat without having a permanent mooring.

To explore this conflict, this paper brings together the discussion on the intensive capitalization of urban spaces, especially housing, and the appearance of alternative housing methods in an interstitial space. This case study participates in the 'quest for spaces that allow for autonomy and creativity' which was at the center of Lefebvre's intellectual project (Ronneberger, 2008: 135), and analyzes the emergence of a new form of housing in central London and the transformation of this space as a site of socio-political contestation and oppression.

For the last 70 years, Regent's Canal, defined as the dark corner of London (Interviewee 4), is an abandoned urban space (Knight, 2010; Burton, 2011). It could be conceptualized as an interstitial and differential space. Interstitial and informal spaces are spatial outcomes of rapid accumulation and concentration of capital in space and long-term structural changes in the economy (Johnson, 2006). These spaces are understood in the literature as full of possibilities as well as vehicles of imagination (Armstrong, 2006; Cupers, Miessen and James, 2002; Doron, 2000; Hudson and Panas, 2011; Sola Morales, 1995), and the vacancy created leads to opportunities for diversification and appropriation (Tonnelat, 2008; Santos Junior, 2014). Interstitial spaces contain the 'potential for ordinary users of space to seize new rights to urban space and

produce differential space' (Leary-Owhin, 2012:2) as well as the foundations for contestations (Harvey, 2000; Groth and Corijn 2005; Merrifield, 2006).

In Lefebvre's theory of space, the city is intrinsically antagonistic. On the one hand, the city and urban spaces allow the survival of capitalism; on the other, they constitute the space and timeframe where contestation and opposition to capitalism exist, notably through the existence of differential space (1967). 'The urban [space] is both site for the construction of hegemony and Achilles heel of capital' (Lefebvre, 1991: in Kipfer, 2002:139). Differential spaces are defined by Lefebvre as 'created and dominated by its users from the basis of its given conditions. It remains largely unspecified as to its functional and economic rationality, thus allowing for a wide spectrum of uses which is capable of integrating a high degree of diversity, and stays open for change' (Groth and Corijn 2005: 521). For Merrifield, differential space is 'the space of what socialism ought to be, a space that doesn't look superficially different but that is different' (Merrifield, 2006:113). According to Leary-Owhin a 'strong differential' space combines both a process of 'politicized appropriation and the assertion of right to the city'.

Inhabiting is the realization of a 'full and dignified life' (Purcell, 2008:94) Can inhabiting floating homes on Regent's Canal illustrate the struggle for differential spaces in London? Is defending the use of boats as homes part of a broader social struggle aiming to redefine social power in the making of the city? Through Lefebvre's concept, I examine the canal as a differential space creating a fertile-ground for contestation in contemporary London. I explore

how inhabiting Regent's Canal is an illustration of differential space, not extracted from Lefebvre's theoretical utopian post-capitalist world. Instead, this is practiced by boaters through the daily appropriation of urban space. 'Experimental dwellings (...) should be seen as beacons pointing towards a broader possibility: that housing might support non-oppressive social relations, not in some utopian realm but in everyday life' (Marcuse and Madden, 2016:117).

In the first section, I will argue that inhabiting the canal is a stepping away from a neoliberal arrangement of urban spaces. In the second section, I examine the CRT's reaction, attempting to regain control over the canal through commodification and surveillance.

Understanding the contestation potential of floating homes in London

'It is in places that are not coded by market-led urban development—since temporarily left aside from the hegemonic visions of configuration of urban space (due to their having become obsolete in terms of their original function and use value) where distinct possibilities for practices of innovation and playful intervention arise' (Groth and Corijn 2005: 506).

Regent's Canal combines two of the main social struggles of contemporary cities: the question of spatial justice and the 'capitalization' of cities. This is a vacant urban space overlooked by planning and local authorities. Regent's Canal offers an alternative and affordable housing solution. It was progressively

seized by people who wanted to live in central London.

Low-income households, already impacted by the 2010 welfare reforms, face extreme economic hardship in London (Hamnet 2010, 2014, Hodkinson and Robbins, 2013), with difficulties affording skyrocketing housing prices (Aalbers and Fernandez, 2016). One of the main outcomes of this situation is the move of population to less expensive urban areas (Ambrose and Jenkins, 2011; Fenton, 2011) and the new use of narrow-boat as residence. With the latter option, Londoners found a way to inhabit in central areas of London, such as Paddington, Islington, Camden or Hackney, without paying exorbitant rent price. For boaters 'living on a boat is an excellent way of bypassing the crisis' (Meikle, 2014):

'The prices were going mental and I knew I needed to get on the property ladder before it was too late [...]. This boat cost me £28 000, well £38 000 with refurbishing costs, who can have a two bedrooms flats for that price in central London? There weren't really many other options than the boat' (Interview 3)

"I owned a house in central London. When my wife and I got divorce, I needed to sell and couldn't afford a house on my own... the boat came as an option (...) it's working quite well since I run my business and need to follow my teams on different workplaces" (Interview 2)

"I am an actress, and this life is way too unstable to rent a place (...) I needed to save money and to stay in London" (Interview 8)

London's spatial organization of individuals is enacted through the economic filter (Brenner and Theodore 2002), in which the rent or purchase price rises with the relative centrality of a unit. Urban boaters challenge this filter. For example, properties in the recent redevelopment projects in King's Cross cost an average £16,361 per square meter (Gilmore, 2016). By contrast, the price of a square meter of a narrow boat that one could moor in this area varies from £814 to £1900. While both options share centrality, amenities and services, flats are around 15 times more expensive than boats. Boaters prefer this situation, stating that 'London was getting nastier [and I wanted to avoid] being trapped in the mortgage life forever' (Interviewee 9 and 10). This sentiment was also shared by other interviewees (Interviewee 4).

Boaters have access to central London, and in doing so are challenging the socio-spatial logic of capitalist urbanization (Harvey, 1989, 2005). In this organized system, inhabiting a boat constitutes a step towards an 'unintended appropriations of space and radical attempts to reclaim urbanity and centrality' (Kipfer, 2002:141), and a demand for a fairer spatial organization of the city. This passive disruption is an expression of the 'right to the city' (Harvey 2008, 2012; Lefebvre 1967). As left-over space, canals open possibilities for other urban behaviors and habits that disrupt hegemonic ones. Boaters reshape the relationship with the city by challenging 'the clearly defined, rigidly programmed, aesthetically and socially controlled spaces of the core city in which the chances of alternative social practices are limited (Hudson et Panas, 2011:3). The residential use of canals and canal boats

constitute a creative interpretation of urban space: they are shaping the city, securing pathway, sailing through the city center, living in the city without an address while still being part of local communities (participating, voting, and using public facilities and space...).

'People are interesting on the canal: they are people who lived for a passion who want to escape the normal 'way of life'. It is a way to take yourself out of the global and general behavior that is expected from you as a citizen and consumer' (Interviewee 4)

Analyzing the boaters' community, defined as 'people in a specific area who share common ties and interact with one another' (Lyon and Driskell, 2012:5), would potentially bring fruitful insights into Regent's Canal's as a differential space, but is beyond the scope of this paper.²

In stepping aside from societal norms, boaters' behaviors are criticized by neighbors. For example, one person in the commentary section of an article in The Guardian reads:

'You know what else is even more affordable? Go back where you were born. If you can't afford London property or rents it can only mean you don't have marketable skills London needs. Ask yourself do you really want to be in a place that doesn't want you?'³

As the comment above illustrates, opponents consider boaters to be undeserving citizens because they live 'off the grid'. More specifically, many boaters take advantages of amenities they do not directly pay

for. Through their daily behaviors boaters in London are proving that urban spaces are not limited to the price people can pay, simultaneously unveiling the existence of a different system of values in relation to private property and urban commons (Marx, 1867; Marcuse and Madden, 2016).

In the literature, contestations to the neoliberal order are increasingly translated through everyday life and struggles, such as the right to adequate housing and basic services (Harvey, 2012). Lefebvre considers that in modern industrial society, everyday life, interpreted through both space and time, is colonized by economic-technological imperatives, 'however, (...) there always remains something that escapes domestication' and inhabiting, one of the most basic human behavior is the 'new subversive category' (Ronneberger, 2008: 135). Inhabiting can be disruptive by translating a daily contestation to a system of value, be it labor exploitation, destruction of a living environment, or the predominance of exchange value over the social use value of urban space - for instance, the Regent's Canal case. With increasing competition over urban land for capital investment, the unexpected occupation of certain urban space, such as that of water, questions the dominance of the exchange value of the social use value of these spaces. This phenomenon of commodification, 'the general process by which the economic value of a thing comes to dominate its other uses' (Marcuse and Madden, 2016:17) is deeply rooted in the organization of the housing system and now extends to watersides and water spaces (Davidson and Lees 2005).

The use value of a commodity is a relative concept (Harvey, 1973) since 'it has reference to the needs

which the properties of a commodity as a physical artefact can be employed to cater to' (Giddens, 1971 in Pivo, 1984). The use value of the urban space depends on the needs and the expectations of each user: it can include physical and locational characteristics, but is essentially the 'ability of the land to help satisfy the needs of a land user' (Pivo, 1984: 41).

The use value of water for boaters is the utility of water: a place they moor their boat and inhabit. This is linked to the need for inhabiting centrally in the city, including access to work or school and connecting with social networks, and is disconnected from the price of the occupied space. (Theodore et al., 2011). Through their presence, boaters affirm a vision of the canal for its use value: it provides them with a space to float on and a solution for housing from which they would otherwise be priced out. 'For many boaters, the capacity to exist harmlessly on infrastructural water with minimum consequences to that environment is a profound act, a lived statement in counterpoint to bankrupted ideas of property as investment'. (Knight, 2010:220).

However, this consideration of the canal for its use value conflicts with the planners and developers' perspectives of Regent's Canal, the latter tending to consider the waterways for the exchange value they would add on waterside infrastructures and for the existing possibilities to 'capitalize on the waterside potential' (Brooker, 2013). This difference in assigned value might be a catalyst for the tension between the CRT and the boaters. The former manages the canal from an investment and capitalization referential, and denies the use

of canals as a social space for inhabiting. In the perspective of the political economy of housing, the struggle illustrated here comes from the 'unavoidable contradiction' resulting from the distribution of housing as a commodity: 'living space will be distributed based on the ability to pay and provided to the extent that it produces a profit. But ability to pay is unequal while the need for a place to live is universal' (Marcuse and Madden, 2016: 51).

With boaters, the city space is a place where people inhabit and answer basic needs and rights (water, education, social life...), which constitute a vibrant and political claim. 'Housing is not only the object of struggle. In some cases, it offers a glimpse of what non-alienated social life must look like' (Marcuse and Madden, 2016:111). Through their moving but continuous occupation of urban water, boaters assert their presence and right to appropriation of urban space. Inhabiting the canal is a simple but efficient affirmation of human rights- the right to adequate and affordable housing, the defense of common urban spaces, and the promotion of new forms of appropriation of the city in contradiction to neoliberal development. For Purcell, 'the right to appropriation can be conceived not just as the right to be physically present in existing urban space, but the right to a city that fully meets, above all other considerations, the needs of inhabitants (...) it demands that the city, more than anything else, be for inhabitation' (Purcell, 2008:95). With boaters, urban space is considered through the social goods it creates for boaters, and more generally for people inhabiting the city. These passive and de-facto contestations contradict the CRT's vision of the canal.

From Occupation to Oppression: The CRT's Attempts to Neutralize the Struggle

As a differential space, Regent's Canal spurred an innovative use of this urban space, but the appropriation of Regent's canal through inhabiting is opposed and suppressed by the CRT. The latter considers that urban boaters are putting pressure on boating infrastructures, for example through water and electricity provisions and on sewage and waste management systems.

'It is clear that we need to improve our understanding and management of capacity constraints. Growth puts pressure on essential boating facilities and on otherwise harmonious relationships between boaters and local residents and between different types of boaters' (CRT, July 2013).

While understanding the CRT's difficulty⁴ in answering a 'growing numbers of complaints'⁵, considering its new management strategy from another perspective is helpful here. The CRT's new managing strategy emanates from a broader context of redefinition of public sector and governance as well as growing influence of the private sector⁶ in urban affairs (MacLeod and Jones, 2011). This evolution is revealed by the shift from the British Waterways to the CRT in 2012. Transferring the public body to the third sector⁶ was meant to secure funding⁷ (British Waterways, 2009) and 'take full advantage of the skills, expertise, innovation and funding opportunities offered by the private sector' (DEFRA, 2007:60). and arose out of Big Society's agenda set up by the Coalition Government. As stated in 2010:

'The Government considers civil society has a very valuable role to play in delivering public services as part of our commitment to creating a Big Society. We will therefore be continuing to look in detail at whether a third sector model would be appropriate for British Waterways' (Richard Benyon, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, June 21st, 2010).

Extensive research analyzes how Big Society principles interplay with public service reforms, decentralization, community empowerment and the political economy of austerity pursued in the UK (Bach, 2012; Levitas, 2012; Clarke and Cochrane, 2013 ; Williams, Goodwin and Cloke, 2014). It has been understood as a 'regressive and punitive withdrawal of public sector involvement and privatization of the finance and delivery of services' (Williams, Goodwin and Cloke, 2014:3) and a part of neoliberalisation (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck 2012; Clarke and Cochrane, 2013).

The public waterway management body retains the monopoly of space control on England's and Wales's canals. However, the management has shifted to a strategy focused on property endowment (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2012a: item 2.4). To support this objective, the CRT has 'unlimited power to dismember and dispose of the waterways system for cash, piecemeal, whether directly through sale, or by default through financial failure to repay loans' (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2012b). One could conclude that the CRT doesn't see the boaters as maximizing potential 'profit', and

thus value, that could be produced by this urban water space.

The imbalanced nature of the relationship between boaters and the CRT led to circumventing the 1995 Act. The CRT implemented its own interpretation of the law and took action against boaters who were non-compliant. Although the CRT does not have legal powers to define a minimal distance to travel, it does have the power to stop providing continuous cruiser licenses, to refuse a license for a boat, to raise license fees (Section 8 of the British Waterways Act 1983) as well as to remove boats without a valid license from water (Section 13 of the British Waterways Act 1971).⁸ The CRT is authorized to turn boaters into illegal occupants of the water, and act against the non-compliant ones, hence alienating boaters and maintaining a climate of ontological insecurity. According to Marcuse and Madden (2016:59), residential alienation is a form of social violence and a governing instrument creating an environment of insecurity and anxiety in ones home. It is caused by the fear of displacement and dispossession, and can have massive consequences on one's psychological well-being. The CRT on Regent's Canal puts residential alienation into practice as a tool for implementing social oppression and maintaining a power structure.

Controlling non-compliant boaters is translated into a double strategy: implementing 'psychological warfare' and retaliation through the non-issuance or termination of boating licenses. Created to reduce a problem of license evasion, the 'enforcement team and patrol' is continuously watching, recording and controlling the cruising patterns of boats. They

identify the boats that are not moving 'far enough' (although there is no minimum distance legally indicated) or often enough and thus are not on a 'bona fide' navigation. According to the CRT these boats should not be able to stay on the canals.

'On average, each stretch of waterway is monitored every month, with increased frequency in London, where daily checks are the objective on the Regent's Canal [...] We now have an estimated 250 continuous cruisers living for most of the year on the Regent's Canal. Our sightings analysis suggests that a minority of these could reasonably be assessed as being compliant with the mooring guidance' (CRT, 2013:11-12).

CRT stigmatizes continuous cruisers in using a criminal lexical field, defining canal inhabitants as exploiters and offenders, implicitly denying their legal right to live on the water, while at the same time framing the situation against boaters, a perspective which is massively broadcasted in the media. Through this lack of clarity and constant control, the CRT has created a constraining environment. Many people fear losing their boat, home and lifestyle. This is illustrated through the CRTs use of terms like « foreclosure » and a radical risk vocabulary. 'The intention was not to solve a problem. It was harassment intended to make life so difficult, and unpleasant, that people would give up and leave the waterways' (Mayers, 2014). Looking at the vocabulary and formulas used in letters to boaters provides examples of this psychological warfare.

'You are at risk of losing your boat'.
'It is likely that you will need to make

arrangements for alternative accommodation. Please contact your local Council's Benefit and Housing department as they may be able to help you find another place to live'.
'We may remove and demolish your boat'.

Before excluding boaters the CRT warns them by refusing to renew their license and giving them a restricted one, which lasts for less than six months, making them endure uncertainties about their future and exposing them to a higher risk of expulsion (Odling, 2015).

'I know I haven't done anything wrong, but it's still a very frightening situation. My boat is my home, they told me they were going to destroy it and that I couldn't do anything about it'.
(Jeff Zedic, in the interview given to Guggenheim, 2015).

A concentration of this practice exists in London, where 44% of these restricted licenses were handed out in March 2016. Through harassment, uncertainties and fear, or more directly through dispossession, people are excluded from the canal. Despite the small number of boaters being dispossessed, the CRT's controlling and harassing strategy effect's the boaters' ability to defend their right to the city. The boaters' associations raised this concern, showing how families couldn't meet the new standards set up in the 2011 guidance because of their proximity to a specific area, such as schools. Cruising patterns broke the new rules set up by CRT, and families therefore became non-compliant and were forced outside the boating life, sometimes into homelessness.

'The number of boats without a home mooring has declined since then; in May 2015, Canal & River Trust stated that there were around 5,600 boats without a home mooring. In a recent statement, Canal & River Trust reported that figure is now 5,281. The NBTA believes this reduction in boats without a home mooring is the result of Canal & River Trust's new policy' (NBTA, 2016).

Between January and June 2016, 10% of the continuous cruiser population needing a new license had been forced from the canals (CRT, 2016) and consequently from the differential space they constituted.

It is difficult for Regent's Canal inhabitants to be labelled as 'compliant' from the CRT while maintaining an urban life (e.g. going to work, maintaining networks of relationships, having children going to schools.) These activities provide opportunities for the CRT to takes action against boaters. The options for the non-compliant boater are limited: either to leave the canal, to have their boat confiscated, or to find a permanent mooring and pay for the appropriate license. However, the scarcity of permanent moorings and their elevated prices in hotspots such as in London (120 residential mooring existing for a price up to £25,000 per year, all occupied), leaves out the other 10,000 boaters (lowest estimation) inhabiting the canal in London. For them, there are no other options but to leave the canal or the central city (as an illustration, in April 2017 - at the time of writing- the closest residential mooring from London was in Uxbridge Moor, 20 miles away).

The CRT sells its mooring vacancies through an auction system to the highest bidder, which easily and quickly puts most boaters out of competition, with no regard taken for time spent on the canal, personal situation, or use of the boat (Jessel, 2014). As the Trust stated, '...we have to control the number of boats, which have increased by 40% over the last four years. The only way we can do this is through price, and some people will have to suffer' (Griffiths, 2011). This social and financial exclusion of continuous cruisers who cannot compete to have access to a permanent mooring, or who cannot take the harassment and stressful life imposed by the CRT, are excluded both socially and financially. This echoes the expulsion of the 'low income groups from favored location' happening elsewhere in London (Harvey, 2001). It shows how the CRT supports the transformation of canal space into this property-as-exchange value (MacLeod, 2011). This exchange value is dominant over the social use value of Regent's Canal, and is enforced on boaters through marketisation. This phenomenon deprives this differential space of the characteristics that previously set it apart from other urban spaces.

Conclusion

Regent's Canal's case illustrates how vacant and invisible urban spaces, differential spaces in Lefebvre's work, provide an opportunity to re-invent the urban framework. When examining Regent's Canal's current crisis, two causes emerge: first, the lack of adequate and affordable housing in central London, and second, the intensive capitalization of urban space and penetration of private interests into

the governance of the city. Inhabiting Regent's Canal is a viable solution to the housing issue. Boaters consider boats as homes and reassert their right to inhabit the central city, standing out against the socio-spatial logic of capitalist urbanization. They have found an alternative way of life that reinvented a more socially integrated urbanity on the canals. However, this alternative way of urban life is under threat from the CRT, which does not recognize the boater's presence on the canal as legitimate. To integrate the canal into the capitalized urban fabric, the CRT has been exercising oppressive controls on this population.

From its emergence to its paroxysm, the differential space is time-limited in the Regent's Canal case study. At the beginning of London housing crisis, the canal was as a shelter from the financial exclusion of the city center and an incubator for a model of a city providing for its inhabitants. Inhabiting the canal provided a new answer to the question of 'how to live well in the city' and re-engaged the debate over 'what the city is for' (Purcell, 2008: 94). However, since 2015 Regent's Canal has transformed into a new controlled space where different processes of value appropriation, the management of a public space as an economic asset, and the implementation of an organized exclusion of low-income groups have occurred. Following Lefebvre's definition of a differential space, taking the boaters out of the water equals taking the substance out of the space, and thus also eliminates its existence.

Endnotes

¹ The access of exploitable data about boaters (numbers and socio-demographic variables) is limited to the very characteristics of Continuous Cruisers, and constitutes a limit of the present work.

² To go further on this topic, consider the work of Chapdelaine et al. (2015) on houseboats communities in Paris and Alex Vasudevan (2015) on subjectivities of squatting communities (2015).

³ Comment retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/nov/11/canal-boat-affordable-city-centre-living#comment-43494103> Part of this research project was building on the analysis of different boater community websites and social media hotspots, and completed the fieldwork undertaken.

⁴ The author recognizes that one of the article's limits is the unavailability of recent interviews with members of the CRT's board and volunteers.

⁵ The growing numbers of complaints, reported on the CRT's response to London Assembly (2013) has not been translated into formal complaints, as appeared in the Freedom of Information request response (following link). https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/south_east_visitor_moorings#incoming-365121

⁶ The third sector is defined as a set of organizations that exist between the state and the private sector. It includes charities, voluntary organizations, housing associations, co-operatives and social enterprises delivering a very diverse range of services (British Waterways, 2009:3).

⁷ An annual deficit of £30million was estimated in 2009, for the British Waterways to fulfil its waterways' maintenance assignments (cf. British Waterways 2009).

⁸ Section 8 of the British Waterways Act 1983 permits the Trust, after giving at least 28 days' notice, to remove a craft which is sunk, stranded, abandoned or unlawfully moored on the Trust's waterways. Section 13 of the British Waterways Act 1971 states that it is unlawful to moor or keep any houseboat (defined as any vessel not used for navigation) on the Trust's waterways without a valid license. It further gives the Trust the power to remove or (ultimately) demolish a houseboat if, following proper notice, the owner does not first remove it.

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Resistance through Research: Reflections on Social Justice Research and Activism in the Trump Era

Rebecca Crane, PhD Candidate, Urban Planning
Skye Allmang, PhD Candidate, Social Welfare

The university is a powerful institution. Within the university, faculty members, research staff, and students are in a continual process of reshaping existing knowledge and producing new theories and empirical research. It is a privilege to work within such a space. At the same time, those who work and study within this space carry an important responsibility to think critically about the role that their research is playing in either reproducing inequality or challenging it. The outcome of the 2016 election created an explicit question for those within academia to answer: what can, and should, be done by those who work in research to take action and speak out against the incoming administration's promotion of inequality and social injustice?

It is in this context that a group of UCLA PhD students from the departments of Social Welfare, Urban Planning, and Education came together to discuss our role in responding to the exclusionary rhetoric and policies from the Trump administration. As PhD students in the professional schools, we conduct research on issues of race, gender, disability, and class-based discrimination, and we critically examine the opportunities that people have to participate in the institutions that shape their lives. We wanted to think through how to expand our efforts to focus systematically on issues of oppression and inequality, and to connect our research to movements outside of academia through partnerships.

We formed a working group to create dialogue foregrounding a politically-engaged research agenda responsive to urgent challenges and attacks on the communities we support. A plan for a conference came out of the meeting. Over 70 people, including graduate students and community-based researchers, attended the day-long conference at the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs. Together, we reflected on the role of students within the university, what resistance entails in that context and beyond, and how to create connections between community-based organizations and researchers.

Rebecca Crane is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA. Her research examines housing solutions in urban areas, with a particular focus on housing affordability and accessibility for low-income communities. Her dissertation assesses accessory dwelling units as an affordable housing strategy in the City of Los Angeles.

Skye Allmang is a PhD candidate in the Department of Social Welfare at UCLA. Skye's research focuses on understanding the underlying causes and consequences of inequality in access to employment. Her dissertation is on the relationship between job quality and health for young adults in the United States.

Appendix

Conference Agenda

8:45 am to 9:15 am - Coffee and Registration

9:15 am to 9:40 am - Opening Remarks

Dr. Ananya Roy, Professor of Urban Planning, Social Welfare, and Geography and Director of the Institute on Inequality and Democracy at UCLA

9:40 am to 10:00 am - Coffee and Continued Registration

10:00 am to 10:30 am - Welcome and Introduction

Skye Allmang (Social Welfare) and Rebecca Crane (Urban Planning)

10:30 am to 12:00 pm - Methods Panel

Dr. Daniel Solórzano, Professor of Education and Chicano/a Studies at UCLA
 Dr. Karen Umemoto, Professor of Urban Planning at UCLA
 Dr. Nina Flores, Assistant Professor in the Social and Cultural Analysis of Education at CSU Long Beach
 Dr. Kristina Lovato-Hermann Assistant Professor of Social Work at CSU Long Beach

12:00 pm to 1:00 pm - Lunch (provided)

1:15 pm to 2:00 pm - Research Justice Panel

Saba Waheed, Research Director at the UCLA Labor Center
 Yvonne Yen Liu, Research Director of the Solidarity Research Center
 Lolita Andrada Lledo, Associate Director of the Pilipino Workers Center

2:00 pm to 2:15 pm - Coffee Break

2:15 pm to 3:30pm - Research Workshops

Racial & Gender Justice (Dr. Darcey Merritt)
 Public Services & Spaces (Harry Grammer)
 Migration/Displacement (Andre Comandon)

3:30 pm to 3:50pm

Potential Research Collaborations
 Beyond Foster Care, New Earth, UCLA Labor Center


3:50 pm to 4:30pm - Reception

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The conference would not have been possible without a large group of people who helped organize and facilitate the day, including, but not limited to: Andre Comandon, Feliz Quinones, Hugo Sarmiento, Melanie Sonsteng, Rachel Wells, Carmen Mancha, Shelly Brooks, and Mike Alvarez. Many thanks to all the speakers (see Appendix) who facilitated a thought-provoking dialogue about resistance. We also thank the many participants who gathered with us to share their knowledge and ideas throughout the day.

Whoever Died From A Rough Ride
North Avenue, Baltimore, MD, 11/2016
Photography by Pat Gavin, courtesy of Mimi Cheng



Concrete Weaponry: Infrastructure and the Politics of Materiality

Mimi Cheng

This paper is framed within an ongoing investigation into the relationship between bodies and forms of concrete infrastructure. It argues that the materiality of concrete forms like sidewalks, streets, and highways can either be hacked to become a site of political agency or leveraged as a tool for systemic racial violence. The inquiry is sustained by an argument brought forth by the attorney for George Zimmerman, who in 2013 argued that Trayvon Martin was armed with the sidewalk on which he stood. If Zimmerman was acquitted of second-degree murder in part due to his attorneys' argument that the sidewalk is a deadly weapon, how does engagement with this undeniably argument inform our perceptions of power and safety in the built environment?

The paper first examines the way in which infrastructure becomes a material support for the body in protest. On the first anniversary of Michael Brown's death in Ferguson, MI, protestors shut down a highway during rush hour. I argue that by impeding the function of a highway as space of mobility, it is appropriated as a space of resistance through the temporary presence and plurality of vulnerable bodies. The second case I consider is that of Freddie Gray, who sustained fatal injuries while in the back of a police van in Baltimore. I argue that Gray's 'rough ride' is an example of concrete infrastructure being turned into a deadly weapon in the hands of the police.

Mimi Cheng is a writer, editor, and PhD student in the Visual and Cultural Studies program at the University of Rochester, where she focuses on issues of spatial politics, urbanism, and contemporary art. She is on the editorial board of the peer-reviewed journal, *InVisible Culture*, and has written for *Title Magazine*. In 2016, she was the Writer-in-Residence at Art21/CUE Art Foundation. From 2011-2012, she was the Curatorial and Research Fellow at Slought in Philadelphia.

This article is framed within an ongoing investigation into the relationship between users and infrastructural forms. I am interested in the way we perceive the vast expanses of concrete sidewalks, surface streets, and highways and how their materiality is foregrounded during protest and insurrection. The investigation began with an inquiry into a profane argument by the two defense attorneys for George Zimmerman, a Florida man who in 2012 shot and killed an unarmed black teenager named Trayvon Martin. They claimed that Martin was armed with the concrete sidewalk on which he stood, and even brought a jagged, heavy piece of concrete into the courtroom to demonstrate its supposedly murderous capabilities: “I will be held in contempt if I drop this,” he said, as he places it on the ground with a resounding thud. The man goes on to proclaim,

‘That is not an unarmed black teenager... that is somebody who used the availability of dangerous items from his fists to the concrete to cause great bodily injury...and the suggestion by the state that that’s not a weapon, that that can’t hurt somebody, is disgusting.’

This is a grotesque argument. Not only is the implication that there can never be an unarmed black teenager on the sidewalk, they also imply that his bodily presence is so dangerous that lethal force is justified. If we accept the lawyers’ logic that an expanse of sidewalk is as much a weapon as a brick in the hands of a criminal, then, following the same logic, the sidewalk is an available weapon to anyone with ill intention.

I also considered the disengagement between material and form that undergirds the argument.

How does the chunk of broken concrete on the floor of a courtroom stand in for how it is used in the outside environment? Assigning a material object with the power to cause injury bypasses the other intended use of sidewalks, which is to grant pedestrians smooth passage from one place to another. The more intriguing aspect of the argument is how the lawyers assigned latent agency to an inanimate object in order to criminalize the user. Despite the inherent fallacies of these arguments, it is possible to appropriate its logic: by deconstructing infrastructural forms into their material components, we can focus on their constitutive material affordances to locate sites of political agency.

This paper will expand on this thinking by considering infrastructures of mobility in their complete form. How can sidewalks, streets, and highways become material supports for the user? How do these forms regulate the user in motion? I will also introduce a new object into the theoretical equation: the vehicle as a mediator between the user and the street. Each infrastructural and vehicular form affords a certain speed: a passenger vehicle on a freeway in Los Angeles, for example, can go up to seventy miles per hour (California Driver Handbook, 2018). Going any faster may result in a speeding ticket, whereas going any slower is both unsafe and will likely spur road rage in fellow drivers. The function of high-volume roadways is dependent upon uni-directionality and maintained by constant speed. I emphasize the respective speeds at which the “vehicularized” user is expected to move because the act of impeding traffic becomes a controversial and visible form of protest.

Recognizing Agency

In order to provide a theoretical framework with which to consider the relationship between users and infrastructure, I will first refer to Hannah Arendt’s political conception of the space of appearance in her 1958 book *On the Human Condition*. The concept is derived from the Greek polis, which is defined by the conditions of acting and speaking together: “Wherever you go, you will be a polis,” she writes (Arendt, 1998, p. 198). Arendt defines the space of appearance as occurring when, “I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly” (1998, p. 198). Through this phrase, she constructs the space of appearance as an act of mutual recognition of subjecthood that is contingent upon being with others, not predicated on a predetermined, bounded place. In this sense, the space of appearance is ephemeral: “Wherever people gather together, it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever” (Arendt, 1998, p. 199). Ephemerality is related to mobility: spaces of appearance can change, irrespective of external, material circumstance.

Both the polis and the space of appearance depend upon mutual recognition. However, not all people are recognized as full subjects in the public realm. In antiquity, slaves, barbarians, and foreigners were denied this recognition. Arendt contends that in the modern era, the workers are in this precarious situation. Judith Butler addresses this question of visibility and recognition in her text *Bodies in Alliance and Politics of the Street* in which she writes, “Arendt’s view suggests that action, in

its freedom and power, has the exclusive power to create location. And such a view suggests or refuses that action is always supported, and that it is invariably bodily, even in its virtual forms” (2011). Butler’s conception of support is broad—not only are streets and public squares a support for the protestor, access to healthcare, employment, food, and institutions are also the preconditions for visibility. Protestors must be fed in order to march, but food security is also something that must be demanded of governments and corporations. In this sense, Butler argues that “material supports for action are not only part of the action, but they are also what is being fought about...” (2011) Butler also questions those who are excluded from Arendt’s initial conception of the political sphere. For Butler, the implication of Arendt’s theoretical exclusion is that it disregards the agency of those who are structurally oppressed, which include the stateless, the disenfranchised, and those living under occupation (2011). Written in the wake of events in Tahrir Square in 2011, Butler pushes Arendt’s conceptual framework to articulate the agency of those who were denied political visibility.

Furthermore, Arendt and Butler differ in one key way. Whereas Arendt focuses on the power of action, Butler re-centers the body in political discourse. Rather than conceive of the relationship between the user and the street as one predicated on function, I also think through and with the body in order to foreground the conditions of violence and vulnerability that are always already present in the built environment. Rather than shift methodological attention entirely to the potential agency of objects, I believe that it is theoretically necessary to remain fully attuned to the agency of people who are

systematically denied fundamental rights and recognition.

The analysis of the following case studies is based on this position. Specifically, the case studies consider the ways in which Civil Rights and Black Lives Matter protestors have leveraged the design and visual symbolism of American roads and highways as their material support to create highly visible acts of disobedience. In other words, how has the design and materiality of concrete infrastructure been appropriated as a site for protest? How can it be exploited as a tool of violence and police brutality?

Ferguson, Missouri, 2014

On August 9, 2014, police officer Darren Wilson shot and killed an unarmed black teenager named Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Later that fall, Wilson was exonerated of criminal wrongdoing. In the following days, protests erupted throughout the city (“What Happened in Ferguson?” 2014). To quell the disruption, police officers enforced a non-existent rule, prohibiting protestors from standing still for more than five seconds, even on a public sidewalk. In response, The American Civil Liberties Union filed a civil rights action against Saint Louis County, the superintendent of Missouri Highway Patrol, and five unnamed police officers (“Ferguson Ordered,” 2014).

Ferguson was built for cars, not people. There are no public, car-free spaces for people to gather. The locus of the protests was in West Florissant, where streets and roads are so poorly designed and

maintained that one engineer termed them “stroads” (“How Ferguson’s,” 2014). In certain sections of the street, the only marker that divides vehicular traffic from pedestrian traffic is a painted white line. There are no elevated sidewalks to protect pedestrians, and in many stretches of the “stroad,” the pavement is in desperate need of repair (Dalrymple, 2014). In addition to being unfriendly to pedestrians, Ferguson, like many other American cities, was designed to separate black residents from white residents. From the highest levels of the federal government to local real estate companies, there was a concerted effort to shape the city along racial lines. Zoning rules, tax favoritism, urban renewal projects, and restrictive covenants are just some of the tools in the segregationists’ toolbox (Badger, 2016 and *The Making of Ferguson*, 2016).

Spatial segregation, paired with profound economic inequality and an oppressive police force, laid the foundation for the events of 2014. Because there is a visible lack of public space in Ferguson, the protests erupted along major boulevards. Despite the deliberate hostility of their material environment, the protestors activated the concrete infrastructure as material supports for uprising. This illustrates Butler’s observation that “collective actions collect the space itself, gather the pavement, and animate and organize the architecture” (2011). Not only was the urban infrastructure a material support for the protestors, the hostile and deliberately neglected concrete expanse was appropriated—even if momentarily—as spaces of agency.

While blocking surface streets is a common protest tactic in the United States, blocking highways and freeways is less common. Historian Nathan

Connolly writes, “If you can find a way to jam up a highway—literally have the city have a heart attack, blocking an artery—it causes people to stand up and pay attention” (as cited in Badger, 2016). During the Civil Rights Era, interfering with high-speed traffic was a method of protest. The most notable example is the 1965 Selma to Montgomery Marches that were organized to protest voter intimidation in the state of Alabama. Alabama governor George Wallace, a notorious racist, refused to protect the marchers against violence from state troopers, local sheriffs, and their “possemen.” When Wallace demanded that protestors be barred from marching on all highways in the state of Alabama, a federal lawsuit was brought to court. Civil rights leaders Hosea Williams, John Lewis, and Amelia Boynton served as the plaintiffs. George Wallace, Al Lingo, the Director for Public Safety for the State of Alabama, and James G. Clark, the Sheriff of Dallas County, Alabama, were the defendants. As Director of Public Safety, Lingo also headed the Alabama Highway Patrol (Garrow, 1980).

Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the protestors. In a decision written by Judge Frank M. Johnson, he states, “The law is clear that the right to petition one’s government for the redress of grievances may be exercised in large groups, and these rights may be exercised by marching, even along public highways” (as cited in Sikora, 2007, p. 217). Johnson’s decision, which was highly controversial at the time, was made in concert with previous case law regarding the proper usage of these public infrastructures. Regarding the balance between safety, mobility, and the right to protest, Johnson writes,

‘... the right to assemble, demonstrate and march peaceably along the highways and streets in

an orderly manner should be commensurate with the enormity of the wrongs that are being protested and petitioned against. In this case, the wrongs are enormous’ (as cited in Sikora, 2007, p. 217).

On the first anniversary of Michael Brown’s death, protestors in Ferguson gathered on Interstate 70 during rush hour and stopped eight lanes of traffic for twenty minutes. The images and footage that emerged from the protest circulated across the news media and social media channels. Some are taken from the perspective of news helicopters, while others are from the ground. (Millitzer, 2015). Protestors parked in the freeway shoulder and exited their vehicles. They brought bright yellow square boxes on which was written: “Ferguson is everywhere.” They joined hands across four lanes of traffic, forcing vehicles to a standstill.

Ferguson is not an isolated incident: blocking traffic on major thoroughfares has become a frequent tactic for Black Lives Matter protests (Badger, 2016). Blocking rush hour traffic also instigates road rage—a dark SUV drove through the line of protestors on I-70 and sped down the open highway. At the time of this writing, the most “liked” Facebook comment on the viral video documenting the incident is, “Good for the driver!!!” (Bryan, 2015) To join hands and stop traffic is not necessarily a barricade in the historical sense of the word. In the book *A History of the Barricade*, French writer Eric Hazan traces the first documented use of the word to the writings of a warlord who fought the Huguenots in the late sixteenth century. Barricades were improvised and constructed of whatever inanimate material residents had around them—

cobblestones wrested from the street, overturned carts, furniture, and water barrels were all piled together to halt oncoming forces. The English word is derived from *barricade*, French for cask, which was an object frequently used to construct barricades (Hazan, 2015).

The form and effectiveness of the barricade has evolved. In considering its evolution, Hazan writes, “The physiognomy of cities has changed...In the face of an effective artillery, backed by tanks and other mechanical weapons, the barricade no longer pulls the same weight” (Hazan, 2015, epilogue). Furthermore, as cities modernize and urban spaces succumb to the forces of capital, it is not guaranteed that barricades made of paving stones and overturned carts will stem the forces of oppression. Many carrier vehicles are barred from surface streets—the gesture of moving a protest onto a freeway disrupts the day-to-day lives of private citizens and the flow of commodities carried by cargo trucks.

The term “barricade” is now also used for authorized structures that police departments use to temporarily control the flow of people and traffic. Police barricades are strategic in their form and function. For example, in New York City, if a private citizen wants to index police authority at their event, they can go to the “Police Barricade Request” page on official website for the city (Official Website of the City of New York, 2018). Whether they are made of concrete, wood, or metal, these barricades are not solely intended to restrict movement, since they can be toppled or moved with relative ease. Instead, they function as a material index of municipal authority.

In Ferguson, inanimate objects are not the only barricades against the oncoming forces. Bodies have literally been placed on the line. To drive through an inanimate police barricade is an act of civil defiance, but to plow through a group of protestors is an act of human brutality. By holding hands and standing still against an onslaught of passenger and commercial vehicles, the protestors inhibit the purpose and visual symbolism of the road. Autonomy, mobility, and the uninterrupted flow of capital are all so deeply ingrained in the American psyche that to disrupt traffic, even for twenty minutes, is to challenge fundamental values of American life.

The exuberant punctuation of the Facebook comment along with the more than 12,000 “likes” it received reveals how much Americans respect the freedom that the personal vehicle supposedly affords; they hold sacred the myth of the open road. The irony is that massive public projects are often constructed along what the federal government and local municipalities consider to be paths of least resistance. This usually means that poor communities of color are disproportionately displaced in the construction of highways. This exacerbates spatial inequality. Considering this recent history, the act of undermining a highway takes on increased symbolism.

Baltimore, Maryland, 2015

In November 2015, the six Baltimore police officers involved in the death of Freddie Gray faced charges ranging from misconduct in office to second-degree depraved-heart murder. Here is a very brief overview of what we do know about the stops that were made while Gray was in the back of a police van, based on a statement given by Marilyn Mosby, the state attorney in Baltimore. (“The Timeline of Freddie Gray,” 2015)

Freddie Gray first made eye contact with two police officers on the corner of North Avenue and Mount Street. He ran, but eventually surrendered to the officers on the 1700 block of Presbury Street. A police van arrived at the scene and Gray was placed face down, handcuffed, and put in the back of the van without a seatbelt, a move that is against department regulation. Instead of driving directly down Fulton Street to the Western District police station less than half a mile away, the police van made four additional stops, the last of which was to load another suspect into the van. At each of the stops the officers opened the back of the van to check on Gray, but at no point did they respond to his continued pleas for medical assistance as his physical condition deteriorated. While his hands were cuffed behind his back and legs now also tied together, his entire body remained unsecured. As the van drove down the streets of Baltimore, Gray was tossed around, unable to cushion the repeated blows to his body. He later died from a “severe and critical neck injury” (as cited in “The Timeline of Freddie Gray,” 2015) he sustained during this “rough ride.” The medical examiner determined the critical injuries to be more like those suffered during a car

accident and not the result of self-inflicted harm, as some have argued (Fenton, 2015). Freddie Gray did not deliberately injure his own spine.

My intent is not to retroactively play prosecutor in this trial, but to underline what many in the black community already know: these rough rides, known as nickel rides or cowboy rides, are nothing new. Police officers conduct these rides to assert their authority against anyone whom they think are irksome. The NAACP confirms that in Baltimore, the practice has been around since the 1960s (as cited in Blount Danois, 2015).

Freddie Gray was also not the first to die in police custody after being thrown in a police van. In a 2001 article published by the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, journalists spoke to survivors of these rides who recalled their treatment in strikingly similar terms: “... roaring starts, jarring stops and other maneuvers that sent them rolling across the floor or slamming into walls. With their hands cuffed behind the back, they could not right themselves or cushion the falls” (Ciotta and Phillips, 2011).

Like sidewalks, speed-bumps are designed to prevent collision between vehicles and pedestrians. Viewed differently, with depraved intention, they can cause great bodily harm if approached with a foot on the gas pedal. A turn in the road is an opportunity to throw around a passenger, a stop sign is an excuse to slam on the brakes. For example, on a Sunday morning in February 1999, Reverend Charlice Harris was driving to church in North Philadelphia when she got out of her car to stop police officers from violently subduing a suspect. In her mink coat and high heels, she

was handcuffed and thrown into a police van. She said, “I ended up sliding all over the place. It was a very rough ride - bumpy, up, up and down hills. They seemed to be just rushing, and I wasn’t no murderer” (as cited in Ciotta and Phillips, 2011).

A Political Proposition

Through these examples, I demonstrate two ideas. First, the design and materiality of our built environment has consequences. Second, they can be hacked to become a site of political agency or appropriated as a tool for systemic racial violence. This is especially visible during times of insurrection. The question of movement and mobility is central to these encounters and their subsequent effects. Judith Butler contends that to protest is to collect, organize, and animate the material environment, even if it is just for a moment. She thinks through the ways in which a plurality of bodies can use a street or public square as material support to reclaim political legitimacy and challenge oppressive regimes (Butler 2011). The protestors in Ferguson actively undermined the function of highways by standing against the flow it affords. They used the highway as a stage to declare what white America denies: that black lives matter.

While the protests in Ferguson are remembered as an extraordinary instance of action, more insidious, but less visible alliances between humans and material infrastructure occur every day. We need only think about the quiet proliferation of hostile design to note how urban designers work in concert with municipal authorities to deter the presence of those marked as socially undesirable. The design and proliferation of anti-homeless benches is just one example.

That said, it is time to think back to the overarching question that inspired this line of inquiry: if George Zimmerman was acquitted of second-degree murder in part due to his attorneys’ argument that the sidewalk is a deadly weapon, then how does acceptance of this argument change our perceptions of power and safety in urban space? Can we insist that authorities are also taking advantage of the materiality of our built environment in a way that endangers the lives of others? To deactivate the apparatuses of power, it is necessary to realign both our optic field and the language of concrete infrastructure. While Butler conceives of material supports in the broadest terms to include healthcare and employment in addition to streets and squares, I am interested in the literal materiality of infrastructure as well as the actions it affords.

This proposition is not an ameliorative effort, nor is it a rallying cry for immediate collective action. I am not trying to temper optimism or de-emphasize the urgency of the issue. To accept the totality of latent possibilities within our built environment requires that we confront and negotiate our own vulnerability. The argument that police are intentionally using the design of city streets and their police van to injure passengers is disturbing, but to let it disable our ability to deactivate apparatuses of power would be an unfortunate mistake. As long as there are highways, streets, and sidewalks, there will be militant efforts by municipalities and governments to control and even undermine their usage and design. Our political task, then, is not to demolish these physical infrastructures, but to think through their material affordances in order to reveal slippages of logic and control.

Endnotes

¹ I have explored this in two unpublished papers: “Concrete Weaponry: A Case for Profaning Infrastructure,” 2015 and “The Fast and the Furious: Infrastructure and the Politics of Mobility,” 2016. The first paper explores the concept of material affordances, unintended use, and their political implications. The second focuses on the role that highways and freeways play in the American imagination, as well as their impact on racial segregation and violence.

² Video footage of the trial was initially found on news website 9news.com. Note that as of February 11, 2018, the video is unavailable.

³ A transcribed portion of the defense’s argument can be found on <http://www.rawstory.com/2013/06/zimmerman-lawyer-trayvon-martin-armed-himself-with-the-concrete-sidewalk/>.

⁴ I engage—hesitantly—with emerging discourse in the theoretical field of new materialism that includes actor-network-theory, object-oriented-ontology, and thing theory. This critical work seeks to articulate new models of subjectivity and include the work of Bruno Latour, Gilles Deleuze, and Bill Brown. New materialism acknowledges the capacity for inanimate objects to have agency and ontologies, and that human subjectivity exists in networked relation to non-human actors. My hesitance emerges from a suspicion that despite what Mel Y. Chen has called new materialism’s “aesthetics of equality,” it also contains within it the possibility to overlook the reality of human difference and unequal distribution of power. This is particularly important

when considering Black Lives Matter, a movement that demands recognition for the fundamental value of black life. Despite my hesitations, the discourse on new materialism is undoubtedly vibrant and has influenced many fields of study, including urban planning. I thank an anonymous reviewer for referring me to the book, *Planning Matter: Acting with Things* by Robert A. Beauregard that was published in 2015 by University of Chicago Press.

⁵ Badger writes, “Researchers at the Rudin Center for Transportation at New York University, in a forthcoming study, counted more than 1,400 protests in nearly 300 U.S. and international cities related to the Black Lives Matter movement from November 2014 through May 2015. Half or more of the protests in that time in Saint Louis, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Oakland, Calif., wound up shutting down transportation infrastructure.” Note that at the time of this article’s publication, the study from Rudin has not yet been made publicly available.

⁶ I am continually reminded of the tragic and violent events that occurred in Charlottesville, Virginia on August 12, 2017. A young woman named Heather Heyer was killed by a white nationalist when he rammed his car into a crowd of peaceful protestors. Thirty-five others were injured in the attack. He faces numerous charges, including first-degree murder.

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Grappling with Housing Capital

Amelyn Ng

This response paper grapples with the financialization of housing-as-capital through several texts on housing and political economy that are instrumental to discussions on radical planning and exclusionary urban developments, but have not been widely read in the architecture, building and planning disciplines. Using these texts as key interlocutors, the paper is structured into three “moments”— Property Boundaries, Household Debt, and Investment Vehicles—each presenting specific reflections and questions that deal with housing capital as a significant and multivariate space of struggle. The paper ends on three brief propositions which radically speculate on disassembling the housing economy straitjacket of inequality, themselves provocations for further debate and discussion.

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I. Property Boundaries

The lines we draw as architects, planners, and cartographers are not apolitical by any measure; they have sociopolitical and economic valences whose metrological and legal functions serve as instruments of capitalism, and also open up previously “untapped” lands to financialization. In “The Properties of Markets” (Mitchell, 2007), historian and political theorist Timothy Mitchell describes the boundary condition “not as a thin line but as a broad terrain, in fact a frontier region” (p.247), as an alternative to the market/non-market, inside/outside and capitalist/non-capitalist binary definitions of boundaries that typically pervade economic discourse. Boundaries are thus not merely issues of representation for economic calculation, but importantly, spatial, temporal and socio-politically contested sites. This is not necessarily a new concept, but one that is too-easily forgotten in practice; one might recall Henri Lefebvre’s spatial triad of (1) spatial practice, (2) representations of space, and (3) representational space (Lefebvre, 1991, 33).

Mitchell critiques Peruvian entrepreneur and economist Hernando de Soto’s book *Mystery of Capital* (2000), which promulgates the titling of informal land as a means to unlocking “dead” housing assets and transforming it into live (or “liquid”) capital for further reinvestment: by (literally) drawing informal urban housing into the marketplace, it would, in theory, enable rural dwellers to collateralize their properties for business loans. Touted as a “solution to global poverty” (Mitchell, 2007, p.249), de Soto’s thinking was widely influential in the economic development of the global south, instigating the formal titling of land and registration of informal properties across Peru and later in other Latin American, African and Asian countries.

However, Mitchell reveals that the uptake of housing as collateral for loans in rural Peru has not actually been a dominant reality, for many residents are disinclined to risk their homes for business credit (2007, p.260). Thus, the act of abstraction through titling and land legalization did not bring about the great economic liberation of rural homeowners, but instead inscribed informal settlements with increased state monitoring and market control, and increased inequality: the very opposite of de Soto’s golden promise of alleviating global poverty.

Mitchell’s thickened “frontier” boundary condition can perhaps also be seen as a zone of contestation for moral claims for housing and challenges to capital’s expansion into “untapped” markets. Let’s say we dispute where a line falls on a title plan; it is not just a “line” but we are effectively opening the possibility for massive fluctuations in its building value. In his study of land formalization in a southern Egyptian village, Mitchell (2007) notes that “making land legal for building increases [its] value by a factor of ten” (p.262). He also notes the drawbacks of legality, namely that it can make land unaffordable (p.257). With the boundary as a consequential technology of representation in mind, can the financial gaming of land value be undermined by its own rules? Could the housing inequality battle be taken up by, say, a subversive group of land surveyors, property lawyers and cadastral mapping professionals in urban planning departments, to instigate via spatial intervention intertemporal transfers and redistributions of wealth? Economists see misrepresentation of land as a problem of poverty; Mitchell considers what this misrepresentation does; it seems that misrepresentation also holds subversive potential for countering certain inequalities.

II. Household Debt (and the financialization of daily life)

From the housing market to marketing... Our increasingly financialized and privatized housing climate is rapidly diminishing our choices for inclusive housing. What do we have (left) to 'stand on' and make claims on equitable housing? As fewer low-income citizens are able to rely adequately on rights to state-subsidized housing, increasingly precarious risks and debts are being taken on (namely mortgages and other housing loan and insurance schemes).

Australian economists Dick Bryan & Mike Rafferty remark in "Political Economy and Housing in the Twenty-first Century" (2014) that households aren't merely wellsprings of and pawns for capital, but are also complicit "in embracing the image of themselves as a integrated portfolio of risk exposures" (p.462). Thus, the home itself looks more and more a site of financial risk management and shock absorption (p.408). Like Mitchell's critique of de Soto, Bryan and Rafferty deconstruct the thought leadership of Rober Shiller, an economist, Nobel Prize recipient and patent owner of US suburb house price indices (p.407). Almost uncannily echoing de Soto's rhetoric, Shiller saw the home and household as "potentially major reservoirs [of] untapped wealth and income, and therefore, a target for financial innovation" (p.407).

How might one consider social representations of personal finance which lubricate the flows of capital via households-as-an-asset-class (p.407)? Consider the post-mortgage-crisis spread of financial literacy classes, insurance advertisements, pay insurance, and credit and risk abatement

services. These products were regarded by Shiller as important tools to hold householders to on-time payments, thus absorbing risks from the market, and maintaining the "liquidity" of housing (p.407). The moralizing undertone of financial literacy movements by big banks and regulators, that individuals are ultimately responsible for the housing crisis, is a false one, and nothing short of ironic (Olen, 2013). That household debt is still commonly seen as democratizing and empowering for aspiring property owners (as Shiller advocated), is also just as much a question of media influence as a strictly economic or legal one.

In addition to the legally binding performativity of housing contracts that secure indebtedness, real estate and banking sectors also utilize the social performativity of media-technical apparatuses (television, film, news, social media and other graphic-textual representations) to facilitate coercion, habilitation, and responsabilization of the prudent, indebted individual. On this note of mediatization, one wonders what kinds of marketing implements, scare tactics and persuasive acts were used in the predatory "blockbusting" of neighborhoods in the US as described by Manuel B. Aalbers and Brett Christophers in their complementary article, "Centring Housing in Political Economy" (2014). "Blockbusting" (also known as "panic peddling") is the real estate practice of racial fear-mongering in white neighborhoods, where the prospect of black neighbors moving in is used to spook white homeowners to sell low "while they still could," then reselling those houses at premiums to black homeowners who would otherwise be excluded from accessing those neighborhoods (Aalbers and Christophers, 2014, pp.376-377). Even 64 years after the landmark 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling against segregation, racial bias

continues to exist in US real estate today, and has recently resurfaced in media in light of our current ‘developer presidency’. Numerous complaints have been made against Donald Trump for the refusal of black applicants in Trump-owned rental apartments (Mahler and Eder, 2016). This seems to further reinforce the power in capital-as-a-social-relation, and that housing inequality has not only spatial, economic and political ramifications as outlined above with boundary-lines, but also has significant semiotic and semantic registers.

III. Investment Vehicles

At a larger scale of representation, if housing abides by “the mantra that ‘rising house prices are good’” (Aalbers and Christophers, 2014, p.378), would we be able to ‘read’ our city’s horizon-lines as a visual barometer of our economic times, which in turn prompts how much we should spend or save? To what extent do cranes and housing construction activity provide us a superficial sense of economic security, while indicating at a deeper level, crises of accumulation and “capital switching” (Aalbers and Christophers, 2014, pp.378-379). After David Harvey, they explain the disinvestment of money out of bank institutions and into the built environment in crisis times; that is, ‘parking’ money in a secondary circuit of capital until the crisis is over (p.379). It is interesting that one may be able to visually “read” finance in our neighborhoods.

But how does the crisis of over-accumulation actually wear out? Is it because more building materials are being consumed and more labor is

being poured into construction industry, thus re-lubricating the primary circuit of goods and services? It appears that another key factor of speculative investment is whether the building is existing or new: ‘parking’ money in existing housing for safekeeping could “draw existing capital away from more productive ventures, exacerbating broader problems caused by the lack of investment in activities that create employment” (Mitchell, 2007, p.262), like construction activity. It also seems that architecture’s assigned function would matter to its success as an urban investment vehicle (e.g. ‘parking’ money in generic mixed-used office towers cast a wider net of potential tenants than industry-specific, mono-functional buildings, such as schools or laboratories). Turning back to housing capital, however, it seems that the opposite is true: that it is the very specificity of function of housing as a fundamental necessity, as social dwelling upon which most of us depend—which makes houses so attractive to the securities market in the first place. And, as a corollary, housing is also a central concern to the US Federal Reserve, of which an alarming 40% of all assets are in fact housing-based securities (Bryan and Rafferty, 2014, p.409). In this quagmire of financialization and debt-on-debt, housing markets have never been more precarious, nor its marketing strategies ever more imperative to state security.

Three Radical Propositions

To end on a rather radical note: might these texts spark three potential ways of collapsing capitalist hegemony in housing? (1) As mentioned above, by editing existing property representations to redistribute wealth,

(2) by refusing to pay debts en masse, or (3) destroying representations/ records of debts altogether and thus reintroducing ambiguity that is legally unenforceable? These of course raise their own inherent problems, and perhaps this is a paper for another time; such is the risk of venturing outside of the box and coloring outside of the lines (puns unintended).

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Third-Wave Neoliberalism in Practice: Engagement, Equity, and Social Welfare in the Halifax Centre Plan

Sandy Mackay

Planning activities typically reflect the prevailing values and processes of the times in which they occur (Forester, 1989; Grant and Gillis, 2012). Examining an initiative can reveal how a planning department, municipality, or specific actors approach contemporary planning theory and practice. This paper discusses the implications of naturalized neoliberal politics and policies on the plan making process by examining a planning undertaking in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. The Halifax Centre Plan, “the first comprehensive planning policy for the Regional Centre” (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016b, 2), redefines land use patterns in much of the urban core. In an era where cities require capital investment to ensure operation, this study highlights how planning practice in Halifax is influenced by naturalized neoliberalism to ensure the preservation of market interests, reduce the validity of “politicized” voices, and address social issues through market mechanisms.

Using Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ as a framework, this paper identifies how the engagement process was framed through an imperative for growth and illustrates how planners addressed key issues raised by citizens through mechanisms of neoliberalization. I argue that this is consistent with naturalized or “third-wave” neoliberalism. This paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the Centre Plan for equity and social justice in Halifax and suggests that the tools of contemporary planning practice are not capable of contesting third-wave neoliberalism. There is a need to expand the critical dimensions of planning to include critical reflection on normative practices, embrace radical and differing perspectives, and resist the influence of pervasive neoliberal politics.

Sandy Mackay received his Master of Planning degree from Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia in 2017. His current research interests include innovative housing policies and how culture and self-reflective planning practices vary across planning departments. He lives in Victoria, British Columbia and is pursuing professional accreditation through the Canadian Institute of Planners.

A Brief History of Neoliberalism

The central tenet of neoliberalism is the application of classic liberal economic arguments to the operation of society. Put simply, “society functions better under a market logic than any other logic, especially a state-directed one” (Purcell, 2009, 141). Beginning in the 1970s, industrialized states began to dismantle postwar economic structures and extended “market discipline, competition, and commodification throughout all sectors of society” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, 350). In this first phase, commonly referred to as *laissez-faire* neoliberalism (Purcell, 2009, 142), neoliberal policies led to dramatic cuts in public service and infrastructure spending, and often the transfer of these responsibilities to lower levels of government (Adamo, 2012; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The elections of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States coincided with particularly aggressive forms of *laissez-faire* neoliberal restructuring (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Olesen, 2014).

Despite the promise that market logic and *laissez-faire* policies could help counteract the declining profitability of traditional mass-production industries and an extended global recession in the 1970s (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Purcell, 2009), states employing early neoliberal strategies suffered market failures, environmental devastation, and social unrest (Adamo, 2012). In response, a second phase of neoliberalism developed throughout the 1990s. *Aidez-faire* neoliberalism (Purcell, 2009, 142) integrates discourses of social and environmental reform, policy development, and service delivery into traditional issues like deregulation and welfare reform (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Rather

than minimizing state expenditures, *aidez-faire* neoliberalism is characterized by an interventionist state apparatus. Whereas *laissez-faire* state deregulation was concerned with the destruction of post World War II Keynesian economic principles like strong labor unions, national intervention into the economy, and a national welfare system (Purcell, 2008; 2009), *aidez-faire* policies reinforce neoliberalism through institutional and regulatory restructuring (Peck and Tickell, 2002).

Planning practice was similarly influenced by *laissez-faire* and *aidez-faire* policy trends. Early *laissez-faire* practices reduced state involvement in planning and facilitated market operation. In contrast, *aidez-faire* planning practices that emerged during the 1990s actively intervened in markets (Olesen, 2014). In housing markets for example, *laissez-faire* policies privatized public housing, but encouraged gentrification only to the extent proven viable by private interests. Under *aidez-faire*, however, gentrification began to be treated as a development tool. Often branded as “reinvestment”, local governments, state level agencies, and federal administrations increased assistance to gentrifiers, relaxed zoning, and reduced protection of affordable housing. (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). Urban areas which capital interests had previously deemed risky or unprofitable were rendered safe for investment through *aidez-faire* state intervention.

The third phase of neoliberalism is understood as a period where neoliberal discourses are found everywhere and pervade all scales of governance (Boyle, McWilliams, and Rice, 2008; Olesen, 2014). Termed by Keil (2009) as “roll-with-it neoliberalization” (p.232) and often referred to as “third-wave”, this period is characterized

by a depoliticization of neoliberal practices in policymaking (Peck, 2001). Rather than political choices over which the state has agency, neoliberal solutions are presented as imperatives (Kern, 2007; Keil, 2009). The result is a naturalization of neoliberal policies and a seemingly broad consensus for city-building practices that generally advance the neoliberal goals of economic development and competition. Olesen (2014) suggests depoliticized neoliberalism acts a paralyzing structure, limiting the ability of the planning process “to imagine radically different futures” (p.296) and curtailing its ability to “constitute a space of deliberation and strife” (p.296). In an environment of naturalized neoliberal imperatives, radical or conflicting perspectives are often framed as disturbing elements or viewed as counter-productive to the process of generating consensus for a planning initiative (Olesen, 2014; Pløger, 2004; Purcell, 2009;). This allows for their easy dismissal and exclusion. Integrating dissenting voices is a key challenge for planners in the face of third-wave neoliberalism as a planning process that promotes the neoliberal imperatives of growth and competitiveness actively curtails radical or politicized perspectives.

Actually Existing Neoliberalism

The utopian idealism of free-market narratives is markedly different from the uneven practice of neoliberal restructuring programs variously enacted in the name of competition, choice, freedom, and efficiency (Peck, Brenner, & Theodore, 2017). States often muddle through neoliberalization and cities are subject to experimentation and opportunistic reform (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Because of its varied definitions, Peck, et al. (2017) describe

neoliberalism as a ‘rascal concept’; “an unruly, polymorphic, and discrepant social formation, as a mode of regulation wrapped in (self) delusion and (purposeful) misrepresentation, and as an historical-geographical process (re)produced through uneven development” (p.24). Sceptics question the concept of neoliberalism as it has become embedded in contextually specific ways that often contradict basic neoliberal principles and run parallel with other ideologies and programmes of reform (Hackworth and Moriah, 2006). The characterization of contemporary political economy as “neoliberal” is overly simplistic and academically fruitless (Boyle et al., 2008).

The concept of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ was formulated to grapple with the confounding complexities of neoliberalism (Peck, et al., 2017). Rather than attempt to articulate ideology, Brenner and Theodore (2002) argue constructive neoliberal analysis should focus on the different tools, or mechanisms, through which neoliberalization is applied. It is better understood as a process defined by the institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles in which it takes place (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The framework for this research is based on Brenner and Theodore’s broad overview of contemporary neoliberal processes and policies, or mechanisms, that have affected urban institutions throughout North America and Western Europe. For example, when discussing urban housing markets a neoliberal analysis might look for policies that raze or privatize public housing, eliminate rent controls, increase opportunities for speculative investment, introduce market rents, or expand private approaches to housing provision (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).

The Centre Plan in Context

The capital city of Nova Scotia, Halifax is home to slightly over 400,000 people (Statistics Canada, 2017a). The city grew slowly throughout the twentieth century and large-scale downtown development did not appear until the 1950s and 1960s (Grant and Gillis, 2012; Grant and Leung, 2016). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, most high-rise developments were single projects and were often accompanied by contentious and highly politicized planning processes (Grant, 1994). In the mid-1990s, neoliberal frameworks were gradually installed in Halifax, highlighted by heavy investment in waterfront improvement (Grant and Leung, 2016) and the provincial government's 1996 decision to amalgamate Halifax and the surrounding communities. The restructuring initiated economic development strategies focused on revitalizing the urban core (Grant and Leung, 2016). As in other major Canadian cities, Halifax's planners experimented throughout the late 1990s and 2000s with new urbanism, smart growth, urban design, and creative city/class approaches.

In 2009, the Downtown Halifax Secondary Municipal Planning Strategy (DHSMPs) introduced form-based code, a planning tool that regulates design and aesthetics, rather than types of uses on a property. The first step in a process that would eventually include the Centre Plan, the DHSMPs reinforces the importance of urban design in development outcomes (Grant and Leung, 2016). Developed after a series of intense, citizen-led challenges to tall building proposals centered around preserving sightlines from major landmarks, heritage structures, and character, the strategy

sought to "create clarity and predictability in the development approval process so that quality development can occur more efficiently and with fewer appeals" (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2009, 3). Critiqued as an "approach to downtown planning that privileged design over democratic engagement practices" (Grant and Gillis, 2012, 37) the DHSMPs, limits the ability of citizen groups to oppose development by "spelling out development requirements and removing many opportunities for public engagement and appeals of decisions" (Grant and Leung, 2016, 120). This marked a distinct change in development conversations in Halifax. In 2012, when the developers of the Skye Halifax, a 48-storey tower, sought plan amendments to exceed height guidelines and encroach on protected view planes they argued that an interesting skyline, increased housing density, modern architecture, and "high-quality" urban design that protected pedestrian views would attract young people and urban professionals and facilitate growth in the urban core (Grant and Leung, 2016). Though Skye Halifax's requests were denied, increasingly planners are being asked to weigh protection of heritage assets against economic development goals (Grant and Leung, 2016). More recent publicly funded development projects, including the Nova Centre and Halifax Central Library, incorporate the modern architecture, dramatic skylines, and pedestrian-focused urban design Halifax is promoting across planning policy documents, including the Centre Plan.

Method

This study of the Halifax Centre Plan is not limited to the final draft policy document. As a part of a

larger study (Mackay, 2016), more than 40 documents including background reports, engagement feedback, and draft policies spanning the entire two-year planning process were gathered from the Centre Plan website, centreplan.ca, and a document library, shapeyourcityhalifax.ca/centre-plan/documents. Borrowing from Brenner and Theodore (2002) and Sager (2011; 2013), a thematic analysis was used to identify elements of 'actually existing neoliberalism' in the Centre Plan documents. Relevant passages from documents were coded by theme and banked. Additionally, engagement feedback from three public participation sessions was categorized broadly by content.


The Halifax Centre Plan

The Halifax Centre Plan resulted from an extensive process that began in 2006 when the Halifax Regional Plan established an administrative boundary for the Regional Centre. Encompassing the Halifax Peninsula and part of Dartmouth, the Regional Centre is the locus of political, cultural, and economic activity in the Regional Municipality. As of 2011, it was also the most densely urbanized portion of the city, home to 95,000 people, 50,000 dwellings, and most jobs in the municipality (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c). In 2009, Halifax adopted the Downtown Halifax Secondary Municipal Planning Strategy (DHSMPs) to guide renewed economic interest in the commercial core of the Regional Centre. The Centre Plan, conversely, is billed as a "comprehensive planning policy" (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016b, 2), rather than an economic development guide. Labeling the plan "comprehensive" implies policies that will address greater issues of equity and distribution of urban benefits, not just restore investor confidence, and attract private capital (Sager, 2011).

Beginning in 2015 and continuing for two years, the Centre Plan process was a focus for the planning, development, and political communities in Halifax. Engagement sessions were heavily advertised, planners promoted the plan in planning schools, and politicians and city staff encouraged involvement at every opportunity. Newspaper and media coverage were extensive, and the Centre Plan was billed continuously as an opportunity to shape Halifax and to clarify land use objectives for the future (Silva, 2016). For many in the planning community, the Centre Plan was expected to be the "silver bullet" that would give planners and concerned citizens the tools to address contentious issues in their city.

Centre Plan Engagement Feedback

Throughout 2016, Halifax planning staff led three community events and several education and consultation events. The first event introduced the plan, the second was a neighbourhood theme workshop, and the third focused on growth scenarios. After each event, the feedback was catalogued and posted online. Most engagement feedback came from the community events. In the first two scenarios, citizens were invited to contribute in person by adding comments to one of seven boards representing seven focus areas in the plan; land use & design, mobility, public spaces & places, culture & heritage, housing, sustainability, and jobs & economic development (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016b). Each board included a concise list of policy areas the Centre Plan could address. Under housing, for example, planners indicated the Centre Plan could address affordability, housing for seniors, low-income



Area of the Halifax Regional Municipality encompassed by the Centre Plan with existing DHSMPS indicated in purple (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c, 20).

Centre Plan Engagement Session 1 (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016e)	
Theme	Occurrences
Walkability and pedestrian comfort	51
Affordable housing	42
Parks and open space	23
Cycling and bike lanes	18
Transit scheduling and amenities	17
Centre Plan Engagement Session 2 (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016d)	
Theme	Occurrences
Improve existing streetscapes to enhance pedestrian & cyclist use	134
Connect existing trails, active transportation routes & street grid	96
Support the development of affordable housing	82
Appropriately located density	80
Preserve existing neighbourhood character	71

Figure 1.1
Citizen Feedback from Centre Plan Engagement Sessions 1 and 2

individuals and new Canadians, housing stock rehabilitation, home-based businesses, or diverse housing types (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016b). Participants could also provide in person feedback at round table discussions. The first event generated 717 comments, and the second generated 1,684 comments. Figure 1.1 catalogues the five most frequent comment categories in each of the first two sessions. The third session asked citizens to vote, rather than comment on specific growth and building height scenarios. Feedback from this session could not be coded with the same themes as the first two sessions.

In both sessions, citizen feedback overwhelmingly supported several policy initiatives: enhanced pedestrian comfort, active transportation, streetscape improvement, park development, and affordable housing. Many citizens also supported policies to address issues of homelessness and gentrification.

The following section explores the policy mechanisms through which these themes were integrated into the Centre Plan and how closely these resemble processes of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’.

Establishing a Growth Imperative

The Centre Plan stresses the importance and inevitability of growth as the primary driving force in Halifax. A growth scenarios report for the city published in 2013 projected a 2031 population of 485,000, a 25% increase over the population in 2009 (Stantec, 2013). The Centre Plan aims to support up to 40% of that population increase, citing the need to encourage “economically and environmentally responsible growth” (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c, 23). The figure is presented as common sense “given current trends

toward urban living and potential for greater growth” (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c, 19). However, recently released 2016 census data indicates that the demand for urban living may not be as high as expected. From 2011 to 2016, population in the Regional Centre increased by less than 2000 people, or about 2%, mostly in more suburban Dartmouth (Statistics Canada, 2017b). The densest and most urbanized area of the city, the Halifax Peninsula, grew by less than 300 people, or 0.5% (Statistics Canada, 2017b). Population data coupled with internal acknowledgment that vacancy rates in the Regional Centre nearly doubled from 2008

to 2015 (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c, 14), indicates growth may not be inevitable.

At community engagement sessions leading to the release of the Plan, the growth imperative was particularly evident. The third community session focused on the need for population increase and the benefits associated with that increase. For example, planning staff indicated that “increased development provides greater housing choice that, in turn, facilitates aging in place and improves affordability” (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016a, 4). The engagement session focused on growth scenarios did not ask if Halifax should grow. Instead, the statements posited population increase and intensification as a fact.

During the engagement process citizen responses had certain constraints. For example, when asked, “How should we grow?” (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016a, 2) citizens were required to cast a vote for one of three development options. The first option limited growth to 25% in 10-story buildings and 75% in 5-story structures. The second allowed 50% in each category and the third prescribed 75% in 10-story buildings and 25% in 5-storey structures.

Each scenario was accompanied by the caveat that smaller numbers of stories would necessitate larger building footprints and mean less land would be “preserved” (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016a, 20). Citizens may associate preservation with protections for heritage developments, spaces of cultural importance, and open space. For planners however, preservation means “maintaining developable land for future growth” (Halifax Regional

Municipality, 2016a, 20). By manipulating language and limiting citizen input to one of three categories, all of which prescribed intensification and increased developer rights, planning staff ensured outcomes would confirm the assumption that growth is important and inevitable.

Associating Density and Increased Development with Social Outcomes

In citizen engagement sessions, planners distributed materials that directly linked intensification with more successful shops and restaurants, easier accessibility by active transportation, and cost savings for tax payers (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016a, 4). In the draft plan, this narrative continues. When discussing transportation goals, the plan implies that an increased “number of people living and working in the Regional Centre makes it both a viable and important area to expand the use of transit and active transportation modes such as walking and cycling” (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c, 39). This implies that transit and active transportation are not viable given the current population and will not be expanded or improved unless intensification occurs. After intensification, proposed growth centres will “have the ability to become complete communities with excellent transit accessibility, where pedestrians and cyclists feel safe and comfortable” (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c, 80). By associating intensification with transit and active transportation upgrades, planners tie the most popular engagement feedback to increased growth and development in the Regional Centre. Smart Growth principles in the Centre Plan posit a similar relationship between intensification and a more livable built form. The following excerpt is from

a section espousing “complete communities”:

“The Centre Plan contains policies that, over time, will strengthen existing communities, enhance the elements that make a complete community and bring these elements to all communities within the Regional Centre. This is accomplished by establishing higher density mixed-use areas and by encouraging infill and a variety of housing forms to provide the necessary number of people to support a variety of businesses, services, and public amenities, such as parks. These uses are then complemented by opportunities to walk, cycle and take public transit” (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c, 20).

Though not directly referencing smart growth or new urbanism, the principles associated with complete communities are underpinned by mixed-use, transit-focused development. This includes the ability to live, work, and play near one’s home, and a decreased reliance on the personal automobile. Many of the social benefits in the Centre Plan are associated with increased population growth and property development. As outlined by Sager (2013), the plan is an example of property-led development, rather than comprehensive planning. The Centre Plan assumes that encouraging property development will result in economic prosperity. It ignores the critique of property-led regeneration for its failure to address wider issues of equity and for the power it gives private market interests like developers, influential businesses, and corporate landowners (Sager, 2013).

These elements of the Centre Plan align citizen feedback with two of Brenner and Theodore’s mechanisms of neoliberalisation. Citing walkability, affordability, improved streetscapes, and active transportation, planners justify the need for “revitalization, reinvestment, and rejuvenation” within the city (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, 372) and “create new opportunities for speculative investment in central-city real estate” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, 371).

Addressing Housing Affordability Through the Market

While not the most frequent theme in engagement comments, housing affordability and gentrification were central topics during the Centre Plan engagement process. Citizens made it clear that the Centre Plan should provide an “affordable and diverse range of housing options” (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c, 29). The Centre Plan addresses affordability throughout the document, but policies are typically vague or use verbs that provide planners and politicians with room to subvert the policy. For example, rather than mandate, the Centre Plan only plans to “promote” or “encourage” family-oriented housing, and a mix of housing options (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c, 60). This despite more than 30 mentions of the importance of maintaining family housing in engagement sessions.

The Halifax Centre Plan addresses affordable housing primarily through density bonusing. Density bonusing allows developers to exceed height limits for a property, provided they agree to contribute certain public benefits to the city or neighbourhood.

The following policy appears twice in the Centre Plan, in the sections prescribing land use in both future growth nodes and centres:

“Create two building height regimes; a lower, pre-bonus height which may be achieved without the contribution of certain public benefits, and a post bonus height where public benefits more than the minimum development requirements are achieved.

Consider a variety of public benefits when assessing site plan approval applications seeking a height bonus in exchange for the provision of public benefit, in accordance with the bonus zoning provisions of the Halifax Regional Municipality Charter. Establish provisions in the Land Use By-law to guide negotiations of appropriate public benefits **which must include affordable housing** and may include:

- Publicly accessible private open space
 - Community and cultural space
 - Public art
 - Cash-in-lieu where none of the above are appropriate (emphasis added)”
- (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2016c, 84, 106)

Density bonusing is a potentially problematic method of dealing with affordable housing. Even if affordable units are paid for by density bonusing, studies have indicated that policy supported density is likely to lead to cultural and economic shifts that displace residents (Jones and Ley, 2016). While the Centre Plan states appropriate public benefits must include affordable housing it still seems like

a developer could choose cash-in-lieu rather than ensure affordable units. Once the gentrification process has started, in-lieu fees or cash, zoning, and density bonuses do not lead to the production of sufficient affordable units (Kamel, 2012). Jones and Ley put it bluntly, “the density bonus... announces the death of affordable housing” (2016, 19).

Density bonusing represents an “expansion of private approaches to social service provision” (Brenner and Theodore, 2012, 369) consistent with ‘actually existing neoliberalism’. Affordable housing, typically the domain of the state, is now dependent on market actors, further emphasizing the integration of neoliberal logic by planners.

Conclusion

The Halifax Centre Plan is an example of a planning strategy that emerged in a neoliberal policy environment. The engagement process was constructed to ensure support for a growth imperative and several important issues raised by citizens during the engagement process are addressed through mechanisms of neoliberalization. Over the next several decades the Centre Plan will prescribe planning responses to issues of affordability, equity, and social welfare in Halifax. Consequences for the lived experience of city will be an important site of future research.

Implications for Equity and Social Justice

Revitalization efforts that privilege mixed-use intensification have been critiqued for their potential to displace residents, intensify socio-spatial

polarization, and co-opt citizen feedback to align with mechanisms of neoliberalization (see Jones and Ley, 2016; Kipfer and Petrunia, 2009; Tretter, 2013). In an increasingly neoliberal environment, where a person’s relationship to the city is defined as one of consumer, spectator, and client, the city is no longer obligated to be “a provider of social services, a promoter of difference, or an engineer of social justice” (Kern, 2007, 676). By reshaping Halifax’s urban space through residential intensification, the Centre Plan is partially responsible for influencing who has a ‘right to the city’. Increasingly, the right to belong may only be available to those who can assert their claim privately through the market (Kern, 2007, 676).

Depoliticization and Dissent

The Halifax Centre Plan illustrates the ability of the neoliberal state to position housing intensification and increased development as solutions to urban problems. By presenting growth and intensification as imperatives, rather than choices, planners depoliticized inherently political actions. This approach limits the space or opportunities for conversation and radical alternatives. During the engagement process, citizens could choose between tightly prescribed categories. The categories either allowed for growth, or split political discussions into depoliticized categories. For example, the few comments about Halifax’s indigenous and African-Nova Scotian populations were categorized under “Heritage and Culture” and separated from discussions of housing or land use and gentrification. I also observed fellow participants in public discussions about protection of neighbourhood character dismissed as anti-

progress or ‘NIMBY’. The Centre Plan thoroughly limited radical opinions, but the degree to which it will affect Halifax will be an important avenue for further study. Future research based on lived experience interviews that illustrate policy outcomes will hopefully expand this study.

Rethinking Practice Under Third-Wave Neoliberalization

The third-wave of neoliberalism is not an explicit policy regime or a campaign platform. It is an extension of political economy, disguised as generally accepted “good practices”. Planners in Halifax did not set out to design an engagement process that curtailed radical perspectives, in fact just the opposite. The Centre Plan was meant to be an inclusive process that embraced contemporary practices, but ended up distorting feedback so that it could be addressed by a set neoliberal policy tools. This illustrates the degree to which planning has been coopted to serve neoliberal ends. If all a planner has is a hammer, everything becomes a nail.

Critical planning theory often reacts to problematic elements in practice, but rarely provides the tools for practitioners to integrate critical understanding into their work. This knowledge is vital if planning expects to contest third-wave neoliberalism and develop contemporary practitioners who can do more than lunge “from one normative proposition to the next” (Grant, 2017, 341). I argue that there is a need to expand the critical dimension of planning practice by creating contexts where scholars and practitioners and work with and inform each other. In that sense, the spaces of struggle must be expanded to the day-to-day of

the practicing planner. We as practitioners need to understand and develop the tools to critically reflect on normative practices, solicit and embrace radical and politicized perspectives, and resist the influence of neoliberal politics. We need to expand our toolkit to include more than hammers. It has been suggested that professional organizations like the American Planning Association and Canadian Institute of Planners could become an important space for the learning and reflection necessary to being this process by hosting more rigorous learning sessions and expanding relationships between planning theorists and practitioners (Flyvbjerg, 2013; Thacher, 2013). I would like to expand this research further. Planning schools are where the tools and conceptualizations of good practice are formulated. An epistemological examination of curriculum and teaching methods might lead to tangible recommendations that improve practice.

Radical planning perspectives that welcome critical discourse are vital surpassing this stage of urban development in Halifax. Planners should encourage and mobilize difference to create progressive outcomes, as opposed to fitting citizen's concerns into limited categories. Imaginative and critical planners who recognize the value of conflict and politicized dissent are needed to transform urban planning.

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Spatializing Class Struggles of Post-Colonialism and Post Modernism: Of the Messing and Cleaning in the City of Harare

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This paper is an attempt to document and critique the dynamics defining in the city of Harare, Zimbabwe, in the post-colonial period where white elitism has been replaced by statist domination that runs contrary to the promises of independence and overcoming income and racial barriers. It argues that a new struggle has been ignited along income and political lines where the poor (hungry, jobless and economically-stranded) are the ones supposedly spoiling city grandeur and aesthetics. The dominating elite class in the form of government is trying to 'clean up' the city by planning and replanning it, yet overlooks and overrules the interests of vendors and home seekers. The paper utilizes documents for context analysis and concludes that spatial injustice in the city of Harare has now been compounded by the shrinking economy and a pseudo-public interest advancement.

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Introduction

This paper explores how access to basic services is at play within the city of Harare. Central to the struggles for access is the replacement of the colonial system with class-based relationships in the post-colonial city that has served to replicate racial inequalities. Neoliberal processes of service segmentation and discordant understandings of the right of the city underlie social inequalities, and the power struggles currently overwhelming Harare.

This exploration highlights the gaps that need to be closed to advance the sustainability agenda for Harare, promote equitable service delivery and livability among the urban poor. We identify the replacement of the post-colonial period white elitism with statist domination as central to understanding the nature of the gaps that have developed. The rise of fragmented political and economic interests that operate on unequal terms runs contrary to the promises of independence of breaking the cycles of inequality (McGregor, 2013; Hammar, 2017). Within this broad arena of contestation, the paper focuses on the role of planning, and specifically waste management, in generating social inequalities and differentiated service delivery and provision in Harare.

We choose to focus on waste management because the rapid rate of urbanization exacerbate challenges for managing waste in both developed and developing countries. Local authorities struggle to collect, recycle, treat, and dispose of the solid waste an increasing population generates (Bogner et al., 2007). The establishment of effective, accessible, affordable and truly sustainable waste

management practices, especially for developing countries is critical to sustainable development (Engeldow, 2010).

Waste management includes the whole cycle of waste creation, transport, storage, treatment, and recovery and does so to minimize pollution (Nyanzou and Jerie, 2014: 35). Waste management also includes the control of waste-related activities with the aim of protecting human health and the environment and resources conservation (Engeldow, 2010).

This study draws primarily from secondary data sources and government documents to develop a qualitative research design. We draw from the literature on Harare that centers the urban morphology and class struggles in the city. We privileged research grounded in local fieldwork that frames the key area of interest: waste management. We then use thematic content analysis to sift through official documents such as government ordinances focusing on settlement development, housing issues and public health to show the disconnect between issues on the ground and a formal institutional infrastructure ill-equipped to keep up with the rapid urbanization of the country, let alone to rectify past injustices.

Harare: Background

Harare (formerly Salisbury) is the primate capital city of Zimbabwe. The city was initially established as a settler colony in 1890. At the time, colonial administrators envisioned Harare to accommodate the white settlers who were anticipating finding some mineral deposits in the area (Zinyama et

al., 1993). Since their prospects were futile, the settlers engaged instead in agricultural activities. Commercial and industrial land use activities soon complemented agriculture and supplanted it as the dominant activity in Harare. This new source of growth led to the settlement assuming the role of administrative capital.

The additional functions of administrative capital for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland reinforced the dominance of Harare as a regional commercial and administrative hub during the 1950s and early 1960s. The short-lived confederation put the three territories that would become independent Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe under a single political leadership that reflected the dominance of Zimbabwe (Mutondoro et al., 2017).

Colonial administration concentrated infrastructure development in Harare. The University of Rhodesia, Salisbury International Airport, and an extensive rail and road networks linking most parts of the country played important roles in the regions' development (Muronda, 2008). Harare was accessible not only to local cities and towns around the country, but to the world at large. Heavy investments in the management of infrastructure services sustained the budding colonial city. These efforts included road construction and maintenance, provision of bulk infrastructure such as water and sanitation, as well as housing.

Harare was growing rapidly, but it remained an enclave for the white settlers and was never conceived as more than that (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009). Settlers were creating a haven for themselves

based on systematic exclusion, only allowing a limited number of Africans to live in the city to meet labor needs. Despite robust population growth, the white population peaked at around 300,000 (City of Harare, 2012). As such, the initial planning and development of Harare accommodated only a small population. The new settlement was built around a small fort and administrative offices for the British South Africa Company, and a cadastral plan was prepared with generous streets laid out on two intersecting grids (Zinyama et al., 1993).

Development of residential suburbs was based on racial lines and a rigid hierarchy, which translated to clear spatial patterns. Whites resided in the most affluent suburbs, Asians came next, followed by Coloureds and lastly the Africans (Brown, 2001; Patel, 1988; Toriro, 2008). The colonial government ensured that this remained the status quo through the implementation of a number of legislative instruments designed to maintain white supremacy in Harare (e.g. Pass Laws, Land Apportionment Act, Vagrancy Act and Tribal Trust Lands Act).

Africans were only allowed in the urban areas on a temporary basis. The main instrument for this separation was the Land Apportionment Act (Number 30 of 1930) which divided the country into African (black) and European (White) areas (Drakakis-Smith, 2000). Further reinforcing this division, the Urban Areas Accommodation and Registration Act (Number 6 of 1946) stipulated that only employed blacks could be allowed in towns and cities. This Act allowed the local authorities to set aside urban locations for working Africans and required that employers accommodate their workers within their premises (Musekiwa, 1995).

This led to the colonial government building many hostels or servants' quarters within the employer's residence for African workers (Chirisa, 2010). The first settlement for African workers was established in 1892, and legislation in 1906 allowed the designation of separate black residential areas, and made it compulsory for all African workers not living at their place of work to live in these locations. In 1907, some 20 ha were allocated for the first African township at Harari (now Mbare), 3 km south of the city center (Zinyama et al., 1993). Therefore, although there were racial discriminations in service provision, it was mainly an issue of quality rather than quantity affecting African suburbs during the colonial period (Wekwete, 1990).

After attaining its independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean government awarded every Zimbabwean citizen "the right to the city" meaning that the urban area was now free for everyone to travel to, visit, and reside. The restrictive laws which confined most Africans to the rural areas were relaxed (Zinyama et al., 1993; Mbiba, 2017). This caused a rapid uptick in the urbanization rate centered on Harare as the economic center of the country.

The frequent droughts which plagued Zimbabwe in the early 1980s further fueled the growth of the urban population. Failing crops forced many rural folks to migrate to the cities in search of a better life, which on top of the natural population increase had dire consequences for cities (Patel, 1988). The capacity of Harare was immediately surpassed and the combination of unstable economic growth and escalating demand for urban services (housing, water and sanitation, waste management and

transport among others) turned the city into a pool of urban waste (Feresu, 2010; Bandaiko and Mandisvika, 2015). The aspirations of equity that independence had heralded disappeared with the poor being the worst affected (Kamete, 2002; Manjengwa et al., 2016). According to the latest statistical estimates, the population of Harare is at least 2.1 million (ZimStat, 2012).

Theoretical Framing

Colonial urban history created racially segregated cities in Zimbabwe. Segregation insured that the parts of the city would have differentiated access to critical services and to the city as a source of livelihood and belonging. Post-independence policies, or the lack thereof, have maintained spatial inequality as the status quo. When paired with rapid urban growth, this has led to the alienation of the urban poor (Muchadenyika, 2015; Mutondoro et al., 2017). In the remainder of the paper we examine how the inequalities the colonial system entrenched in space impact the possibility of the equitable provision of basic services.

Power informs our analysis of the political status quo and sources of contestation that have emerged over the years in Harare. Power refers to "the ability to control resources, own and others', without social interference" (Galinsky et al., 2003, p. 454). Moreover, power enables one to bring about desired outcomes through controlling and manipulating others as well as deciding on the control of resources and affecting behavior of others (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977, p. 3).

Power is also relative and has a direct relationship to

agency. It works through individuals and collectives. What is important here is that the colonial system created asymmetries of power through the restriction of urban areas. We show how this asymmetry persisted after the ousting of minority rule and how people are contesting its evolution. Foucault (1982) argues that if an understanding of power relations is to be achieved, there is need to "investigate the forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations."

While we eschew framing our discussion with reference to the right to the city literature, ideas central to this idea are salient to many of the developments that have taken place in contemporary Zimbabwe. The long history of systematic exclusion from the city and the regulation of access to the urban economy based on the exploitation of Africans' labor makes it a powerful lens through which to understand the stakes in expanding access.

The right to the city is a fluid and seemingly complex concept which stresses the need to restructure the power relations that underlie the production of urban space, fundamentally shifting control away from capital and the state and toward urban inhabitants (Purcell, 2002). This space according to Lefebvre (1991) includes the conceived space, perceived space and lived space. The logic is to make sure that the right to the city "modifies, concretize and make more practical the rights of the citizen as an urban dweller and user of multiple services" (Lefebvre, 1996, p.34). The main argument is to ensure that the city is designed to further the interests of the whole society and firstly of all those who inhabit it (Lefebvre, 1996; Purcell, 2002).

At the same time, the right to the city framework is insufficient in making sense of what we observe. The colonial imprint on Harare has distorted the processes through which a right to city may be achieved. In particular, there is a need to reconcile a rhetoric that is imbued with liberation and expansive rights, and practices that have reinforced the marginalization of the urban poor. In making sense of these processes, neoliberalism serves as a relevant lens, especially in identifying the substantial gaps that exist between conceptualizations of neoliberalization under different economic systems.

Harvey (2005) defines neoliberalism as the spread of capitalism and consumerism together with the deplorable demolition of the proactive welfare state (Harvey, 2005). From his definition, Harvey (2005) demonstrates that neoliberalism is anchored on the notion of capitalism where the role of the state is overtaken by rent-seeking proletarians. In this way neoliberalism best explains the increasing domination of the private sector in the provision of public goods and services.

Market forces seem to overshadow the state. Capitalists seek to maximize profits such that elites and politicians take precedence over everybody else in service delivery. In the early 1980s neoliberalism was therefore referred to as market deregulation, privatization and the withdrawal of the welfare-state across the world. Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005, p. 2) regard neoliberalism as a 'hegemonic system of enhanced exploitation of the majority as a global system of minority power plunder of nations and despoilment of the environment.' They further describe it as a beast that uses different mechanisms to trample upon the rights of the

citizens (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005). Different mechanisms are used to trample the rights of the citizens and these include political, economic, legal, media pressures or even military force in extreme cases.

Institutions and Policy of Waste Management

This section provides an overview of the institutional infrastructure currently in place in Zimbabwe. We emphasize the standards and procedures for establishing authority over the key areas of land management that influence the production of urban space (central and municipal government, landowners, development agencies and the construction industry). The major statutory provision regulating such land and property development is the Regional, Town, and Country Planning (RTCP) Act [Chapter 29:12] which state in its preamble that it is:

An act to provide for the planning of regions, districts and local areas with the object of conserving and improving the physical environment and in particular promoting health, safety, order, amenity, convenience and general welfare.

Section 24 of the RTCP Act focuses on development control and established constraints on development allowed in particular areas. One of the key aspects of the act is to insure consistence in urban development as well as safe-guarding the health and safety of citizens.

Waste management is a critical aspect that this Act dictates. Part XII of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter

29:15] provides more direct guidance concerning the expansion of sewerage and drainage and mandates local authorities to provide these services in human settlements. Importantly, these Acts do not discriminate and put the responsibility for the provision of this service on the local authority.

Likewise, section 69 (a-d) of the Environmental Management Act (EMA) [Chapter 20:27] prescribes the standards for handling, storing, transporting, segregating and destroying any waste. The EMA Act systematically guides the proper ways of disposing of different types of wastes and, again, does not discriminate with regards the waste management in different parts of the country. Part IX of the Public Health Act [Chapter 15:09] focuses on sanitation and housing where section 83 emphasis the need for local authorities to maintain cleanliness and prevent nuisances in their areas of jurisdiction.

The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20) advocates for environmental rights in section 73. Section 73(1) (a) states that every person has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being. In this vein, waste management becomes an intrinsic component of citizens' environmental rights. Section 274(1) mandates urban local authorities to represent and manage the affairs of people in urban areas throughout the country. Local authorities must provide services such as waste management to the citizens in their areas of jurisdiction without impartiality. However, section 274(3) states that:

"...different classes of local authorities may be established for different urban areas, and two or more different urban areas may be placed under

the management of a single local authority."

Two important dimensions emerge from the foregoing overview. First, despite a language of uniformity and universal access, the distribution of authority, with an emphasis on local authority, suggests the possibility for important differences in the ways in which urban areas are administered. Second, there is a disjuncture between the text of many of the policies and the realities from which they emerge. While obligations are clearly defined, there is no acknowledgements of the existing gaps in provision and how to address deficits in the supply of services. We now turn to our interpretation of these issues.

Waste Management Dilemma and Class Struggle in Post-colonial Harare

Before independence, the areas the colonialists lived in were well planned and included access to basic sanitation facilities provided either free or at heavily subsidized rates. The colonial government was able to manage waste efficiently within the capital city thanks to a set of ordinances that it regularly updated (Mbiba, 2017).

Some of the ordinances included The Public Health Act, which was amended 14 times between 1924 and 1977. The Act laid the foundations for improved health management and the deployment of sanitary inspectors, who made door-to-door inspections in urban areas (Magadzire and Maseva, 2006). Moreover, the government adopted the Salisbury Sanitary and Refuse Removal bylaws on waste management in 1948, which it would amend 8 times between 1953 and 1978, at which point the

administration replaced it with the Salisbury (Waste Management) by-laws of 1979.

The high perceived efficiency of the colonial administration and institutional framework did not preclude the rise of waste management as one of the most pressing issues in Harare long before it reached today's peak (Nyanzou and Jerie, 2014). Despite the many ordinances the colonialists put in place to strengthen urban administration, they regarded native suburbs as areas for a cheap and easily controlled labor force, and therefore, made no serious efforts to resolve the emerging problems, particularly those of waste management (Nyanzou and Jerie, 2014).

During the 1980s, the state pursued a socialist approach to basic service provision. During these early years of independence, local authorities were still enjoying the legacy of the colonial government. In the absence of significant changes to the underlying urban structure of Harare, service delivery seemed to be an issue under control requiring little change. However, with rapid urbanization and the expanding right to the city, the demand for such services was increasing at unprecedented rates (Patel, 1988; Feresu, 2010). These early years thus perpetuated the struggles the colonial system had created. White residents continued to have first-class citizen status ahead of the other races, in spite of the proclamations of equity in the country.

At the height of the global push towards austerity-based economic development policy in the 1990s, the government implemented the Economic Adjustment Program. The program aimed at market deregulation, privatization of parastatals and other

economic reforms (Hammar, 2017). This era marked a sharp turn to of neo-liberalism in the country. The repercussions for waste management, one of the targets of cost-cutting, were immediate.

In the face of overwhelming budget deficits, the local authorities were forced to improvise on service delivery. The power imbalance embedded in the spatial structure of the city were reinforced as the urban poor were first to see the withdrawal of state services. Their inability to pay and their spatial isolation meant that they received little attention from the councils.

The government was beginning to fail to deliver on its promises to the people and tension mounted between the citizens and government. It is in this context that workers' unions challenged the government to increase wages, which marked the beginning of confrontations and incipient polarization between the state, working class citizen (through unions) and the ruling Zanu PF party (McGregor, 2013).

Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s the collapse of the formal sector continued unabated. As unemployment rose, the informal sector grew. This transition multiplied waste generation and further compromised the abilities of the authorities to manage waste treatment (Kamete, 2010). The reliance on home industries, in particular, atomized solid waste generation in high-density areas where collection became erratic given their spatial extent and population. This created a vicious circle whereby the already strained services and waste disposal systems neglected the most challenging places (i.e. high density, dominated by informal

activity). The greater the accumulation of waste, the lesser the ability of state services to manage it and the greater the health hazards (Feresu, 2010).

In Harare, specifically, the segregation of low-income areas from richer suburbs and employment areas, and extremely low densities, severely limits the access of urban services for poor families (Mubvami, 1998). The situation in the housing sector continues to show dominance of the elites in the form of privileged access to housing stands (Mazingi et al., 2007). Urban space in Harare is thus a by-product of the polarized city and its dual planning processes.

The increasing disparities between the privileged spaces of the city, those that are safeguarded for the elites and have priority for service provision, and the rest of the city has given rise to an approach to service delivery that is antagonistic. Within this logic, spaces that have been marginalized over time are seen as too far gone, giving the government (state and local) opportunities on several occasions to act casually at the the detriment of the poor residents.

People, the poor, lost their properties and business due to arbitrary decisions that cast them as a menace to order, sanity and aesthetics. The most prominent example is the 2005 operation Murambatsvina (Kamete, 2010). After this deadly operation, informal settlement grew antecedent of the economic situation, as if the Harare City Council did not hear the widespread global condemnation of such an activity. Furthermore, in spite of the global trend towards slum upgrading, the council is still using demolition of illegal settlements as a way of cleaning up the city. The demolitions have sparked

conflicts in all affected suburbs and victims have blamed the local authority for abusing their power (Kamete, 2010).

Harare's waste management system captures the inequality within the city, but it also highlights the broader consequences of economic instability that affects the entire city, elite or not. The current authority is struggling to manage the waste under difficult conditions. They face tight budgets, highly inadequate and malfunctioning equipment, inefficient collection practices with variable levels of service, poor and unhygienic operating practices, including no environmental control systems, open burning of garbage, indiscriminate illegal dumping and littering, and a public with seemingly little sensitivity to the garbage around them or any awareness of responsible waste management (Feresu, 2010; City of Harare, 2012). Harare's waste management system needs serious rehabilitation, first on an emergency basis, followed by development and implementation of long-term sustainable measures (Muza, 2006; Nyanzou and Jerie, 2014).

The events in early 2000 have been critical in shaping the class struggles and right to the city in Harare. First, the existence of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the huge support base it commanded in urban areas was a significant threat to the government and ruling ZANU PF party. Ultimately there emerged two classes in the city which were differentiated along political affiliation.

McGregor (2010) narrated that from 2000, Zimbabwe's urban centers became strongholds for MDC, and voters went on to elect MDC councilors

and mayors to run the affairs of local authorities. Urban residents' loyalty to the MDC resulted in the central government neglecting urban citizens and focusing on the rural areas instead. The implication was a dearth of service delivery in urban areas, especially Harare (Chirisa, Matamanda and Bandaiko, 2014).

Chatiza (2010) highlights how the local authorities ceased undertaking their work as stipulated in section 274 of the Constitution and became politicized, pervasively corrupt and marred by patronage and clientism. Poor governance prevailed in Harare for the whole period up to 2009, culminating in the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina (Tibaijuka, 2005). Hammar (2017), for example, argued that the operation was a way of punishing the urbanites for supporting MDC.

The logic of sanitation through destruction extended to subsistence economic activity. Local authorities attempted to dampen street vending in Harare under the hospice of waste management and sanitation (Dube and Chirisa, 2010; Bandaiko and Mandisvika, 2015). Since, vendors and the municipal police have clashed constantly, sometimes with the use of fatal force. The basis of the council seems to be far-fetched as they claim that the vendors are responsible for the waste dilemmas persisting in the CBD.

One vendor interviewed by the Zimbabwe Independent (17 January 2017), expressed that it is unfair for city council to blame vendors for the typhoid outbreak:

"On the day they announced that we should

vacate the streets within 48 hours there was burst sewage close to Bakers Inn along Julius Nyerere Way which had not been fixed for days and yet they want to put the blame on us. They should deal with those burst sewage pipes and clean up Mbare where the outbreak began.”

People have been vending in the streets of Harare for a long time and have never been tied to disease outbreaks in the past. In response, Vendors Initiative for Social and Economic Transformation (Viset) director Samuel said the ban on the sale of vegetables and fruits is unreasonable. He remarks:

“We see no link between the outbreak of typhoid and vendors. Vending has been there for six years and there has never been a problem of that sort. We call upon the City of Harare to stop the blame game and provide the services they are supposed to be providing. (as quoted in Zimbabwe Independent, 17 January 2017).”

Discussion

Rapid urbanization and economic implosion have affected the capacity of the local authorities to provide adequate urban services. This has exacerbated class differentiation and conflict within cities. Elites have become accustomed to blaming poor people for littering and affecting city beautification.

A persistent remnant of the colonial urban structure, suburbs are high density, medium density and low density, correlating inversely with income. These suburbs have a geographical division with high-

density suburbs located in the west and south of the city, and the low-density suburbs occupying the northern portions of the city. While most ethnic groups are present in medium- and low-density suburbs, high-density suburbs are generally home to the majority of the black Zimbabwean population.

Service delivery differences across suburbs has reinforced spatial inequality. High-density residential areas have poorer access to urban services than those in the low density, yet they are the ones with limited means to cope with infrastructural shortage. The government and privileged classes use those in the informal sector, especially street vendors, as scapegoats for making the city dirty and spreading sanitation related diseases like typhoid.

However, the problems facing Harare can never be finger pointed to one person, class of people or institution. This is a problem of the whole system. Yes, planning has failed to some extent, but most of the planning initiatives are meant to promote public safety, health and order; these are the prime reasons that brought planning into life in the industrial cities. In this drive, however, there are economic, environmental, political, and social dynamics that shape the working environment of professional planning.

We can criticize planning laws that have remained static from the colonial period and have contributed to the problems faced in human settlements. This is partly true. The regulatory framework and plans must be robust and flexible to embrace the emerging trends in economies within which they operate. Sticking to the laws that governed human settlement planning during the colonial era is

tantamount to committing professional suicide; too many things have changed which require a change in the governing principles.

According to Chirisa and Dube (2012), the pavements are over-congested, marked by buyers kneeling and crouching and the streets are ever clogged during the night rush hours and all the peri-urban settlements are dotted with slums. The scenario shown above serves to highlight the chaos that the city was and is experiencing and it must serve as an alarm for the city leaders to sit down and take action.

Urban authorities and state planning have responded, but with deficiencies and hick-ups. State and local reforms to relax planning standards, Circular 70 of 2004 for example, is one such effort. The Harare (Vendors) By-laws of 2014, which aimed to control vending in the city, is another. However, these efforts by the state fall short because other facets of the economy are not supportive for example the high unemployment in the country.

The national political and economic policies that produced high unemployment and ostracized the Zimbabwean economy must take much of the blame for the failures of the planning efforts to address some of the challenges. The bulk of the people streaming into Harare go into the informal sector. It is difficult to estimate the level of informal sector activity in Harare, but undoubtedly there is a significant increase. Harare residents resorted to street food vending as a coping mechanisms and survival strategy in the face of high unemployment and lower wages in the formal sector. With this rapid increase in the demand for vending stalls and urban

services at large, there is also need for a robust economic muscle to implement rescue plans.

The economic decline has compounded the financial shortfalls the local authority face in providing urban services and the difficulties local people have in paying for state services. To make matters worse, the local authority is punishing the poor in the name of city beautification through eviction, demolition and confiscation of wares.

Blame cannot single out local government and planning authorities, but there is still much room for improvement at that level. In Harare, the failure of official policy and regulations of urban space to recognize the needs of low-income population groups inhibits these people’s ability to help themselves. Planning under these circumstances is rigid. Yet, urban space is a by-product of the planning process, not a resource in its own right. There is need for a system overhaul, allowing each sector to contribute towards the vision of the “sunshine city” status and not punish poor people who are mere victims of the economic decline.

Conclusion

The preceding sections have demonstrated that the waste problem in the City of Harare has become a cross cutting issue that has no immediate solutions. It is clear that the management of waste is an expensive operation and is becoming increasingly costly due to rapid urbanization and a growing backlog. Waste is a visible testament to failures in local governance, but not a unique problem.

Zimbabwe’s urban poor continue to live in extremely

difficult circumstances. An environment fraught with uncertainties has existed for the urban poor in Zimbabwe since 2010 in the context of a sustained economic decline. They face uncertainties in their individual and collective lives as the state of the economy declines, but also with the government's incapacity to make any meaningful financial contribution to their development needs.

The social and political environment has been characterized by mistrust and a lack of confidence. This paper has shown how the political influences which shaped the development of Harare, compounded by modern-day planning policies, have resulted in a polarized city, where the urban poor are segregated in low-income, single-use ghettos, without the employment opportunities that mixed neighborhoods have.

This paper therefore recommends that there is need for the national and local government, civic engagement, private consultants and planning practitioners to collaborate. Massive resources are needed in place to strike a continuum between citizens and government in Zimbabwe. Therefore, we recommend sustainability, transparency, accountability, and good governance core principles, instruments and theories.

It is clear from our discussion that solving waste management issues needs to come through efforts in other sectors as prerequisite. There is need to integrate the street economy into the mainstream economy in a way that would ensure sustainability of the former and long-term economic growth and sustainable development of the country. However, integrating the informal economy into the

mainstream economy is a great challenge to most governments in developing countries.

Furthermore, the urban housing policy has put an over-emphasis in ownership and affordability. The issue of home ownership being prescribed as a solution is flawed. The policy penalizes low-income earners because, like previous policies, it continues to measure housing need through lack of ownership. The policymakers need to combine information gathered through land price surveys and household surveys to provide an up to date, accurate and detailed profile of land and housing market. This will help to assess the affordability of land for households at different income levels. In this way, low-income earners will be catered for in housing units that are within their means.

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Book Review

Street Corner Secrets: Sex, Work, and Migration in the City of Mumbai

by Svati Pragna Shah

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014

Shivani Shedde

In light of rising right wing movements exemplified by the Hindu nationalist rhetoric of sexual morality, sex workers are subjected to a hierarchical system of rights-based citizenship. Development initiatives in the nationalist agenda, is not securing a means to upward mobility for India's rural and urban poor, but rather the adoption of neoliberal economic reforms to further the infrastructural capacity of the state. For Mumbai's sex workers, this means that rights are not granted by the state, but are subject to negotiation with state actors and agencies for access to basic municipal services – water and electric supply, amongst others.

Svati Shah's *Street Corner secrets* throws light on the politics of prostitution, a contentious subject in the informal economy of India. She makes visible the tenuous relationships of the urban poor with the state, and brings to fore the production of public space and solicitation in Mumbai.

Despite being situated within an uneven economic environment, this monograph provides a sensitive spatial analysis that rejects the powerlessness of sex workers. She asserts that sex work occupies a highly charged political landscape in India - spaces of sex work can be seen as political territories, not simply places of suppression and violence. Instead, the monograph elaborates on the making of intimate space beyond the material and into the imaginative that allows the marginalized to make claims on city space.

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Shortly after reading the fourth of five chapters from Svati Shah's 2014 book *Street Corner Secrets*, I took a moment to pause at the way her ethnography provides a complex theoretical terrain to analyze and assess her potentially contentious assessment of prostitution in Mumbai. Published in 2014, her book challenges stigmatized notions of prostitution and situates sexual services within an informal economy of sex work and commerce. She investigates these practices of commerce within spaces of the city – the brothel, the day-wage laborer's naka (square), and the street side – combining deep ethnography and interviews to excavate the meaning of sexual labor and its relationship to citizenship. She asserts that prostitution is simply a means to an end, borne out of economic need and the material conditions necessary for survival. With such an assertion, her work critiques the adoption of neoliberal reforms by the Indian nation state, and its ever-increasing uneven geographies.

Shah offers the reader a charged reading of the streets and red-light districts of Mumbai that can perhaps be interpreted as 'anti-abolishment'. That is not to say that she precludes the possibilities of violence from her analysis, but highlights the ways in which violence is 'managed' rather than mitigated. Moreover, through an analysis of her interviews with sex workers, Shah frames sex work at the intersection of both, economic boundaries (sex work through the lens of economic precarity associated with caste and class), as well as a deeper understanding of the affective forms and effects of prostitution. She combines this critical ethnography with a strong methodology, and is able to give the reader a means to penetrate the spaces of prostitution and commercial sex work in Mumbai. Secondly, she deploys this framework to analytically rebut larger, singular narratives of Euro-American and feminist discourse. Instead, her study focuses on the matrix

of negotiations, politics and intimacies that permeate ordinary citizens' everyday lives, and provides a strong introduction to the anthropology of urban space as well as the politics of citizenship.

Shah's Marxist analysis draws from ideas of spatial production from Lefebvre and the formation of otherness, or 'heterotopia', from Foucault. She asserts that space, as a means of production, renders it as a means of power. However, in opposition to Lefebvre, she points out that, "space is produced through a process that is never unidirectional, but one that is also shaped by a potentially endless host of agents, events, laws, and practices" (p.34).

Shah conceptualizes space as a set of power relations that produces subjectivities and is in turn produced by those subjectivities. When she places the spaces of sex work in relation to the space of the city (the other site), Foucault's influence is present. She notes, "Foucault's schematic framing of space is built around heterotopias, those 'certain [sites], but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize or invent the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect'" (p.35). She analyzes the production of public space in Mumbai through networks of trade, institutional infrastructure, temporality and the epistemological tensions of "knowing" and "acknowledging" acts and spaces of solicitation. She further posits that state mandated and socially accepted forms of public space, are inherently built on a complex set of exclusions through the aggressive regulation of poor migrants and slum dwellers in these areas, and that "large gatherings of poor migrants in the city's commercial areas are only truly permitted in certain contexts, most notably in the time-bound formation of the naka" (p. 52).

For her, an examination of the political economy of migration and movement is vital. She notes, “[Migration] is understood to have taken place within a complex matrix of decisions, and of power and powerlessness, in which people aim to negotiate their best option for economic survival” (p.31). Her analysis addresses the vulnerability of village life. Many citizens of Mumbai do not have steady work or income to support their families. She continues, “for landless rural migrants in Mumbai, migration retains acute relevance as a category of analysis for understanding the vagaries of daily life. This counters the notion of migration as a linear journey with a finite moment of completion” (p.33). With this statement, Shah embraces the theme of migration as a spatio-temporal process for the landless migrant or sex worker. For this type of worker, access to rights such as water and housing are not guaranteed, but contingent on acts of “negotiation.”

Her successive chapters reflect on these acts of negotiation within archetypal spaces of sex work: the naka, the street and the brothel. Simultaneously, she comments on izzat (honor), majboori (hard work) and marzi (choice). In doing so, she throws light on the complex debate of free will vis-à-vis constructions of “Third World women” within abolitionist anti-trafficking initiatives in Euro-American discourse. She writes, “it seems that the conflation of violence, prostitution, and trafficking reiterate a historically familiar and perhaps recursive trope of the helpless Third World woman who must be saved from her Third World-ness.” She continues, “the familiarity of this trope is so powerful that it takes over any discussion of poverty, of rural development gone awry, or even of economic and social class in relation to sexual commerce” (p.220).

As a reader, I commend her ability to weave together these jumps, from the intimate, to larger narratives of state power, access to citizenship, and international development discourse. Her ethnography is persuasive, elucidating the ways sexual commerce is part of the production of space and self in the city of Mumbai. The book should have broad appeal to urban studies students as it provides an innovative introduction to the anthropology of urban space and the politics of citizenship.

Aquí Estamos: The Sanctuary City's Political Space

Vojislava Filipcevic Cordes

The article argues that sanctuary cities in the U.S. offer a religious and a secular response antithetical to the hostile state, a response fueled by local legal and political reactions and, especially, the solidarity of social movements and political activism. Sanctuary cities are suggestive of transformative politics and offer an inclusive polity as an alternative to the restrictive state. Thus, the argument here reinforces the claim that sanctuary cities in the U.S. can be framed as “an alternative to an exclusionary statist regime” (contra Bagelman 2016, xx; see also, Czajka 2013) and a site of crucial networks of solidarity with the undocumented, the asylum seekers, and the refugees. All three categories of immigrants have become victims of the discourses and policies of criminalization and exclusion - this has taken place in light of the dramatic increase in the numbers of both the undocumented in the U.S. and the asylum seekers in the E.U., simultaneously with more stringent immigration enforcement.

This research addresses the gap in literature on the specific role of cities regarding the transformative potential of sanctuaries and discusses the underexplored problematic linkages between crime and immigration. Sanctuary cities “provide a territorial legal entity at a different scale at which sovereignty is articulated” (Bauder 2016a). As Saskia Sassen has argued, the new strategic role of cities also includes a “return to urban law” (2013, 69) replacing, supplementing, or reinterpreting the national law. The article further compares sanctuary policies in the U.K. and the U.S., arguing that U.S. policies offer greater political space for the city-based grassroots sanctuary movement. Political space is theorized via linkages between urban theory and the concepts of urban commons (Foster and Iaione 2016, 2017, Harvey 2013), right to the city (Lefebvre 1996), and city power (Schragger 2016), in addition to Saskia Sassen’s global city research. Given the recent federal crackdown on sanctuary cities, this political space is at risk of diminishing as mayors seek alternatives to formal sanctuary city ordinances, while on the other hand the number of sanctuaries cities is increasing in defiance of the federal authorities.

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Introduction

Sanctuary cities oppose a hostile state. An international comparative perspective can significantly contribute to understanding the nature and functioning of this opposition. This paper engages in a conversation with Bagelman's (2016) analysis of sanctuary cities in the United Kingdom to deepen our understanding of sanctuary and how it is used in the United States.

Bagelman (2016) relies on the single case of Glasgow to delve into the meaning of sanctuary. Without contrasting evidence, her analysis tends to overemphasize the degree to which sanctuary cities only replicate state exclusions, and fails to develop solidarities with undocumented people, asylum seekers, and refugees.

Her research nevertheless usefully highlights the ways in which sanctuary practices can be limited. She challenges the notion that sanctuary cities in the UK "offer a hospitable, even sacred, remedy" to "hostile, top-down explicitly punitive politics" (Bagelman, 2016, p. 7). On the contrary, she argues that sanctuary cities extend the unbearable wait asylum seekers endure, what she calls the 'suspended state' (Bagelman, 2016, p. 5). The suspended state highlights the experience of having to wait within the charitable zone of sanctuary. Immigrants are embroiled in a process akin to pseudo-incorporation into the margins of society that "too often means integrating into destitution or chronic dependency on charity" (Bagelman, 2016, p. 5). Those who have had their refugee status rejected find themselves cast to the peripheries with rights claims ignored and no access to benefits and services.

The sanctuary movement in the UK has emerged from a grassroots group of faith-based communities. Neither a government policy nor the non-profit sector supported the movement. In neglecting that sanctuary practices have involved a wider range of supporters, Bagelman (2016) offers a limited vision of sanctuary. While the formal sanctuary city might not represent a challenge to the state, disruptive everyday practices of sanctuary (see Darling and Squire, 2013) point to the presence and the actions of migrants and constitute a real sanctuary.

The paper argues that sanctuary practices offer secular and religious responses antithetical to the hostile state. Secular and religious currents of the movement work in synergy but also show signs of tension. On the one hand, the movement has grown, diversified, and secularized, while on the other, immigrants who require physical sanctuaries are still dependent on churches for support (fieldwork notes, July 2017- June 2018). Naturally, this response is fueled by local legal and political reactions (including to abolish ICE, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, which replaced the Immigration and Naturalization Service) and the solidarity of pro-immigrant social movements with the undocumented, asylum seekers, and refugees.¹ I affirm Czajka's (2013, p. 44) notion that "sanctuary's promise lies in its potential to disrupt the state's attempt to monopolize territorial sovereignty and ways of being political." Sanctuary practices shape an inclusive polity and foster resistance to state power in the U.S.

This approach is in contrast to the U.K., where sanctuary cities "reproduce some dominant discourses that sanctuary practices overtly seek

to counter" (Lippert and Rehaag, 2013, p. 4). It is, thus, crucial to emphasize the distinction between the formal, empty rhetoric of sanctuary and the sanctuary practices of political struggle. In the context of this research, this reflects the political activism of the sanctuary movement and the ways in which it attempts to involve citizens of New York in protecting the undocumented; during fieldwork, the New Sanctuary Coalition participants consistently emphasized the role of the community mobilization of both citizens and the undocumented in preventing deportations.

I draw from participant-observation fieldwork in New York with the New Sanctuary Coalition (NSC), conducted between July 2017-June 2018, to analyze the implications of creating and pursuing sanctuary practices. The NSC works to prevent deportations and boasts 1,000 volunteers who accompany immigrants to court and ICE check-in appointments, provide accompaniments and bond funds, and a weekly community meeting referred to as the assembly (fieldwork notes, August 10, 2017). One of the key activities of the NSC that demonstrates the scope of the organization's activities is the legal clinic. As one volunteer described:

"In the legal clinic, we help people who have someone in detention, negotiate legal fees and reveal unfair legal practices, we assist family reunification, help victims of crimes. We can stop or slow down the deportation process. We don't just support the undocumented; we keep the system accountable. The judges know us, ICE knows us. They fear us. They have blocked us [from accompaniments], but we will keep going. We show up to doctors' appointments,

to family court, to lawyers appointments, to Varick Street" (fieldwork notes, August 10, 2017).

Fieldwork results show the effectiveness of the NSC accompaniment program strategy. In numerous cases observed, they resulted in the slowing down of the deportation process. The presence of the mostly native-born, overwhelmingly white, female, and middle- to senior age New York residents was critical for the success of cases. They strongly supported undocumented Friends through their at times silent presence at ICE check-in and case hearings and at times vocal advocacy at the Assembly, vigils, and Jericho walks.

I build on this fieldwork to expand the definition of sanctuary practices. As Nyers (2006, p. 37) has pointed out, "noncitizens are performing some of the most vibrant and 'authentic' citizenship practices." The practice of sanctuary hood, in particular, illustrates how non-citizens participate in the creation of political spaces and the shaping of local politics. It is a space that confronts the norms of the United States and its responsibilities to address poverty and suffering (Cunningham, 1995, p. 210). This space is political space in which the undocumented, the refugees, and the asylum seekers can claim right to the city (Lefebvre, 1996) and where local government in contrast to the state government can exercise city power (Schragger, 2016) to achieve social equality and to institute more equitable criminal justice policies. Thus, while the sanctuary movement can be seen as a set of actions against the repressive state, it might also serve as an impetus for the improvement of local governance.

The rest of the paper articulates the nature of sanctuary practices in relation to political space. I begin by locating the NSC in relation to the notion of sanctuary cities. The criminalization of sanctuaries has created a need for protection that also affords those seeking protection a voice. I argue that voice comes through a combination of factors that give rise to political spaces. Sanctuary hood provides publicness, which, when combined with legality, visibility, and secularization, provide the basis for advocating with the undocumented, refugees, and asylum seekers. I examine legality and visibility as two aspects that put the efforts of the NSC in relief. Finally, the foregoing discussion forms the basis for my synthesis of political space in the context of sanctuary practices.

Criminalizing the sanctuary

I join the call to “reimagine community and solidarity anew beginning from the experience of displacement, statelessness and illegalization” (Vrasti and Dayal, 2016, p. 1001). I examine the ways in which the experience of displacement and illegalization informs the sanctuary practices of the citizens and the undocumented with the NSC. According to Bauder (2016b, p. 252), “‘illegalized’ migrants exemplify marginal populations that are denied equal participation in urban life.” However, social movements, political protests, and sanctuary cities are “mobilizing a layer of possibility of belonging” to at least an urban, if not national, polity (Bauder, 2016b, p. 253).

The focus on cities as sites of political contestation offers a lens through which to understand the disjunction between the label, as applied to a city in the abstract, and practices. A true sanctuary

city is a site of sanctuary practices and crucial networks of solidarity with the undocumented, asylum seekers, and refugees, and, by extension, a location where sanctuary policies are implemented by the local government. The article refers to all three categories of immigrants who have become victims of the policies of criminalization since “the rise of the ‘crimmigration’ enforcement regime in the late 1980s and 1990s and the federal government’s post-9/11 effort to enlist state and local law enforcement to engage in immigration enforcement activities” (Lasch, 2016, p. 159-160).

Distancing the New Sanctuary Coalition in New York from the official New York City administration sanctuary proclamations, a volunteer with the NSC noted that the label of sanctuary means nothing; it is merely a brand. The city claims it will not detain refugees (based on their status), but by the very criminalization of the simplest infraction (such as jumping turnstiles), the city has tools to target individuals based on their race, ethnicity or linguistic skill for deportation on ground that they broke the law (fieldwork notes July 12, 2017).² This creates a contradiction between the intention of sanctuary city and sanctuary practice that renders the label cities apply largely vacuous.

Following the formation of ICE, which replaced the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), “immigrants are legally constructed as more than outsiders: they are potentially dangerous criminals or terrorists threatening the US” (Yukich, 2013, p. 112). For example, Amanda Morales Guerra is a Guatemalan mother seeking a physical sanctuary in an Episcopal church in Washington Heights. A community organizer with the NSC argued that she was a victim not only of el sistema migratorio [a

victim of the immigration system] but also referred to the mother as *la victima del sistema legal* [a victim of the legal system] (fieldwork notes, August 17, 2017). Furthermore, these systems are deeply biased. Many forms of gender- and racial-based injustices are embedded in the US legal system (Lasch, 2016, p. 188-189).

A volunteer with the NSC echoed these observations following a press conference in support of a physical sanctuary for Amanda Morales Guerra, “The ICE does not go after the Irish in Woodlawn or the Eastern Europeans in Brighton Beach. They go after Latin American and African immigrants. They are sending people back into the countries where they are going to be murdered” (fieldwork notes, August 17, 2017).

The NSC’s scrutiny of, and resistance to, the criminalizing technologies of the state demonstrate another facet of the criminalization of sanctuary seeking. For example, the use of ankle bracelets is not only demeaning to the wearer, it also enriches GPS-device companies such as Libre by Nexus (Miller, 2017). At a community meeting of members, one of the Friends recounts how she had to wear ankle bracelets in detention. She did not understand why she had to wear them. Ankle bracelets caused pain, sleeplessness, stress, anxiety, trauma, and problems walking, she said. It was as if the “bracelets were in her head, as when she was not wearing them she would wake up and think about the bracelets. *Braceletos en la mente* [bracelets on the mind]... *una injusticia que hace la inmigración* [an injustice that the Immigration does]” (fieldwork notes, July 6, 2017).

Even in the absence of infractions, the state implements strategies to track immigrants who

have had any contact with law enforcement. A member of the NSC noted at a meeting, “Even though there are declarations of sanctuary city, [the state] gets around that by fingerprinting and sharing the prints across federal databases” (fieldwork notes, September 6, 2017) suggesting the limits of resistance of sanctuary practices.

Creating sanctuaries

An NSC organizer explained that there are three levels of sanctuary:

“1) the public declaration that we stand in solidarity with the immigrants, 2) channeling some of the resources towards sanctuary (participation in accompaniments, uses of church space for the events), and 3) physical sanctuary. We need every single level. We are never harboring or concealing people – this is a public campaign. We are giving visibility to the plight of the people – there are no mechanisms in the immigration [system] for the justice that we need” (fieldwork notes, September 6, 2017).

Physical sanctuary is a complex system which includes security, food, childcare, social activities, legal aid, building preparation, medical and social services, strategies and outreach, and the press (fieldwork notes, August 31, 2017). The NSC wants at once to emphasize the publicness and visibility of their campaign and stress the sanctuary practices that go beyond the provision of mere physical sanctuary, which is commonly the focus of the media.

Furthermore, the NSC has created a project called the sanctuary hood (*el barrio santuario*).

According to a lawyer who works for the Coalition, sanctuary hood is coming from people who live in the community. "It is about explicitly claiming public space and letting ICE know that it is not welcome. ICE uses military equipment -- many are former soldiers from Iraq and Afghanistan. We want to let them know that no one wants to talk to them -- no one wants to help them. This is inverting the panopticon -- letting them know that they too are being watched" (fieldwork notes, interview, August 4, 2017).

The NSC is further developing a rapid response system (a hotline) in case of a possible ICE raid that would work on three levels:

1. protecting the immigrants in their house/the work place/the street.
2. partnering with sanctuary hoods to alert a local priest to open up the church building in case of the need for an immediate physical sanctuary
3. informing the faith-based leaders to whom the immigrant granted a privacy waiver to accompany them to the processing center on Varick Street.

An immigrant facing an ICE raid has numerous options. These include appointing a guardian for their children, connecting with an organizer to mobilize the community, working with a religious leader, and engaging a recorder to document and investigate ICE. The NSC advises the immigrants on best practices. For example, remaining silent, refraining from signing documents such as the I-407 form for rapid deportation, not opening the door, and not to lie if asked any questions. The New Sanctuary Coalition distributes flyers entitled 'Beyond Your Rights' to businesses and houses of worship. NSC volunteer make it clear that the

sanctuary hood works only if the community gets involved. The involvement of US citizens is the key.

There are different levels of sanctuary. One example is to offer a safe, physical space for the person, when confronted by ICE. A person can say, "I know I can go in and be accepted. It could be an LGBTQ community member or a person of color. If a business becomes a sanctuary space, if ICE tries to detain them, the business can close the door and ask for a warrant" (fieldwork notes July 12, 2017).

One of the youth volunteers, a member of DSA (Democratic Socialists of America), organized a sanctuary area in Bushwick and Ridgewood, diverse immigrant neighborhoods of Brooklyn that are increasingly gentrifying.. "We set up a table, talked to businesses, and walked through the neighborhood distributing 'Beyond Your Rights' flyers. We made alliances with other organizations such as The Base, an anarchist group, Make the Road, and [others]... We organized a church sanctuary within a local episcopal church. We contacted about 60-70 businesses and signed up about 40. We were letting people know about the sanctuary space and what their rights are"(fieldwork notes, July 20, 2017).

As an organizer emphasized, "sanctuary hood should be in every spot, in every corner -- that would make New York really a sanctuary city which at the moment it is not" (fieldwork notes, August 10, 2017). Another organizer noted, "Our goal is to extend sanctuary beyond churches, which are critical as sacred spaces. But we want bodegas, delis, places where people go, beauty salons, barber shops, to know what they can do to protect people" (fieldwork notes, August 30, 2017).

According to the sanctuary hood flyers distributed at meetings, a local business could become a sanctuary hub by displaying the symbol of safety, having helpful resources, including "Beyond Your Rights cards," and being able to close doors in case of an ICE raid and demanding a warrant. While fieldwork results are suggestive of the broadening of the movement to include the sanctuary hood effort, this effort would require resources that the NSC currently does not have, including an active civic base in a variety of neighborhoods. Only five people participated in sanctuary hood in Corona, Queens (fieldwork, August 5, 2017) yet dozens of participants showed for the monthly Assembly at Judson Memorial Church in Greenwich Village (fieldwork, 2017-2018).

The symbolic power of the sanctuary hood is nevertheless significant. Sanctuary hood suggests that sanctuary cities are not simplistic positive acts of protection against oppressive forms of state power. In contrast to Bagelman's (2016) assertions, they are legal and political sites of resistance against restrictive, parochial national policies. They are not only against the 'deportation, detainment, and dispersal' regime of asylum (Bagelman, 2016, p. 7), but against an even more restrictive national government in the U.S. that has almost entirely closed doors to refugees.

This argument relies upon a new conceptualization of the city – a site of citizenship and rights-claiming (Isin, 2008). The city is a space of complexity and diversity in which non-citizen immigrants and citizens are both urban subjects shaping their new subjectivity and identity in the city (Sassen, 2013). They act as a 'strategic frontier zone' (Sassen, 2013, 67) for marginalized people, residents whose

position does not afford them an entitlement to power and even robs people of power.

Urban spaces open the possibility to create new fronts of political contestation where those who traditionally lack power can carve out places within the city and make room for new political actors. Such actors could also petition the legal system to become more inclusive and equitable and could try to influence policy-makers and local and state political representatives to offer support for sanctuary practices.

This is especially true in global cities where politics are necessarily transnational. This logic is captured in the chants of a crowd gathered to support Amanda Morales Guerra at a press conference: "¡Aquí estamos y no nos vamos, y si nos echan, nos regresamos!" [Here we are and we are not leaving, and if they make us leave, we will return!]" (fieldwork notes, August 17, 2017). A community leader of the NSC asserted that sanctuary practices raise awareness and "change the way people feel" giving them a sense of a possibility that they will not be deported (fieldwork notes, August 30, 2017). This shapes the urban political subjectivity of sanctuary practices participants, most of whom appeared (and in some cases explicitly claimed to be) empowered by these efforts, in spite of the legal obstacles they may have faced. While the movement places an emphasis on individual immigrants' lives and their own sense of empowerment even in the face of possible deportation, it also construes the undocumented, asylum seekers, and refugees who participate in sanctuary practices as more politically active, better organized, groups.

The sanctuary hood effort suggests that the

undocumented, asylum seekers, and refugees can become political actors and urban denizens claiming rights to the city. The claiming of political spaces of sanctuary could be seen as following four trajectories: 1) the movement towards legality (by challenging the government in court and by claiming “rights”); 2) publicness (through practices such as sanctuary hood); 3) visibility (by ‘coming out as undocumented’ and increasing media exposure in seeking an immigration policy reform. For example, the Dream Act, or via public reemphasis by Democratic mayors on maintaining sanctuary city policies); and 4) secularization (by the broadening of sanctuary sites beyond houses of worship and of the coalition itself to include increasingly secular support, as in the sanctuary hood effort).

These four trajectories also expose the limitations of the movement – one the one hand, the emphasis on legal challenges faces the obstacles of a restrictive immigration law and places the emphasis on individual cases. Public efforts, such as sanctuary hood, must confront insufficient resources and civic infrastructure. Visibility places in the foreground the faces of the Dreamers and relies upon selective media coverage, although examples of grassroots documentary filmmaking (for example, André Daughtry’s film *New Sanctuary*) represent another form of viable resistance. Secularization is, however, indicative of the increasing strength of the movement to resist pressures of religious organizations to select ‘worthy’ cases to support -- yet support of churches still appears critical in cases of physical sanctuaries.

Legality and visibility of sanctuary practices

Sanctuary practices represent a realm of urban law

and do not exist outside of it (see Czajka, 2013, p. 43). It should be noted that legal protections may be a weak tool to protect the undocumented. Advocates of the sanctuary movement in the United States have argued that the state has systematically acted against international and domestic laws concerning refugees.

Sanctuary providers should be seen as following their legal and moral obligations (Czajka, 2013, p. 47). An NSC leader corroborated this view, arguing that (in the context of detainer requests) sanctuary is about maintaining the law and not opposing it (fieldwork notes, July 6, 2017). This conflicts with the view of the INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service, which preceded ICE] officials who asserted that the sanctuary movement is intentionally breaking the law (Czajka, 2013).

In relation to the law, sanctuaries can be both non-confrontational (legal representation) and disruptive. For example, physical sanctuary, in particular--which could be an act of civil disobedience (although the latter was more typical of the 1980’s sanctuary movement aiding the Central American refugees (see Yukich, 2013)).

Most recently, the NSC engaged in a disruptive practice attempting to prevent the detention of the NSC community leader Ravi Ragbir in New York. Ragbir’s detention was a targeted action against an outspoken immigrant leader and an activist. His place in the public eye could not protect him against the ICE’s stepped-up, aggressive efforts to deport him for a felony for which he has long served a sentence. The January 11, 2018 intervention in Lower Manhattan resulted in eighteen arrests including of City Council representatives Ydanis

Rodriguez and Jumaane D. Williams (fieldwork January 15, 2018; see also, Hing 2018). The NYPD arrested those participants because of their resistance in protecting Ragbir. The NSC organized a packed courtroom along with an additional full room and a Jericho Walk (a protest walk around the ICE offices on 26 Federal Plaza in Lower Manhattan). They argued that it was community power that allowed Ragbir’s legal team to win a Habeas Corpus petition and secure his release from custody (on the basis of due process and avoidance of cruelty) (fieldwork, January 29, 2018).³

Second, the question is how a city can become a true place of justice and solidarity with refugees and undocumented people, and not become complicit in their invisibility. Discussing the case of Amanda Morales Guerra, an organizer with the NSC explained

“Amanda and those seeking refuge are not fleeing from justice – they are running toward justice. We are not harboring criminals. We are not hiding. We are defying a law that is unjust. Sanctuary is a symbol of civil disobedience -- a movement of people fleeing El Salvador and Guatemala, defying a law that was sending them to certain death” (fieldwork notes, August 18, 2017).

Offering advice via Skype to a group of Indonesians scheduled for deportation in New Hampshire, members of the NSC noted that they needed to engage in dissent, which can take many forms.⁴

An organizer noted, “In 2010, one of our cofounders got detained and this was followed by waves of civil disobedience – every week a few people got

arrested and in the end 150 people in total were arrested. Phones kept ringing, the fax machine jamming, they asked us to stop calling at which point we kept calling. They released the [Cofounder of the Coalition] from detention” (fieldwork notes, August 30, 2017).

Sanctuary cities as spaces of politics

Sanctuary policies in the U.K. are complicit in the political ‘invisibility’ of the asylum-seekers and conform more closely to historical conceptualizations of sanctuaries as spaces outside of politics, as Bagelman emphasizes.

“Life inside sanctuary is conceived of as sacred, inviolable and pure not only from violence but also from movement and political agency. This spatial understanding of sanctuary as a place ‘cut off’ cements an image of those seeking sanctuary as similarly cut off. Accordingly, to be ‘inside’ a given sanctuary is also necessarily to be ‘outside’ the public or political realm” (Bagelman 2016, p. 54).

Lippert (2004) argued that there is some politics within traditional sanctuaries, extensive discussions with migrants on political tactics, for example. Nonetheless, sanctuary in the UK fosters a subtler form of politics. Sanctuary movements tend to avoid high visibility campaigns (Squire, 2011).

While the concealment and silencing of voices is present in the U.S., it is not a matter of policy. Disruptive sanctuary practices in the U.S. are more about the exposure of undocumented immigrants and their economic, cultural, and social contribution to the city. In sum, sanctuaries accentuate the

visibility of political subjects and participants in social movements, despite the risks of visibility and possible deportation. This strategy highlights a type of sovereignty from the bottom that gives cities a critical role in democratic accountability.

Sanctuary cities in the US are sites of contestation where protests and political activism advance claims to national belonging (see Bauder, 2016b). Social movements and protests of the Trump regime regularly display banners such as “great grandson of an illegal immigrant” and “we are all Muslim now.” It is important to note that this messaging precedes the Trump administration and goes beyond protest of his regime. For example, protesters in San Francisco in October 2015 carried banners saying, “Defend Immigrants” and “Keep SF a Sanctuary City – ICE Out!” (Preston, 2016).

My fieldwork captured this dynamic, as well. The discontent with the federal administration's restrictive policies energized members of the NSC, more so than the inequalities that surrounded them in New York City. This is in spite of the perception that the local administration actions were incongruent with its sanctuary city proclamations. Activists mobilize this kind of messaging to push for greater responsiveness to the needs of a population at the margins. The literature on sanctuary cities is mute on the subject of limited resources that the cities are facing. Cities not only contend with vulnerable immigrant populations, they also have to address a rise in homelessness. The question is what resources the sanctuary cities marshal given in the face of limited resources and cutbacks in state and federal funding (Schragger, 2016).

Urban resistance is more significant given the lack

of resources for migrant settlement policies and the need for “a politics of distributional fairness” given that migrants experience inequality, poverty, and often lack access to resources (Amin, 2016, p. 793). Yet, it is the visibility of the struggle embedded in sanctuary practices, the activism of non-citizens, that often led to the expansion of critical social programs such as health care, state IDs, and access to education, for example (Nyers 2006; see also, Bau, 1994).

The vocal activism of sanctuary-based movements show signs of rejecting what Bagelman (2016, p. 8) has termed, following Foucault, the “governmentalization of the state.” This reflects the US administration's desire to have a merit-based system of immigration, a “technology that incites those people ‘seeking’ asylum to become good aspirational citizens” (Bagelman, 2016, p. 8). Bagelman (2016, p. 78) argued that this was precisely the case of sanctuaries in the UK.

In contrast, the sanctuary practices of the NSC, for example, do not require immigrants to better themselves and become productive citizens. “We do not distinguish between the good and the bad immigrants. All of our immigrants are ‘criminals,’” explained an organizer. An example of ‘criminality’ is an immigrant leader who was arrested because he was merely riding in a vehicle driven by his cousin who was speeding in Vermont (fieldwork notes, August 10, 2017).

The NSC's call for “open borders” summarizes their inclusive vision of immigration and citizenship (fieldwork notes, June 2, 2018). Consistent with Isin's (2017, p. 195) argument that the sanctuary movement is a platform where solidarity with non-

citizens reshapes conceptions of citizenship and who can perform citizenship, these new acts of urban citizenship go beyond mere symbolic acts of resistance to exclusionary state practices.

As Sassen (2013) has argued, “the challenges of incorporating the ‘outsider’ became the instruments for developing the civic in the best sense of the word. Responding to the claims of the excluded has had the effect of expanding the rights of the included.

Conversely, restricting the rights of immigrants has led to a loss of rights of citizens” (Sassen 2013, 69). Sanctuaries, thus, according to Czajka, “not only usurp state sovereignty, but also challenge the state's definition of who and what counts as political, and who deserves or has the right to have rights” (cited in Isin, 2017, p. 195). They become sites of performative citizenship on the part of the undocumented, the asylum seekers, and the refugees.

As Abou Farman (2017) has warned,

“[t]o call sanctuary symbolic only is to minimize the lives and efforts of precisely those people – documented and undocumented – who have stood up under its banner, and had the courage and political vision to take real risks with on-the-ground activism that has had real effects for communities. [...] Sanctuary is not a symbol, it's a commitment.”

Farman (2017) and Bauder (2016a) both argued that a sanctuary could be identified as a form of local sovereignty and could even be seen as threat to national sovereignty (see also Filipcevic Cordes,

2017).

Sanctuary cities in the US are more than just “‘pockets’ of sovereignty, where citizens assert their visions of justice and contact the state when it drifts too far from social realities” (Lippert and Rehaag, 2013, p. 10). Lippert (2004, p. 547) suggests the term ‘sovereignty from below’ to capture the capacity to create sovereign governmental spaces as means of resistance when the state fails or becomes overly distant. Sanctuary practices represent a response that “rises up from the streets.” Sanctuary cities themselves are suggestive of the strength of Democratic city councils and mayoral power opposing presidential executive orders.

Rather ironically, this kind of sovereignty from below can exist thanks to constitutional protections. Sanctuary city administrations in the US base their policies on the Tenth and the Fourth Amendments, which protect the rights of individuals.⁵ Sanctuary cities are thus examples of how the constitution and limits on federal power can protect vulnerable minorities and non-citizens (Somin, 2016). In effect, they create a space for a return to urban law (Sassen, 2013, p. 69). That is, laws that replace, supplement, or reinterpret the national law. Sovereignty as encapsulated in sanctuary practices and cities fit with the narrative of ‘rebel cities’ that perform civil disobedience (Harvey, 2013). More importantly, they attempt, at least in the US to evoke alternate forms of urban legality.⁶

What is new here is that the current sanctuary movement, which is accompanied by direct legal challenges to the state, is questioning the distinction between rights of the city (legal rights) and rights

to the city (social rights) (cf. Isin, 2008, p. 273). While “politicized groups of non-status migrants are enacting themselves as citizens even when the law does not recognize them as such” (Nyers, 2010, p. 142), they are also seeking to alter the law and to establish a new urban law to recognize and protect them, as the above noted efforts of the NSC suggest.

Conclusions

Discussing the case of Amanda Guerra Morales, a community leader with the New Sanctuary Coalition emphasized that Amanda was a mother who needed food for her children. They continued, “[I hope] that we still have a country here to protect those who are suffering. Even if the doors are locked, there is still a process... We believe that there are legal options. She needs to go into that space and fight.” Amanda thanked her supporters saying, “No lo hago solo para mis hijos pero para toda la comunidad [I don’t do this for my children only but for the entire community]” (fieldwork August 18, 2018).

Bagelman’s (2016) critique neglects to emphasize that many cities lack resources to address adequately problems of work, housing, educational, health, and social services for undocumented people, asylum seekers, and refugees. In fact, many cities play a more active role, as examples from the US show, in refusing to comply with the statist exclusion and do not simply represent “fluid and diffuse assemblage of practices” (Bagelman, 2016, p. 95). Sanctuaries are thus not sites “through which the state is produced” (Bagelman, 2016, p. 96), but sites where the state sovereignty is contested and where exclusionary state practices

are rejected.

In San Francisco, this refers to remaining within law and within the limits of municipal jurisdiction of a governmental sanctuary that protects an inclusive polity. In New York, this is evident in the legal and political strategies of the NSC. According to Isin (2017, p. 196), sanctuaries are an “inversion of borders: these struggles invert inside and outside in ways that make it difficult to maintain the myth of the borders of the state as a homogenous contained space.”

Sanctuary cities challenge the distinction between rights of the city and rights to the city. They represent embodiments of new rights and legal protections for undocumented people, asylum seekers, and refugees in the city. My research echoes Squire and Darling’s (2013, 69) rejection and contestation of the term refugees as invoking victim status or subordination. While the state increasingly constitutes subjecthood as an oppressive category, the sanctuary city is a space for the political struggle for undocumented people, asylum seeker, and refugees.

Endnotes

¹ Solidarity can be understood, following Pierre Rosevale, as “a ‘community of sentiment’ that is based on involvement” (cited in Squire 2011, p. 301). This concept can be expanded to include working class citizens (including indigenous peoples) and non-citizen immigrant solidarities in the urban environment – a strategic site of political struggle (Bauder, 2016b, p. 258 - 263) – and across borders (Isin, 2017). This is similar to the research that links sanctuaries with “a philosophy of solidarity whereby equality becomes shared by various social movements that embrace the existence of a universal community of migrants that precedes those categories that are closely tethered to the nation-state” (Lippert and Rehaag, 2013, p. 7).

² Another lawyer who works for the Coalition emphasized as well that subways should be seen as public spaces, given that turnstile jumping can lead to deportation (fieldwork notes, interview, August 4, 2017).

³ As of latest development, Ragbir was granted a stay of removal (November 1, 2018), but still awaits further legal challenges and faces a possible deportation.

⁴ “Letters, [planning] demonstrations, signing privacy waivers, pressuring deportation officers and their superiors, escalating pressure with each action, forming alliances with Black Lives Matter and DSA, faith and political leaders, a variety of political groups including libertarian, unions, organizing accompaniments, engaging in civil disobedience, finding points to disrupt the detention and deportation process, [and] recording events” (fieldwork notes, August 30, 2017).

⁵ The Tenth Amendment mandates that powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people. The Fourth Amendment protects the individual against search and seizure without a warrant.

⁶ Discussions of sanctuary movement also note that sanctuary practices further “actuate higher forms of law, including international law” (Lipper and Rehaag 2103, 2) or in the case of churches emphasize natural law and the obligation of churches to assist the vulnerable population (Michels and Blaikie 2013, 31). Activists further “invoke[d] the principles of personal accountability developed in the Nuremburg tribunals” while some “referred to it as a new ‘Underground Railroad,’ drawing on religious and moral principles of the 19th-century US abolitionist movement, and building off of the experience of the 1960s with civil disobedience campaigns against racial segregation” (Powell 2017).

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Planning Protest Out: Protest Policing, Urban Design, and CPTED

Hans Sagan

This article discusses the administrative logics of urban spatial control over protest and spatial politics, and their manifestation in professionalized practices of urban design. Starting from the position that urban space is a contested field between various political actors, the article examines the militarization of protest policing as an expression of neoliberal approaches to controlling urban space and public behavior. Professionalized environmental design is the means by which the administrative logics of control and fear of the other are made manifest. Vague use of administrative terms in public discourse such as “crime” and “terrorism” support fearful citizens who desire defensible spaces to keep out over-inflated threats. The spatial values of neoliberalism divide people into a variety of populations to be spatially managed, generally at the cost of their legal rights. Examining critical literature, existing projects, and administrative practices, the article builds the argument that designers are complicit in making concrete the normativity of fear and neoliberal spatial organization through the application of design tactics of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design, and how the use of such practices is changing urban spaces into militarized fortress zones.

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As the wealth gap has increased in the United States and other advanced nations, urban planning has become more complex and difficult. This thorny problem was evident at the recent United Nations Habitat III conference held in Quito in 2017, revealing the extent to which policy makers are giving needed attention to urban-level governance and discourses of stability and security (United Nations, 2016). The language and declarations of the Habitat III meeting contrasted with the concerns of local protesters. More than forty distinct groups of protesters were denied access to the event, which was guarded by militarized police, and fortified with a perimeter fence ironically emblazoned “Cuidades Inclusivas” (“Inclusive Cities”) (Perry & Herd, 2016). How can such a difference between stated aim and action be possible? What is the administrative and spatial logic behind this contradiction between goals and actual conditions?

This contrast belies an administrative logic that prioritizes limiting and controlling access to urban spaces. One of the consequences of the neoliberalization of urban space is that pre-existing urban power relationships have become re-organized. Neoliberalization is broadly about limiting state power while restoring class power through financialization of capital (Harvey, 2005). This means that historically state-guaranteed spatial access rights and privileges are under threat.

Access to urban space is one way to express power. As a result, cities become contested fields between multiple actors and stakeholders; some promote a new configuration of rights and protections, and others resist these developments. This paper explores the emerging administrative logics of protest policing in urban space under neoliberalism

and speculates how these tactics of spatial control emerge in the administration of both existing urban spaces and the design of new places.

Architecture and urban design create urban spaces. It is in these spaces where policies become realities, where they affect people’s lives. Urban design serves as a means of managing populations, which is a facet of what Michel Foucault (1991) calls ‘governmentality.’ The practice of and the way of thinking about governance. Further, protest policing’s spatial tactics and social policy oriented urban design are kinds of social technologies, based on Karl Polanyi’s definition of “...those practices which intensify control over human (social) activity through new regimes of visibility and discipline” (Ong & Collier, 2005, p. 7).

Protests function effectively by re-configuring the everyday uses of urban space and transforming them into extraordinary spaces. These transformations symbolize the political crises leading to the protests, and serve to interrupt business-as-usual, ideally disrupting the very political and economic processes that initiated and sustain the ongoing political crisis (Lofland, 1985). This means that protests serve as crises of spatial administration, challenging the original intention of the designers. While police are the first line of defense against protests, architects and urban designers are the rear guard.

Models of protest policing

Sociologists John Noakes and Patrick F. Gillham trace the development of protest policing tactics from the 20th to 21st centuries. The authors note that protests and protest policing are part of historic

cycles of innovation and escalation. Significantly, each shift in protest policing has been a response to both crises in policing to larger economic shifts. Broadly, policing practices are often about control over urban spaces. Protest policing is intensification of the “good guy vs. bad guy” machismo, drama, and territoriality of policing (Herbert, 1997).

The earliest model of protest policing, called the Escalated Force model, is from the period preceding the 1970s. In this model, protections of civil rights are absent, there is no tolerance of public disruption, and both violence and arrests are frequent. The spectacular televised and public failure of the model during the Democratic National Convention protests in Chicago in 1968 cast it in crisis. This also roughly correlates to an economic shift in the United States away from manufacturing and toward greater financialization, particularly under Nixonian economic reforms.

The next model of protest policing emerged from the police riots in Chicago. During these riots, the police showed concern for the well-being of the protesters, even to the detriment of public order. Under the Negotiated Management model, from the 1970s through the 1990s, protester rights were valued; community disruption allowed, and police often negotiated with protest leaders. Both violence and arrests were last resorts.

During this same period, a protest at the Republican National Convention in Dallas in 1984 devolved into chaos and violence. Protesters took a chaotic path through the downtown, vandalized public art with paint, marched through bank lobbies, and even blockaded the delegate entrance to the convention.

One protester eventually burned an American flag in a symbolic display, the legality of which eventually made it to the Supreme Court. The Negotiated Management mode dominated protest policing until the 1999 anti-World Trade Organization protests in Seattle. During this protest, the numerous protesters used decentralized communication structures, and overwhelmed police response.

The Strategic Nullification model of protest policing, also known as the “Miami Model” of protest policing, emerged from this crisis. Police forces first implemented this model during the anti-Free Trade protests in Miami in November 2003. In this model, police actions are pre-emptive, not reactive. Police rely on intimidation, selective force, and the rule of law to limit protests. In other words, police ensure that protests have as little impact on daily urban life as possible (Noakes & Gillham, 2006). Police use many tactics of special control and area denial to achieve this end, including the threat of superior militarized force, restricting protest permits, and spatial containment. Through these tactics, protests themselves become spatially restricted to the point of irrelevance, if not criminalized outright. The model spread from there and is now the dominant model in most developed states.

Protest policing and urban design share operational and conceptual characteristics; they are both concerned with public order, engage with urban space in a territorial fashion, and are based in predictive logic about human behavior in urban space.

This has significant implications for the future of environmental design, as a professional practice, for

urban design, and for the administrative systems, which oversee the use of said space. The rights of public space and the proper social roles of the users of urban space come under scrutiny when governments suspend laws in times of crisis and anxiety, as during protests, or reconfigure spatial laws and practices, as in urban design.

Protest policing within neoliberal logic
In *Private Lives, Public Spaces: Democracy Beyond 9/11*, Henry Giroux and Douglas Kellner (2003) examine the belief that neoliberal economic freedom is the best form of democracy. One consequence labels and potentially constricts behavior. In this economic system, any behavior which does not fit into roles determined by neoliberalism is deemed either unwanted or a threat to that system.

The authors emphasize the criminalization of youth and the commercialization of public space. According to them, we are undergoing a “collapse of public discourse, the increasing militarization of public space, and the rise of a state apparatus bent on substituting policing functions for social services” (Giroux & Kellner, 2003, p. 31). They state that to criminalize the behaviors of one group of people or another is a step towards totalitarianism. Giroux sees the need to maintain discourse on social responsibility: “The first casualty is a language of social responsibility capable of defending those vital public spheres that provide education, health care, housing, and other services crucial to a healthy democracy” (Giroux & Kellner, 2003, p. 82).

Similar to the outlook of the Strategic Incapacitation model of protest policing, they describe the retreat of the liberal state and the rise of neoliberalism as

domestic warfare. This shift creates discourses of governance where whole populations are cast into the role of transgressors or enemies. They note that “[a]s the War on Poverty ran out of steam with the social and economic crises that emerged in the 1970s, it has been replaced with an emphasis on domestic warfare, and that the policies of social investment, at all levels of government, have given way to an emphasis on repression, surveillance and control” (Giroux & Kellner, 2003, p. 39).

Giroux makes the claim that due to the social and economic shift following the 1970s, criminalization became standard operating procedure of social policy. Concomitant with this increasing criminalization has come domestic militarization. He describes the passage of the 1994 United States Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act as the beginning of a sweep of ‘no- tolerance’ law enforcement practices. Under these practices, most of the funding allocated by the act was for prison construction and operation.

This advancing criminalization of populations and intensification of militarism is a tactic of neoliberal governmentality. Part of the neoliberal strategy is to reduce government spending for all social policies and vastly increase it for both military expenditures and criminal justice (Williams, 2004). Often the materiel and equipment from the military ends up in police hands, and police forces function more and more along military lines, shifting their mission perception from enforcement and protection to invasion and occupation. Angela Davis notes that the increase of for-profit prisons under neoliberalism has produced harsh policing policies which increase arrests and incarceration, for even minor crimes, in

order to keep prison populations (and profits) high. Giroux’s discussion further analyzes this shift in governmentality and equates crowd control to population management. Partha Chatterjee (2004) addresses this in *Politics of the Governed*. Chatterjee discusses how society treats those deprived of rights as populations vs. citizens. I would invert this for protest policing and urban design: those we treat as populations rather than citizens lack rights. Under the current Strategic Nullification model of protest policing, police treat individual protesters as one mass; police grant only minimal and conditional rights to those obstructing space. They are subject to abrogation or revocation, depending on the mood of the arresting officer.

The concept of ‘population management’ is an extension of Michel Foucault’s conception of governmentality. Concomitant with the development of neoliberalism, and its re-figuration of governmental, social, and economic relationships, there has been an attendant shift in spatial management, corresponding to a shift from participatory citizenship to management of populations (Berlant, 1997; Foucault, 1991). The use of the term ‘population’ in this sense comes from Foucault (2007). Essentially, there is a spatial and behavioral component to how citizens are treated. This has meant that not only have citizens’ rights and protections changed, so too has how policy constituted these groups.

In governmentality, the management of in-group/out-group status is a core concept around which national identity is constructed. Further, fear of the ‘other’ is fundamental to this identity. The ‘other’ acts in ways that are not part of the system. The perception of the

‘other’ as undisciplined and unruly creates the need for management and punishment. This management takes place through both administrative processes and through spatial management. “Good” citizens stay off the streets and shop; “bad” citizens take to the streets and protest. This is the prioritization of neoliberal values in an urban setting. Only neoliberal constructions of normal behavior are valid. It is a transliteration of economic values into the social realm, coding normalcy into how things should be. This coding of behavior as desirable or undesirable, as normal or criminal, is a core component of emergent urban spatial regimes.

Dissent as terrorism

Zbigniew Brzezinski’s discussion of the origins of the word “terror” in policy explores this shift in linguistic normativity. He criticizes use of the term as excessively vague, a kind of “floating signifier” for all manner of fears. Terrorism, in fact, is a technique of asymmetrical warfare: killing unarmed non-combatants for purposes of political intimidation. This technique of inspiring fear leads to pervasive fear, which only the production of secure environments can allay.

This ubiquitous security contributes to a siege mentality. When presented with any transgressors of the neoliberal spatial order, the specters of lurking terrorist danger latch onto them, and repression of protests ensues. John Collins and Ross Glover (2002) outline this linguistic shift as the concept of “collateral language.” Discourses of political meaning subsume and transform previous words, giving them new meanings in new contexts.

The term 'terrorism' has acquired new meanings under the post-9/11 regime. Edward Said stated in response to the 1986 American bombings of Libya that we must examine and question the notion of terrorism because of its vagueness (Said, 1988). At the time, the term denoted any military actions political enemies of a state or regime took. "Terrorism" is the result of specific actions taken by specific people to define certain examples of political violence, typically violence committed by those who are opposed to U.S. policies in the world (Collins & Glover, 2002). The practice of labeling something as "terrorism" makes one's own positions legitimate by contrast.

This becomes even more relevant when examining the intertwined relationship between the urban design profession and anti-terrorist policy, contributing to an institutional web of terrorism experts who sustain narrow views on terrorism while shifting from policy institution to government agencies and back again (Collins & Glover, 2002). This earlier foundation morphed into the current uses of the term 'terrorism.' The perceived enemy of the "West" shifted from Marxism to Islam. As before, though, terrorism terms any activity that works against the official sociopolitical order. The vague, tautological, and self-constructing definitions of terrorism are necessary for U.S. policy: having an explicit definition would lead to a closer examination of the actions of the United States as terrorism.

The shifting use of the term 'terrorism' poses challenges to both policing and perceptions of spatial order. As neoliberalization shifts the emphasis in policing to military practice, police adopt this logic to legal political speech and protest, if the protest is

against current government policies or actions. Both the United States Department of Defense (military) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (police) have equated protest with low-level terrorism (Osborne, 2009; ACLU, 2009). The FBI-coordinated suppression of the "Occupy Wall Street" protests in New York City in 2011 provide an apt illustration of this logic. A Joint Terrorism Task Force worked with banks and the FBI, alongside local police, to monitor and work to nullify the Occupy protests (Smith, 2012).

Spatial security through environmental design
Many cities throughout the US host major public events such as marathons, festivals & concerts. Municipal governments are aware of the constant threat of terrorism during these events, heightening the need for spatial security. The role of Environmental Design in providing spatial security is well-documented (Newman, 1972; Schneider & Kitchen 2002, among many others). Governments bring in policymakers, architects, and urban planners to mitigate these issues through either the development of policies or the creation of spaces. The means by which cities, and the elites that design and pay for them, protect themselves is through the language of security applied to urban design and architecture. They express it through the practice of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED).

While CPTED took its early influences from humanists Oscar Newman and Robert Sommer, their influence did not translate to the application of behavior modification through design. The data gathering techniques for both periods of CPTED's lifespan have remained the same. The physical

designs have remained constant, but the ideology behind the implementation of these methods has changed drastically.

The field started its development from suggested designs for making modern and Modernist structures more appealing for human use, through improving user surveillance and allowing for more personalization. However, this user-centered approach gave way over time to an owner- or management-centered approach, focusing on internal and external building "security" and prevention of crime rather than improving quality of life for users.

This emphasis on physical security and urban spaces might result in the increase in attention to various environmental design means to increase security. With the increasing focus on architecture and design as a taste-expressing process, and a diminishment of architecture as analyzing and designing systems, it seems increasingly likely that designers will prioritize aesthetics and pay over participatory politics. Already these fears of terrorism, distaste for the downtrodden, and privileging of the already-privileged result in a kind of neo-medieval design aesthetic, a return of moats and baileys, an emphasis in urban design on walls and zones. Target hardening is part of the sales pitch for any design project. However, invoking terrorism to justify urban security or CPTED redesigns threatens to subsume all other social discourses in to the rhetoric of 'security'.

Further, if urban designs do not include enough considerations for security, those who decide where capital goes might decide that environments or regulatory climates are too costly. Fernandez (2008)

examines how Seattle's status as a nexus of protest groups with a long history of civil disobedience made it a poor choice for the 1999 WTO. Subsequent WTO meetings took place in remote locations, which only the very wealthy could access. Two years after Seattle, the WTO met in Qatar, a Persian Gulf Arab state monarchy known for strict immigration laws: protesters could not afford access, nor would the state have granted it for protesting. In 2003, the WTO met in Cancun, Mexico, with the conference on a small island, with rigorous security checkpoints at every entrance.

Other high-level financial meetings, such as the G8, removed their meetings from urban spaces to remote resorts like Davos in Switzerland, thus separating protesters from their networks of support, and making access unfeasible (Fernandez, 2008, p. 92-95). As long as capital is mobile, and as long as those who hold it fear for their security, it will remove itself to places where it can advance unimpeded.

However, it is more difficult to abandon vast amounts of capital locked within cities and urban spaces. An occasional ministerial meeting is one thing. The more permanent structures, like corporate headquarters, regulatory centers, administrative centers, and banks, that serve the daily operation of elites, however, are fixed in space. Despite the promises of communication technology, physical places need to exist to hold bureaucratic processes. This fixity has pushed capitalist classes to seek new strategies to insulate themselves from the masses. They created new exclusive and secure urban enclaves that eventually amalgamated into urban fortresses.

This kind of thinking is already in evidence. Military spatial logic in cities includes zones as means to control the movement of people and material. Mike Davis (1998) writes about the administrative partitioning of Los Angeles into a variety of “zones of exclusion.” Places in which those who can afford control over spatial designs deliberately exclude people whose presence and/or behavior they find objectionable. In the second Gulf War, the United States established a massive military, administrative, and diplomatic enclave called the “Green Zone” in the heart of Baghdad. This miniature city had all the comforts of American cities behind tall concrete walls and numerous checkpoints. This bastion of American privilege in the center of a war zone eventually became untenable as the second Gulf War wound down.

The fortress mentality also applies to architecture. The techniques of defensible space can just as easily defend the wealthy and privileged. Again, Davis (1992) writes about mean-spirited deterrents to street life in Los Angeles, from benches impossible to lay upon, to sprinklers on timers to discourage rough sleeping, to baroque enclosures of trash receptacles to deter scavenging. It is a thorough rejection of William Whyte’s recommendations for engaging and comfortable urban social spaces.

Urban planning researchers Richard Schneider and Ted Kitchen (2002) trace the history of place-based crime prevention in their book *Planning for Crime Prevention: A Trans-Atlantic Perspective*. They describe the three-primary means of spatial control: impeding access, facilitating surveillance, and territorial control. Their work includes an exploration of historical models of place-based crime prevention

strategies: including caves, castles, citadels, walls and trenches. They are design solutions for the same problems. The authors provide ample illustrations. In the Paleolithic, cave dwellers sought the security of defensive structures at cave mouths and high ground. Neolithic defenses around the first cities, Jericho circa 7000 BCE for instance, included walls and towers. Similar defense continued in the form of palisade walls in Jamestown, Virginia. English curtain walls, as well as motte (an early construction of the more modern term “moat”) and bailey construction served as precursor to castle designs. Renaissance cities had elaborate earthworks designed to repel invading armies and dominate the landscape (Schneider & Kitchen, 2002).

For millennia, cities served as engines of war, designed to repel, or confound invading armies and serve as strategic defense sites. Double and triple curtain walls provide access control and surveillance functions. The authors conclude that walls are an adaptive strategy against predation. However, as simple solutions to complex problems, their strategy of separation and denial typically fails. Rather, “...the answers to defensibility are likely to lie in much more complex interplay among social, physical, political, and economic forces that we are only starting to recognize and understand in our modern cities and towns” (Schneider & Kitchen, 2002, 88).

Historian Christopher Duffy (1975) makes a similar argument against the citadel as a defensive form. He asserts that citadels were “the only kind of fortification which could be turned equally against foreign enemies and fellow citizens.” (Duffy, 1975, p. 22). He further notes the problems of citadel-style defensive logic in a free and democratic society.



Figure 1: The new United States embassy in London. Image: Kieran Timberlake Architects.

From French populist Carnot, he quoted “a citadel is a monstrosity in a free country, a refuge of tyranny which should be the target of indignation of every free people and every good citizen” (as quoted in Schneider & Kitchen, 2002, p. 88).

The fortress design of the global neo-medieval has no better exemplar than the designs for the new United States embassy complex in London (Khanna, 2009; Sterling, 2008). Currently under construction, architecture firm Kieran Timberlake designed a 21st century castle. A moat surrounds the building. Earthwork beams and concrete bollards block the

long entranceways circling the building. The walls are reinforced concrete and the windows have steel shades from which residents can peer suspiciously at visitors. The design of this building broadcasts security and insecurity in every design detail. It is a chilling thought if this building should win design awards and become the vanguard of a new urban typology of exclusion.

The desire to protect and secure space is apparent in a myriad of spatial and design elements. Flusty (2007) in "Building Paranoia", an article within a larger volume called *Architecture of Fear* (Ellin & Blakely, 1997), discusses the transformation of his family home from a place of comfort and sociability with the neighbors to a place existing behind multiple levels of checkpoints and security. He describes this as "crusty space", "a space that cannot be accessed due to obstructions such as walls, gates and checkpoints" (Flusty, 1997, p. 49). He expands on the example of gated communities, which restrict access to residences and amenities through spatial tactics and administrative procedures. These procedures include access only by appointment, ID checkpoints, memberships, and so on. Private firms the developers contracted provide services the state typically covers, such as cleaning, maintenance, trash removal, and security. This produces a sense of community based on exclusion and isolation, and aids in the development of a siege mentality.

Identifying these populations provides targets for said specific inclusion. Technologies of subjectivity—the bodies of knowledge and expert systems—to induce optimal self-government of citizens—accomplish the criteria of inclusion, for example, health regimes, education, or entrepreneurship.

The technologies fall under "political strategies that regulate populations for optimal productivity, increasingly through spatial practices" (Ong, 2006, p. 6). The application of these technologies materialize in the form of militarization of urban space, control of travel, zoning, and development.

Ong (2006) describes the disarticulation of traditional elements of citizenship, such as rights, entitlements, privileges, territory. She develops these ideas further, explaining how market forces re-articulate these elements such that a neoliberal matrix is redefining citizenship. She draws from Agamben to elucidate the "distinction between citizens, who have juridical rights, and excluded groups, who exist outside legal protections. The exception thus allows the institutionalization of innovative spatial administration" (Ong, 2006, p. 19). According to Agamben (1998, p. 170-171), outside of citizenship, non-citizens live within "...a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of subjective right and juridical protection no longer [make] any sense..." Thus, the reordering of citizenship comes with a reordering of urban space. Physical manifestations of this reordering, such as target hardening, traffic bollards, electronic surveillance, and security checkpoints, are in place in urban spaces where the neoliberal process has further advanced. Teresa Caldeira (2001, p. 256) describes these as "fortified enclaves", hardened and defended sites which are socially and spatially segregated, keeping the poor excluded. While these are extreme examples of urban form used to enforce politics, the techniques of isolation and militarization are the same. These enclaves represent a radical form of urban space that eclipse an urban modernity based

on public space. The logics and tactics behind their creation spatially reinforce class boundaries and class homogeneity as superior to public heterogeneity. Therefore, the tendency toward design for security is profoundly anti-democratic.

Conclusion

What possibilities exist for urban design and public space? As Max Page (2008, p. 86) puts it "Shouldn't urban designers be able to create better spaces for the exercise of democratic protest? [...] Protesters chose their sites, their routes, their rituals and their songs to highlight the distance between a regime's symbols and the needs and desires of the people. A protest can only succeed [...] if it defies the regime by occupying space usually denied it, or occupies it in a way that transforms the place's meaning.

The energy of the protest comes from the tension between the symbols of the regime (including its spaces) and the aims of the protest. Does then this mean that public spaces and political protest must be at odds? "The element that remains constant over virtually all of these protests are this: the feeling of being surrounded by hundreds of thousands of other people who share beliefs. A massive rally is supremely uplifting for the protesters and the movement they represent, reminding them of a simple point: you are not alone" (Page, 2008, p. 87). Perhaps, then urban designers can continue to advocate for open places and public spaces, designing in the spatial elements of democracy and public dissent.

If designers fail, what can be done? If their need to express their aesthetics (and to be paid while

doing so) overrides their social responsibility, what then are the consequences for urban spaces? Can protesters and spatial transgressors devise new spatial strategies for dissent? The creativity displayed in subaltern approaches to both the physical and symbolic qualities of renegade spatial interventions are encouraging. It is a staunchly humanist position to suggest that human creativity and the drive to express freedoms through spatial interventions can transform spatial design practice.

Further, by their natures, cities are networks of interlocking systems. While the logic of bunkers and fortresses might transform cities to make dissent less noticeable for elites, if people have access to information and can organize themselves, then they will use urban space as a medium of civil disobedience.

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